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PROCEEDINGS :
Ninth Indian Philosophical Congress

Poona 1933-34.

PART I

Editor :
H. D. Bhattacharyya



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Contents.

	PAGE
Foreword : S. Radhakrishnan. ...	
OPENING ADDRESS BY H. H. THE RAJASAHIB OF SANGLI—i	
1.—Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative forms : (Presidential Address) : By K. C. Bhattacharyya. ...	1
2.—In defence of substance : Dr. Rashvihari Das. ...	28
3.—The Realm of Values : A. F. Markham. ...	40
4.—Mystical experiences : C. A. Tulpule. ...	55
5.—Perception and its object : T. R. V. Murti. ...	67
6.—Substance and Attribute in Saiva Siddhanta : S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri ...	78
7.—The standpoint of Epistemology : Kali Prasad. ...	87
8.—Explanation of Objectivity as Falsity : B. S. Naik. ...	93
9.—The Philosophy of Hans Driesch : D. G. Londhe ...	101
10.—Causality in Modern Science and Indian Philosophy : M. V. V. K. Rangachari. ...	110
11.—The Siddhantin's Criticism of Mayavada : Miss V. Paranjoti. ...	122
12.—The Problem of Time in Indian Thought : U. C. Bhattacharjee. ...	140
13.—Some Problems in connexion with the Nyaya Theory of Perception : Jaidava Singh. ...	150
14.—The First Principles of a Rational Religion : K. R. Srinivasiengar. ...	161
15.—The Madhyamika Theory of Dialectic : Rama Kanta Tripathi. ...	169
16.—The Problem of Moral Autonomy : Dhirendra Lal De. ...	179
17.—Comparison as a source of Valid Knowledge : N. C. Kelkar ...	190
18.—Shri Vallabhacarya : J. G. Shah. ...	191
19.—The Method of Indian Philosophy : P. R. Damle ...	192

(Continued in the next page.)

FOREWORD

I am glad to know that the Proceedings of the Poona Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held last April are ready for publication. It is unfortunate, however, that addresses by two Sectional Presidents were not received in time for publication. I hope that such a thing will not be repeated in years to come.

I may take this opportunity of expressing the thanks of the Congress to the members of the Reception Committee at Poona, who not only made excellent arrangements for our stay there but have also made a small contribution towards the expenses of the publication.

Mr. Haridas Bhattacharyya, the General Secretary who is in charge of the Publication of the Proceedings, deserves our thanks for his energy and expedition.

Waltair
7/12/34

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

OPENING ADDRESS

By

H. H. THE RAJASAHIB OF SANGLI

at the ninth session of the

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS.

1934.

GENTLEMEN,

I thank you for the honour you have done me in inviting me to open this Congress. It is regrettable that an epidemic of plague made it impossible for the Congress to meet in January last, when Poona would have given you not quite so hot a reception as it is now doing. But I hope that in spite of this you will all enjoy your stay in this historic city, and that the interest of your meetings will enable you to forget the heat.

I have been looking through the opening addresses delivered at a number of previous Philosophical Congresses, and I find that my predecessors have, one and all, without exception, begun in more or less the same way—and that is, by the apology of a layman in Philosophy for venturing to address a gathering of experts. I would like to vary the formula if I could ; but frankly, I find it impossible. Standing here before you at this moment, I am acutely conscious of three facts. The first is that I, like my predecessors, *am* a layman. The second is that you are all serious students, and most of you professional teachers, of Philosophy. And the third is that you expect me to say something which has a definite bearing on the subject in whose study you are all united. I

shall try to do this, Gentlemen, as best as I can—if you, on your side, will extend to me the indulgence which is made necessary by the first two facts.

If the essence of all philosophy be the endeavour to systematise experience and to render life intelligible, then I would claim that it is difficult, even for a layman, to live in these present times and not to feel, stirring within him, the impulse towards philosophising. For so much is going on, all around him, which seems to defy systematisation, and which at first sight appears beyond the grasp of understanding. There are times, in the world's history, when invisible forces seem to have seized Man by the hair of his head and to be dragging him irresistibly along a path that is not of his own choosing, and the end of which he cannot see. Such a time, assuredly Gentlemen, is that in which we are now living. Forces are at work in the world to-day, with which statesmen strive in vain to cope and against which economists are powerless. Who would have thought, on Armistice Day, 1918, that within a brief sixteen years the world would be filled once more with fears and rumours of wars? Who, in the year 1922 or 1923 could have foreseen the disastrous financial crisis which, a year or two ago, struck down the richest nation in the world, and from the repercussions of which all other nations have since been suffering? What expectation was there, at the close of the Great War, that mankind would be entering, not on a period of peace and settlement, but on a time in which every human problem would rapidly become more acute and exhibit itself on an ever vaster scale? And yet all this has happened; and the man must be singularly dull of apprehension who does not occasionally ask himself: Why? What, he wonders, is wrong with the World? What is the virus that has entered into the veins of humanity and which no skill of physician seems able to expel?

I can conceive many answers to these questions ; but one thing seems to me to be certain—and that is that restlessness and an upheaval on this gigantic scale must be one that goes down to the very roots of human life. The real issues, whatever they be, must be fundamental. All this trouble, all these apparently insoluble problems, all this bankruptcy of human remedial endeavour, can, I feel, denote but one thing—and that is some basic misunderstanding of life and its aims, penetrating into and so corrupting the whole of our modern civilisation. It is a matter, as a philosopher might put it, of “wrong values.” And Nature, or the Time Spirit, or whatever we may choose to call the Directive Influence behind human affairs, is engaged in heading mankind back on to the right track by her familiar method of stultification. Whenever, in the world’s history, we see civilisation on the verge of self-strangulation, we may be sure that it has gone wrong in just one of the ways which are the special subject matter of Philosophy. The economist who would deal with the situation in terms of his special science, the politician who would deal with it politically, do not go deep enough. Only one thing can put matters right, and that is a fundamental change of outlook, a getting back to some philosophy of Man and the World, which shall be truer to the metaphysical facts of life.

The endeavour to find a formula for the present malady and its cure might, as I have already said, take many forms—is, indeed, taking many forms in the various social, economic and political theories with which the world is clamorous to-day. For my own part, I would venture, with great diffidence, to suggest a formula which is not social or economic or political, but which strikes, in a way deeper than any of these, and which seems to me to be as nearly ultimate as any formula of this kind can be. And I am led to mention it, partly, because it is linked up with our traditional Hindu thought, and

suggests one way, at least, in which the wisdom of the East may perhaps, one day, contribute to the solution of the problems of the world as a whole.

The formula of which I am thinking, may be expressed in the antithesis of two terms—Expansion and Perfection. Both terms need a little explanation, in order to make clear what I mean. By Expansion I mean the constant urge to be more, to do more and to have more than belongs to the present. The key-note of Expansion is restlessness; its spirit is competitive; it repudiates what is in order to be ever reaching out after something still to be attained. By Perfection, on the other hand, I mean that quality of fully realised uniqueness which is most easily recognisable in the works of Nature. In Nature every object achieves its proper perfection simply in being—what it is—in fulfilling, as one might say, the immanent *idæa* of its being; and between any two such realised perfections there can be no scale of grade or comparison, each being complete and absolute in itself. Thus there is one beauty of the rose, and another of the jasmine; and no one would ever suggest that the jasmine could improve itself by ceasing to be a jasmine and becoming a rose. Each is perfect in simply being what it is. So too, there is one perfection of the diamond, and another of the pearl. To bring out the point still more strongly, one can say that there is one perfection of the diamond, and another of the humble stone which one picks up on the road. Each is what Nature intended it to be and, in so being, achieves its specific perfection—and human and relative valuations have no right to intrude here. The common flint is, from Nature's point of view, a thing just as perfect in its own way as the rarest of gems.

Applying this formula, then, to human life, is it not possible to speculate that the ideal of Perfection may perhaps after all be a truer ideal because more in consonance with

Nature—than that of Expansion? May it not be that the true secret of human life is that it is the business of every human being to seek to develop his own specific and individual perfection, in terms of where and what he is, rather than to be ever striving to expand into something greater? And may not the same idea be suggested with regard to the collective life of communities and nations? That every nation, or community within a nation, should seek to cultivate its own garden and not to vie with other nations or communities in the quest of power and wealth, is surely an ideal which has much, philosophically, to commend it. And it is no over-bold speculation to suggest, therefore, that what is wrong with the world to-day may be precisely, the fact that individuals, communities and nations have for too long been following the path of Expansion, and that the only way to world-peace and world-order is to be found in substituting the other term of the antithesis. And here I would have you note how much of the progressive idealism of to day is implicitly on the side of what I have termed Perfection. The late President Wilson, for example, was probably not a philosopher. Yet was not his ideal of the self-determination of peoples but the demand that every nation should be free to develop its own genius and to perfect its own special contribution to the many-sided life of its times? And what is the ideal of Federation but the same ideal of separate and individualised units, each free to perfect its own uniqueness, yet joining voluntarily together for mutual help and protection? So too, with the growing movement towards the Brotherhood of Religions. This does not mean that Religions should amalgamate, or should give up that which is essential to their integrity. It means simply that each should be fully and authentically itself and should, at the same time, concede this right to others. Further too, I think it means that each will inevitably draw nearer to the

other by being, in the highest and purest sense, itself. In these and other ways, Gentlemen, the ideal of Perfection is silently entering into the better thought of our times ; and it may well be that, in this tacit unanimity, it is possible to detect, even now, the first faint foreshadowings of the civilisation of the future. And it may also be—a thing which I myself, for one, believe—that all this deadlock of our age, all this fierce beating against impassable barriers, all this complication and intensification of problems is only Nature's way of hastening things on, of compelling mankind, in sheer despair, to give up its philosophy of competitive Expansion and to turn to the other philosophy of Perfection.

And even if ever this fundamental change comes about, what shall we see ? I said just now that what I had to say linked itself on to our traditional Indian thought. And this is so. For, this principle of Perfection, of which I have been speaking, is nothing else than our ancient Hindu ideal of *Dharma*. That each person has his appointed place in the scheme of things, determined by infallible law, and that this is equally true of each collective unit, the family, the community, the nation, is one of the central doctrines of our Faith. And all our teachings go to emphasise the correlative truth that it is the duty of each such individual or collective body to perfect his, or its, special perfection within the limits imposed by the *Dharma*. Extend this principle to the collective life of the world, and we see in it at once the formula for a truly organised world-polity. For, it is clearly the direct negation of that philosophy of Expansion, of continual revolt against their appointed *Dharma* on the part of both individuals and collective units, which is producing, and has long been producing, the chaos into which world-affairs have now fallen. If I had to venture a prophecy, Gentlemen, I should predict that the next great formulation of spiritual truth, which is to be given to the world, will be

one in which this principle of the perfecting of the individual and corporate *Dharma*, within willingly accepted limits, will be a cardinal doctrine. And I foresee a time when both individuals and nations will reorganise their lives along those lines. None of us here, I am afraid, will live to see it, but I feel sure that it must come. For, the present deadlock cannot go on for ever ; it must end somehow or other. And if it end in the breakdown of our present civilisation, under the weight of problems which it is strengthless so solve, then, as has happened so many times in the world's history, another civilisation will arise, which will develop, in practice, the ideals which its predecessor was unable to apply.

And when once the ideal of Perfection has been established, as the guiding principle of human life, we shall see what poets and idealists have so often dreamt of, namely a Return to Nature. For the principle in question, as I have already said, is universal in the Natural Order. To each thing its specific and individual perfection, which is achieved by its simply being what Nature intended it to be—such is Nature's law ; and between such realised perfections she recognises no higher or lower, no degrees of comparison or of estimation ; for each is complete in itself. When each man can come to recognise this—to accept himself and his lot for what they are, and to endeavour to perfect himself in terms of those ; when each natural collective unit can do the same—then we shall get that organic correlation of Difference within Unity, which is the secret of Nature's life. Then and then only, moreover, shall we get that truly national life, which seeks not to expand beyond its dharmic limits, but which is content to cultivate to the highest degree the possibilities of its own specific genius.

These, Gentlemen, are some of the loose and ill-arranged ideas, which have occasionally come into my mind in watching the troubled spectacle of our times. That I have ventured

to obtrude them upon you, on an occasion like this, is I fear a sin of over-boldness. But I am hoping that in your reception of them, you will show me the same kindness that you have shown in according me the high and undeserved honour of opening this Congress.

It now remains for me to offer my sincere wishes for the success of this Conference. And may I also add, Gentlemen, the hope that out of its deliberations there might evolve ideas having not merely theoretical value, but such as might be capable of embodying suggestions applicable in a practical manner, to the solution of some at least of the most pressing problems which confront us to-day, no less than the world at large.

Concept of the Absolute and Its Alternative Forms.

BY

K. C. BHATTACHARYYA

(Presidential Address delivered at the Ninth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Poona in March 1934.)

Philosophy starts in reflective consciousness. Reflection is the awareness of a content *as to* a mode of consciousness. The phrase *as to* means some relation and it is in reference to this relation that the concept of the absolute has to be understood. What is this relation ?

We ordinarily understand a relation as between the contents of consciousness and we have here apparently to conceive some such relation as subsisting between content and consciousness. Of the two relations—between content and content, and between content and consciousness—the latter has to be understood in terms of the former. Not that we know relation in objective consciousness before we come to be reflectively conscious of a relation between content and consciousness. To be aware of a relation *as such* between two terms, of their relation as distinct from their whole having the form of being, is to be aware at the same time of the possibility of the terms being not related in that relation. Now unlike a term known to be existent, a relation known to subsist between two terms cannot be *imagined* to be absent. The possible absence of a known relation in fact can never be apprehended in merely objective consciousness. Hence we can know a relation *as such* of two contents only in

reflection which is specifically the consciousness of a relation between content and consciousness. Yet although there can be no consciousness of a relation prior to reflection, the relation of contents may be said to be prior to the relation of content and consciousness in the sense that the former is intelligible by itself while the latter is intelligible only in terms of the former.

There are those who hold that because we are only reflectively conscious of relation, the relation between content and consciousness should be read into the relation of content and content and not *vice versa*. The relation of content and consciousness is to them a transparent identity-in-difference and all relation of contents is to be understood as the same relation in an implicit form. The difficulty is that the relation of content and consciousness is not explicitly or self-evidently appreciated as an identity-in-difference by reflection itself, being in fact claimed to be so appreciated only in a higher consciousness called absolute or speculative consciousness. The possibility however of this supra-reflective consciousness may be disputed and it is necessary in the first instance to show if and how reflection itself points to it.

Prima facie to reflection, the relation of content and consciousness appears as an implicative distinction. We are reflectively aware of the content as distinct from and in necessary reference to consciousness and the reference is not merely verbal but is implicitly an assertion. In the case of an asserted implication between two terms, the fact asserted is a relation (or unity), the terms of which are not the terms asserted to be in implication. If A is asserted to imply B, a factual relation is meant but A is not understood as a term of the relation. A here stands for a fact which need not have the relation but is thought as having it, the fact being not altered by being so thought. This fact should be capable of being expressed by a term that does not refer to the relation

and the relation should be taken as between this term and the implied term 'B. For every implying term, it is necessary to find such a non-implying term, if possible ; and until and unless it is found, the implication has to be taken as an *indefinite* formulation of a factual relation (or unity). To reflective consciousness there is implication between the content and the consciousness of it and the implication points to a factual relation (or unity) of which one of them at least is not really a term. One of them at least stands for an unnamed something which need not be related to the other. Some factual relation then appears to be only *indefinitely* formulated as the implication of content and consciousness in the reflective stage.

Now if it can be shown within reflection that this indefinite relation cannot be denied to be a distinction and cannot be denied also to be an identity, a stage of consciousness in which distinction and identity of the same terms are positively known together may be taken to be demanded by reflection which cannot understand them together. That the content is somehow distinct from consciousness is obvious to reflection but identity is not so obvious. What immediately appears is an indefinite distinction between content and consciousness : the terms are undoubtedly distinct but they are not wholly distinguishable. Have we the right to interpret this vague indistinguishability as an identity ?

The indefinite relation of content and consciousness appears to reflection at once as distinction and as not distinction but this non-distinction cannot be positively asserted as an identity. Things may come to be distinguished that were undistinguished but what are once distinguished cannot be later taken to be non-distinct without at least one of the terms being taken to be illusory. Hence to distinguish terms imperfectly is to be able to assert their distinction but neither to assert nor to deny their identity.

But it may be contended that distinction and identity stand on the same footing in respect of undeniability : like distinction, identity also once apprehended cannot be denied. That we distinguish what were undistinguished does not mean that we knew their *relation* of identity which is now denied. We reply that it is possible to deny the relation of identity even when it is explicitly apprehended. There is something peculiar about the relation of identity, as expressed in the dilemma : if its terms are not distinct, they are not related at all and if they are distinct, they are not identical. We cannot get rid of the dilemma and admit identity as a relation unless we hold that while the distinction of its terms is cognitively undenied, it is positively entertained only in non-cognitive consciousness. The fact A in the context M is said to be identical with A in the context N when A has the differential characters x and y in the contexts, which are presented and yet as neither factual nor non-factual. If the characters be facts, A cannot be identical in the two contexts and if they be no facts at all, there is no distinction of terms and therefore no relation. They have accordingly to be taken as not cognised characters but aesthetically apprehended expressions which do not preclude the cognised identity of A and yet are themselves cognitively undenied. To assert a relation is not to *assert* a distinction between its terms but only not to deny it. We may be affectively or conatively aware of a distinction where we do not intellectually disbelieve the distinction but do not also assert it. Identity then such as is knowable is a relation of terms, the distinction of which is undenied but unknown. Now what is unknown and yet speakable as felt *may* come to be known. If the differential characters x and y come to be known, the identity of A would be denied. Identity ~~cannot~~ accordingly be taken to be undeniable like distinction.

The indefinite relation then, of content and consciousness

should not be interpreted as indefinite identity. There is no demand therefore in reflection for a stage of consciousness in which content and consciousness may be explicitly seen to be identical in difference. The only necessary demand in knowledge is that what appears as indefinite in an assignable respect should be definable in that respect. If further the indefiniteness is such as *necessarily* appears to a stage of consciousness, that stage is taken to demand a higher stage where the indefinite gets defined. To reflection, the relation of content and consciousness appears necessarily as an indefinite distinction only and not as an indefinite identity. The demand is for this distinction to be defined and for a supra-reflective consciousness where this distinction can be visualised.

The concept of the absolute in any form is taken to belong to a supra-reflective consciousness. The possibility and nature of this consciousness have to be understood in reflection as a necessary problem. The conception of an explicit identity-in-difference of content and consciousness is not demanded in reflection. Reflection demands only a non-implicational distinction of them to define the necessarily implicational or indefinite distinction that is presented to it. The absolute accordingly has to be problematically understood within reflection as meaning not an identity but only a completely definite distinction of content and consciousness. It may be that the supra-reflective consciousness in which the reflective implication of content and consciousness is turned into a non-implicatory distinction is itself consciousness of identity in a symbolic or metaphorical sense. But in any case identity *as a logical relation* has to be definitely denied between content and consciousness before this mystic identity can be appreciated.

We are concerned for the present with the conception of the absolute such as is intelligible as a problem to reflection. We have to trace in detail how the indefinite distinction of

content and consciousness can be defined, how their apparent identity can be denied, how in fact the implicatory distinction can be resolved into a non-implicatory distinction. We shall find presently that the implicatory distinction of content and consciousness varies according as the consciousness is knowing, feeling or willing. The implication is resolvable in different ways in these three spheres and the absolute is understood in the reflective stage in terms of the mode of resolution in each case. Knowing, feeling and willing will then each have its own formulation of the absolute—viz. truth, value and reality (or freedom) respectively, as will be justified later. In the reflective stage these absolutes or formulations of the absolute will be found to be un-unifiable and to be in a sort of alternation. Whether a mystical identity of the absolutes can be reached in the supra-reflective consciousness does not concern us. Our problem is to show how reflection demands a specific absolute in each case.

What is specifically apprehended in non-cognitive consciousness cannot be literally formulated in terms of knowledge. Philosophy which cognitively deals with the contents of all consciousness should claim to know *not* the non-cognitive contents themselves but only *that* they are non-cognitive, that we believe in contents which we do not know. It can therefore speak of these believed contents only by a sort of intellectual symbolism *as though* they were known. To reflection, the implicative distinction of content and consciousness varies according as the consciousness is knowing, feeling or willing. The variations may be represented by three modes of distinction that we recognise as between known contents. If A is distinct from B, B may be simply an other, or it may be constitutive of A, or A and B may be both constitutive of C. So the content that is distinguished in reflection from consciousness may be spoken of as unconstituted by consciousness or as constituted by consciousness or as along with

consciousness constituting some kind of unity. The first mode of distinction is the relation of content and consciousness in knowing and the last two will be found to appropriately symbolise the relation in willing and feeling respectively.

The content of a knowing act is unconstituted by that act. The *particular* act of knowing discovers and does not construct the object known, even if the object be admitted to be constructed by *some* knowing. Knowledge would appear to mean that the object known is in some sense independent of it though it may be a question whether what we ordinarily claim to know is properly said to be known and to be independent of the knowing. Where the object is coloured by the particularity of the act of knowing, it may be said to be only empirically known but it is still taken to be known so far as it is believed to be independent of it.

The content of willing may be said to be an act, an end, or the empirical embodiment of the end—the organisation of certain objective facts (including the means) by the end. None of these is a fact that can be said to be known in the willing, believed as independent of the willing in the sense the content of knowing is independent of knowing. Each is constituted by willing in the sense that apart from willing, it is nothing at all. It cannot be said that it is a future fact that is *known* in the willing. Willing is indeed some form of consciousness of the future but the future here, unlike the future that is said to be known, is not a fact but a contingency, not what *will* be but what *would* be *if* it were willed, not as already determined but what is being determined by the willing and as therefore apart from the willing nothing at all. Yet the content of willing is distinct from willing, distinct as what is constituted is distinct from what constitutes it.

Reflective knowing is consciousness of the known object as distinct from the knowing. Reflective willing is conscious-

ness of the act willed as being distinguished by the willing from itself. Neither is consciousness primarily of the distinction itself or the distinguishing. Reflective feeling is primarily consciousness of the distinction (or the distinguishing) of content and consciousness. To be conscious of a content *as felt* is to be conscious of the content in unity with the feeling or of feeling unified with the content. The unity of two contents means—whatever else it means—an imperfect distinction between them; and we have to understand the unity of content and consciousness on this analogy. The unity of which reflective feeling is conscious is the imperfect distinction between content and consciousness, taken itself as a content. To be conscious of a content as known or willed is not even to be implicitly conscious of unity of content and consciousness. The known content appears to reflection as perfectly distinct from knowing and a unity of perfect distincts cannot be reflectively conceived to be knowable. The content of willing as constituted by the willing alone cannot be understood to constitute along with the willing any unity other than the content itself. It is only in reflective feeling that we are conscious of something, viz. value that is as much content as consciousness, that is not indeed *both* of them at once but what each of them is and is not alternately. The felt content is imperfectly distinguished from feeling but not constituted by it in the sense that apart from it, it is nothing at all. We do not indeed know but cannot deny that the value of an object is really in it. ✓

Reflective consciousness is definite consciousness of something. The content of feeling of which we are reflectively conscious is not a definite content. What is perfectly distinct from another or constituted by another in the sense of being nothing without it is definite in itself. What however is imperfectly distinct from another and unconstituted by it is not definite in itself. Now an indefinite can only be referred

to in connexion with a definite content. What we are definitely conscious of in reflective feeling is the imperfect distinction itself of content and consciousness, this indefinite *as such* being in fact their unity. The indefinite content of feeling can only be referred to as a factor of this unity.

The content of knowing then is perfectly distinct from knowing and is unconstituted by it. The content of willing is imperfectly distinct from willing though distinct in itself and is constituted by it. Content and consciousness make a unity in the case of feeling but not in the case of knowing and willing. There are thus three modes of distinction of content and consciousness of which we are reflectively conscious. Each of these is an implicative or indefinite distinction in some sense and the indefiniteness will be found to consist in the fact that a relation that is intelligible as between content and content is only half intelligible when taken to be the relation between content and consciousness.

* * * * *

To begin with knowing. If the content of knowing be perfectly distinct from knowing, how can the distinction be implicative or indefinite at all? It is implicative in the sense that the content of knowing is *necessarily* understood in reflection as what is perfectly distinct from knowing. The content *implies* such a reference to knowing and apparently means nothing without it. When one content is asserted to imply another, a relation is asserted of which, as we said, the implying content is not really a *relatum* but some other content which need not have the relation and which as thought with the relation is the implying content. This irrelative content may not be actually formulated but we conceive it to be formulable. It is difficult to conceive however what the known content apart from the knowledge-relation can possibly mean, since it is before the mind only as known.

The consciousness of a content as known is not indeed the

consciousness of it as a fact necessarily related to knowing but it is not also the positive consciousness of it as only accidentally related to knowing. Reflection in fact on knowing tells us nothing about whether the content known is or is not necessarily known. The known content *means* indeed what is perfectly distinct from knowing but this verbal reference to knowing need not mean a *necessary factual* relation. The perfect distinction too does not mean that the content stands for something that would be even if it were not known by any one. Both the idealistic and the realistic positions here appear to be over-statements. In one sense however the realistic position may be said to have an advantage, for although reflection does not testify that what is known need not be known, it does not deny it while the idealistic view that the content is constituted by the knowing of it appears to be plainly opposed to reflective testimony.

It may be however that if and when the realistic conception of the known content as what need not be known is realised, the idealistic notion of its being constituted by knowing will be found to have a meaning. Criticism of knowledge may show that all that is actually taken to be known in the reflective stage is in some respect constituted by the particular act of knowing and therefore is in that respect not properly known though its known character can not be denied altogether. Meantime we may reject the ordinary idealistic argument that to be aware of knowing an object is to be aware of recognising it, aware therefore of the object as necessarily known. There is actually no consciousness of recognising the object in the literal sense of remembering the past knowing of it. All that is actually meant is that to be aware of knowing an object is to be aware of knowing *truth*, knowing something—in other words—to be eternal or timeless. The object may be temporal but that it is in time is not itself a temporal fact. To know is to have

a timeless truth revealed but this does not mean that it is timelessly *known* and so known *again* in the present act of knowing. There is apparently no ground to assume either a previous knowing or of a timeless, impersonal or universal knowing along with the present knowing to justify the use of the word recognition.

The realistic position that the known content may exist unknown is not denied but cannot also be asserted in the reflective consciousness. It may be said however that it cannot be denied or asserted because only the proposition is meaningless. Can reflection understand it as a possibility? The possibility, we reply, is understood in reference to what we take to be *self-evidently* known. Certain known contents appear at least to be self-evident, not simply evident. So long as the evident is not contrasted with the self-evident, we say about it '*it is*' and not '*it is to me*'. When it is contrasted however, we say '*it is to me*' (though not '*to me only*'), while of the self-evident we say simply '*it is*'. To say '*it is to me*' is to suggest that it may not be ; and to say—in denial of this possibility—that *it is* is to imply that it might not have been to the knower at all, that it is eternally true, that it is truth literally revealing itself. If anything then is known to be self-evident, it is known as what need not be known.

That the known content may exist—or more accurately—may be true without being known is then intelligible as a problem to reflection. It is therefore deniable, and it is not denied (though not asserted) because some content claimed to be self-evident appears to be implied in all knowledge. What is taken to be known is thus implicitly believed to be self-evident and only in this sense to be what need not be known. The realistic view of the independence of the known content, of its known-ness being accidental, can only be admitted in the sense of the content being in some respect self-evident or self-revealing. The realist's definition of knowledge has to

be accepted but the question against him would be if what is claimed to be known is really known, is independent of the particular act of knowing or knowing generally. It is not the question if what is taken to be true is true. Value, for example, may be claimed to be known but it may be legitimately asked if it is known at all, if it is not merely believed in a non cognitive way. So one may ask if what is taken by Kant to be only empirically known as involving construction of experiences is, as the realist will claim, really known, known as independent of the constructivity of the knowing act. The Kantian view may or may not be accepted but the question is certainly legitimate if what is claimed to be known is known in the realist's sense of the term. The realist apparently would not admit the necessity of testing whether what is supposed in the first instance to be known is really known.

The known content should be what need not be known but where is the content that is known as such? The self-evident, we take it, is what is known to be independent of knowing in the sense of being eternally true without requiring to be known but is anything admitted to be self-evident in the reflective consciousness? No known content is absolutely indubitable and in any case there is no agreement as to what content is indubitable. But some content or other appears self-evident in the sense of there being an explicit consciousness of doubt about it being unintelligible. The unintelligibility of doubt about a content should be distinguished from what is called the inconceivability of the opposite. Inconceivability of the opposite is understood only by trying to conceive it and to try to conceive it is to entertain a problem in thinking or meaning, if not of knowing. But there are cases where the problem of thinking the opposite of the content known is not entertained and one is conscious of its not arising at all. To be conscious of a content as self-evident is to be conscious not of its negation being unmeanable but of the problem of meaning the

negation not even arising. We are conscious of the self-evident in this sense though the negation of what appears as such may later come to be conceived through a new self-evident cognition or revelation.

What we reflectively speak of as true *or* false is a judgment. The self-evident is that of which we cannot be conscious except as true. Is there then any self-evident judgment? To form a judgment is apparently always to be conscious of the *problem* of meaning its negation. This applies even to what is taken as a necessary judgment. Its negation is found to be inconceivable only after it has been tried to be conceived and it is so found because it is but the elaboration of a systemic concept which is really a *postulate* that is neither true nor false and may admit of rival postulates. It is a direction of imagination in which what tends to be imagined is *eo ipso* believed. The belief is here not properly cognitive but is what may be roughly called a *feeling* of cognition. It is the consciousness that something *must be* without the consciousness that it *is*: it is as though one dimly felt what must be. The so-called necessary judgment is an analysis of the content of such felt cognition and is not properly knowledge.

What however is inferred, i. e., believed as what *must be* because something *is* is believed also as what *is* and as such cannot be said to be merely felt as known. It is only the necessary that is not consciously inferred that should be so characterised. That a conclusion follows from a premise or premises is the only content that can be claimed in reflective consciousness as self-evidently known and not merely necessarily known i. e. felt to be known. Properly speaking indeed, that a conclusion follows from a premise is not a judgment though expressed as such. The following is not a relation of contents that is itself a content coordinate with them. Still as it is not an arbitrary subjective relating of contents, we cannot

say it is not a *believed* relation though it is no *content* of consciousness.

A disguised form of this inferential following we have in a judgment like 'A implies B' which may be paraphrased 'to know A is to know B'. What does the word *is* here stand for? The two knowings stand for subjective acts but the connecting word *is* does not mean another act coordinate with them. Nor does it mean a relation of the contents A and B that is a third content. It appears to be a relation not of the contents but of the cognitions in respect of their content, being itself however no subjective act of cognition. It cannot be said not to be known though it is not content of the knowing of which A and B are contents. Whether it is the content of the reflective consciousness is not known in the reflection itself and so *for the reflective consciousness* it means neither the consciousness nor the content of consciousness.

The self-evident is to reflection a relation that *is* without being the content of a knowing that is known. 'To know A is to know B' cannot be said to be no judgment and yet here we are not conscious of the problem of meaning its negation. It may well be that the assertion is a mistake but when it is made, it is made on the basis of an immediate unquestioning belief which is yet on the reflective level. The problem of meaning the negation of a perceived content does not arise during the perception because perception is not on the reflective level. But it is only reflectively that we say 'to know A is to know B' and yet the knowledge here is immediate so that if later it turns out to be false, it is taken to be an illusion and not merely a thinking error. Since the knowledge is reflectively immediate, there is not only no conscious problem of meaning its negation, there is the consciousness of such a problem not arising. It is only about what is known as the *content* of knowing that such a problem

arises. So it is about judgment generally (which is on the reflective level) except what we take to be the primordial judgment—viz. 'to know A is to know B'. It is primordial judgment because it is the basis of necessary judgments that are the bases of all other judgments. A necessary judgment is still known mediately through the baffled attempt to conceive the opposite. This also is based on a judgment like 'to know the inconceivability of the negation of a judgment is to know the judgment to be axiomatic'. A judgment of the form 'to know A is to know B' is self-evident judgment which is implied in all other judgments. That the terms of a judgment *have* a relation i. e. appear to be related to the relation only means that to know the terms is to know the relation—which is just a judgment of this form.

That the copula of this primordial self-evident judgment is not known as a content requires further explanation. The judgment is indeed knowledge and knowledge of the contents A and B as known but so far as it is knowledge of the relation implied by the word *is*, it is not knowledge of it as a content that is known. In the case of a judgment like 'A is B', we understand the copula as a relation that is at least partially a content on a level with A or B. But in the judgment 'to know A is to know B' the *is* is not on a level with the cognitions of A and B, far less with A and B. It is not known as known like the cognitions and their contents in the reflective consciousness. How then do we *say* that it is known? Because the sentence 'to know A is to know B' is significant and what it signifies cannot be disbelieved. The import of the sentence or of the word *is* in it is in fact understood only when already spoken and not in the speaking of it. When even understood as already spoken, it is not retrospectively taken as the content of that speaking and *distinct from it*.

It is understood in fact as *spoken* but not as *spoken of*. The word *is* in the judgment is not understood as known *content*.

What is understood (without disbelief) only as already spoken and not in the speaking of it is understood as known but not as known content. By known content is meant what is *knowable* as distinct from the knowing of it. It may not sometimes be so known in the knowing of it but it may be known later. The import of the word *is* in the judgment 'to know A is to know B' is not so knowable at all and may accordingly be (loosely) called a known no-content. It may be suggested that the import of the word *is* here therefore is the knowing act itself (or I) that is known by first appearing as content and then getting denied. It does not however *appear* at all as content to be negated : it is only symbolically spoken of later as content in the full consciousness that it is only verbally distinguished from the problematic knowing of it. Meantime the knowing of A and B that appears to reflection is definitely distinguished from it. What then the judgment 'to know A is to know B' signifies is known but does not appear as content to be accepted or rejected. It appears neither as known knowing nor as the content of such knowing.

This judgment is the only self-evident entity of which reflection is aware and the copula in it is not only not known as content but is explicitly known as what known content—including the apparent reflective content 'known knowing'—is not. The known position from which all content is distinguished—as represented by the copula here—is implied in all reflective knowledge, in all judgment like 'A is B' where the *is* means this over and above a relation that is a content.

To sum up. In reflection on a content as known, the content implies knowing and is indefinitely distinct from it in the sense that it *means* this reference to knowing (though it means perfect distinction from knowing), that it does not mean independence of this reference and is not known as what

is accidentally known. Reflection demands that it should be so known. The content is known to be only accidentally known i. e. to be only accidentally a content, when it is self-evident. The only self-evident of which we are reflectively aware is a judgment of the form 'to know A is to know B' or what the word *is* in it stands for, this being meant in all judgments or knowledge on the reflective level. This then is the element in all that is reflectively known that is known as what need not be known, the element that is free from the implicational relation of the content to the knowing of it, the element that reflection demands to be isolated but cannot itself isolate. This is the absolute for knowing that demands to be freed from its immanence in the implicational distinction of content and knowing.

So far about knowing. We may now rapidly indicate how the implicative relation of content and consciousness is demanded to be resolved in the case of willing and feeling. What implication of content and consciousness does reflective willing present? The willed content, as has been pointed out, is constituted by willing in the sense that apart from willing it is nothing at all. Yet the constituted content as definite in itself appears as a limitation to the constitutive willing: willing appears to be necessarily the willing of what is foreign to itself. In the reflective stage the willed content is appreciated as real through the willing but yet as its limitation, not as its self-limitation. It is not apparent at this stage that the will limits itself to realise itself, freely commits itself to a being to annul it and become freer. Reflection demands that the limit that is necessarily constituted by willing should be realised as self limitation in this sense. That is how the implication of content and consciousness is problematically understood to be resolvable in the sphere of willing.

To elaborate the problem. The relation of two contents willed at once may be taken to suggest the relation between

willed content and willing. Two contents e.g. two acts are said to be willed at once when one of them is a means to the other. Two unrelated acts cannot be said to be willed at once and two acts that are jointly means to a third act cannot be *distinctly* willed in the willing of the third act. A conscious will-relation of two contents must be a relation of prior and posterior, the prior being that through which the other is possible. In the relation of means and end *as willed*, the end is the prior through the willing of which it is possible to will a content *as means*. Now this relation of means and end has to be understood as the relation of willed content to willing. A willed act has to be taken as a means to the willing of it though it is through the willing that the willed act is possible. It is difficult to understand however how the willing of an act is the end of the act willed, how in other words willing is realised by the putting forth of the act, how one can be said to act in a particular way in order to act freely.

That we objectively act to be subjectively free, that the good will and nothing but the good will is the value for which we will an act—the view in fact of Kant—may be called the idealistic view in this connexion. The realistic view here then would be that we act for an objective end and not for the subjective end of being free ; and an extreme form of this view may be conceived that we objectively act in order that we may objectively act for evermore. In the case of knowing, we pointed out, the realistic view is *prima facie* more acceptable than the idealistic view. In the case of willing apparently, the idealistic view is acceptable in the first instance. The realistic view amounts to saying that there is no willed act that is good in itself and the view that we objectively act in order that we may objectively act is just its logical consequence and its *reductio ad absurdum*. The idealistic view is consonant with the nature of reflective willing—viz. that the prior is the end but in the reflective

stage it appears to amount to the barren statement that it is good to will what it is good to will. The demand is to find a vital meaning for the statement, to understand how willing is a willing of itself.

Reflection indicates how it is to be understood. There is the difference between 'I will this act' and 'I will this act that I ought to will'. When the former is not contrasted with the latter, the will-consciousness is expressible as an imperative 'let this act be done'. When however it is contrasted, it is expressed as mere information 'I am doing it' while the latter is properly expressed as an imperative 'let this be done' which implies 'I may not do it'. In contrast with it, the former appears as a statement of fact though by itself it appears as an imperative. The implication is that willing as represented by the former is itself a being that is to be superseded by willing as represented by the latter, that what is taken as free is implicitly not free, that therefore we will an act in order to get rid of the being of the act, get rid of the self-complacent will to continue in this being—what may be called the will to indolence. Reflection indicates the way but cannot understand willing or freedom at its limit.

In reflective feeling, there is the definite consciousness of an indefinite distinction of the content felt and the feeling of it. The content felt is not definite in itself like the known or willed content and is understood in reference to this indefinite distinction definitely appearing to reflection *as though* it were a unity. We say *as though*, because the unity does not appear as a definite self-subsistent unity from which its constituents are distinguishable. The implication of content and consciousness would be resolved in the sphere of feeling, if a unity of this kind could be apprehended. In the feeling of two contents together, we can reflectively apprehend a self-subsistent unity. Reflection accordingly demands such a unity of felt content and feeling but cannot itself understand it.

To explain. In the apprehension of an object having spatial parts as beautiful both the whole and the parts are felt but differently. The whole as a known content is distinct in itself and even if it be conceivably distinguished *from* the parts, the parts *as in the whole* cannot be distinguished from the whole and therefore can only be imperfectly distinguished from one another. The parts are however distinguished in the feeling way from the whole, being in fact felt as not felt in the way the whole is felt. The whole is felt to be beautiful but the parts are felt to be indifferent, felt to be 'only known', such feeling of their mere knownness being necessary for the appreciation of the beauty of the whole. To feel two contents at once then is to feel their unity and to feel them otherwise than the unity. We try to understand the relation of the felt content and the feeling of it on this analogy. They appear imperfectly distinct and unity means to reflection an imperfect distinction of the constituents. But the unity does not appear to reflection self-subsistent in the sense of the constituents being distinguishable from it. Such a self-subsistent unity is however demanded.

As in the case of knowing and willing, so here one may imagine an alternation of realistic and idealistic or objectivistic and subjectivistic views. The unity of felt content and feeling may be understood as content that is indefinitely other than consciousness or as consciousness that is indefinitely other than the content. Value may be regarded as a kind of object though not as completely distinct from the consciousness of it as the known object or it may be taken to be an impersonalised feeling as somehow expressed in the object and thus objectified symbolically but not as a known character. Neither view appears to have any advantage over the other. Does reflection however indicate how consciously the alternation may be stopped and the unity come to be definite in itself?

Taking value, the unity of felt content and feeling, realis-

tically as objective, we are reflectively aware of the value as referred to the known object that is distinguishable from it. We feel the object as known to be not the value, to be neutral, felt otherwise than the value. This is *feeling* the distinction of the object from the value of it and it is thus that the value tends to appear distinct in itself by having the object distinguished from it. So also if we take the value as an impersonalised feeling rather than as an objective character, in understanding it as expressed in the object we may feel the knowing of the object as somehow *inside* the impersonal feeling, involved in it without being confused with it, much as the image in a mirror shows the mirror to be unaffected by it. Thus we may be said to be aware of the felt object as well as of the individual feeling as distinct from their unity.

So far the relation of felt content and feeling appears to be similar to the relation of two contents of the same feeling. In both there seems to be a unity from which its constituents are felt to be distinct. There is however discrepancy in an important respect. In appreciating a beautiful object where we feel the object as a whole as well as the parts, the parts that appear neutral are *together* felt to be distinct from the whole that appears beautiful. The beautiful object as beautiful thus appears in feeling as a whole isolated not only from other objects but also from its own knowable parts and thus shines as a self-subsistent something in the air. We cannot understand such a thing about the unity of content and consciousness called value. The felt content and the feeling consciousness are only *alternately* distinguished from the value that is their unity. The demand is for them *together* to be feelingly distinguished from value so that it may shine in isolation as a self-subsistent unity. To put it more concretely, the demand is for the concept of a value that is independent of valuation, of its reference to a known object. Reflection understands the problem but does not see the solution.

In all these cases then, reflection tries to understand the relation of the content of a mode of consciousness to the consciousness on the analogy of the relation of the contents of the same consciousness and finds that the analogy can be definitely extended only half-way, although it can indicate the way in which the indefinite aspect that remains over could conceivably be defined. In the case of knowing, how the known content could be without being known is not reflectively understood although the consciousness of the self-evident as distinct from the evident is consciousness of such a *possibility*. In the case of willing, it is reflectively indefinite how willing is the end of the act willed but the consciousness of the *ought* is consciousness of the possibility of getting rid of the being of the act willed. In the case of feeling, value should be understood but cannot be reflectively understood as the definite self-subsistent unity of felt content and feeling but there is the consciousness of its possibility in the reflective appreciation of a beautiful object as what 'never was on sea or earth,' isolated from its knowable relations not only to other objects but also to its own parts.

In all these cases again, it will be noticed that what demands to be understood cannot actually be understood because such understanding would involve a species of negation that to reflection is unmeaning. In the case of knowing, a known content has to be understood as what need not be content of any knowing. In the case of willing, the reality of willing has to be understood as the negation of being, of the being even of the content that is willed. In the case of feeling, the being of value has to be understood by the known as such being distinguished from it. To reflection, for the known content to be without being known is for it to be intrinsically unrelated to knowing in the way of distinction or identity. To be conscious of A and B, not to be able to deny either and yet to say they are utterly unrelated is apparently to state a

contradiction. So to understand the willed act to be distinct from willing and yet to be nothing apart from it or—to put it differently—for the act not to *be* and yet to be real as willing is to conceive the negation of an emergent distinct or the emergent distinction of a negation. To take the felt value also as a being from which known being is distinct is to be definitely conscious of an indefinite, to entertain without disbelief an *appearance* or an indifference of being and non-being. All the three—unrelatedness, negation of the emergent or the emergence of negation, and the indifference of being and non-being—imply unmeaning modes of negation to reflection ; and yet the specifiable indefiniteness in the content of reflection demands to be defined precisely through such modes of negation. To admit the absolute in any form is to admit a negation that is unintelligible to the logic of the understanding.

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The absolute may be generally defined from the standpoint of reflection as what is free from the implicational dualism of content and consciousness. There are three ways in which this freedom can be understood. The content may be freed from its reference to consciousness i. e. from its contenthood. Or consciousness may be freed from its reference to content, in which case it ceases to be conscious of anything beyond itself. Or the implicational relation itself may be freed from its terms as a definite self-subsistent unity. The known that is free from its contenthood, is known as the content that need not be content is the self-evident *is*, just what we call *truth*—the absolute for knowing. Consciousness that is free from its content in the sense that it solely constitutes its content, makes the content a content, creates its distinction from itself is *freedom* of the will—the absolute for willing. The implicational relation of content and consciousness that is freed from their

distinction as a unity is *value* in itself—the absolute for feeling.

Truth, freedom and value then are the absolutes for knowing, willing and feeling. It is impossible to avoid this triple formulation of the absolute though the notion that there are three absolutes would be just as illegitimate as the notion of there being only one absolute. The absolute is not a *known content*, about which alone the question *one or many* has meaning. Truth is self-evident and is as such known but is no content ; of value as the self-subsistent unity of content and consciousness, we cannot say as either that it is not known or that it is like truth self-evident and therefore is no content ; and there is no question even of knowing freedom, the belief in freedom being, as Kant pointed out, no intuition but willing itself. It is meaningless therefore to cognitively *assert* that there are three absolutes or one absolute. The absolute has however to be formulated in this triple way. Each is absolute but what are here understood as *three* are only their verbal symbols, they themselves being understood together but not *as together*.

For freedom, an alternative name would be reality. The real is understood either as will or what is given to will. Will means free will or freedom which though not theoretically known is not disbelieved, the belief in willing being willing itself. The expression of willing is always an imperative 'let this be done', which means no known being and, if anything, means 'let this known situation here be negated, *used* as means, melted into the future'. Willing in this sense is the negation of being and is yet real, its reality consisting in the supersession of being. This comes out more explicitly in the consciousness of the imperative as the moral *ought*. *Ought* is real as the explicit rejection of the *is* or the actual that is known, explicit annulment of the known being of the presupposed 'natural willing'. Known being may be real but

reality is understood in its purity as the conative rejection of known being or more accurately, since everything has to be understood here in conative terms, as the freedom to withdraw or abstain from 'natural willing'. Natural willing called natural in reference to the *ought*—is in itself an imperative: the person who wills says to himself 'let this be done' and not 'I am doing it'. So any willing and specially the willing to abstain from willing is unknowable freedom or reality. What is given to the will is also said to be real because either it is consumed by the will as a means to itself as end or if it cannot be so consumed, it has to be taken as an opposed will. Freedom or reality may accordingly be taken as synonymous.

Freedom or reality then is not known or in other words it is meaningless to call it truth. The true is the self-evident, that of which we are conscious as known but not as known content. Freedom or willing is not known at all or if we are aware of knowing it, we are aware of its knownness as illusory. We are only aware in one grade of willing that a presupposed willing of another grade—natural willing, as we have called it—had an illusory being or appeared to be known. What is known however may be either the self-evident in its purity or some relation of *given* contents—meaning contents given *to the will*—with the form of self-evidence. Every judgment, as has been pointed out, involves a self-evident judgment of the form 'to know A is to know B'. The self-evident in its purity is eternal truth and not reality: but a relation of given contents is not only said to be true but cannot also be said to be not real.

The real then is not true but the true may be real. So speaking of truth and value, we may say that truth is not value but value is not untrue. Just as the predicates true or false do not apply at all to freedom or reality, so the predicates valuable or worthless do not apply to truth. Truth is not felt

or if it is felt, it is felt as unfelt *i. e.* as no value. But the predicate false applies to value in so far as the falsity of a felt value is denied though its truth cannot therefore be asserted. A value like beauty is evident but not self-evident : it appears as a content to an appreciative consciousness and appears without being disbelieved as an illusion but not as what need not have reference to the consciousness. The self-evident is the true and the evident is true if it implies self-evidence and till the self-evidence becomes explicit, it cannot be said to be false.

Again in respect of reality and value it may be said that while the predicate real and unreal do not apply to value, reality or freedom cannot be said not to be a value. Value is a felt being and is neither given to willing nor is itself willed into existence though it may appear as the fulfilment of willing. It is in this respect similar to truth which may shine out in fulfilment of willing in the form of attention but is not brought into *existence* through its causality. Reality or freedom may however be felt and an act that is claimed to be willed is at least not morally indifferent if it is felt to have been genuinely willed. An act in fact that is felt to be morally indifferent is *eo ipso* felt to have been not free, not willing at all, the sole proof of freedom being in the retrospective moral valuation. To say that an act is free is to take it as not valueless though it may be going too far to assert that freedom is a value. Value is a felt *being* while freedom or willing is felt as the real *negation* of a known being and can at best be the felt being of a negation (of known being).

Thus it appears to be meaningless to speak of truth as a value, of value as real or of reality as true while we can significantly speak of value as not false, of reality as not valueless and of truth as not unreal, although we cannot positively assert value to be truth, reality to be value and truth to be reality. *Each* of them is absolute and they cannot be spoken of as one

or many. In one direction their identity and difference are alike meaningless and in another direction their identity is intelligible though not assertible. Truth is unrelated to value, value to reality and reality to truth while value may be truth, reality value and truth reality. The absolute may be regarded in this sense as an *alternation* of truth, value and reality.

In Defence of Substance.

BY

DR. RASHVIHARI DAS.

(Presidential Address to the Logic and Metaphysic Section).

I hope I shall not be abusing the high honour you have conferred on me by asking me to preside over the section of Logic and Metaphysics, if I take this opportunity to enter my humble protest against the modern tendency to regard substance as quite a dispensable, if not already an obsolete concept of thought.

It is suggested that the substance-quality notion of metaphysics is connected with the subject-predicate view of judgments in Logic ; and as the subject-predicate view is found quite inadequate in Logic, its correlates the substance-quality notion, should also be considered defective. Bertrand Russell thinks that people developed the notion of substance because they believed in the indestructibility of matter and of soul. But as physics no longer believes in the indestructibility of matter and psychology has no use for a persistent ego, it appears to him quite useless to retain the notion of substance which has lost its justification. Whitehead rightly thinks that the idea of self-subsistence is involved in the notion of substance. But according to his philosophy, there is nothing that exists by itself and everything enters into everything else, and so the notion of substance is found quite inapplicable in fact. From another consideration also he discards the notion of substance. A substance is understood to undergo adventures of change. But in Whitehead's philosophy the actual occasions, which are the ultimate actualities come into being and then pass away ; they are born and they die but do not change. The main point however is that a substance is credited with its own private qualities, but in Whitehead's view there is nothing in an actual entity which is not borrowed

from or is incapable of entering into the constitution of other actual entities.

This in brief seems to be the position against substance. I should like to maintain on the contrary, that the notion of substance is indispensable to philosophy. Philosophy seeks to give us the knowledge of reality. It is based therefore on the assumptions that reality can be known and that knowledge of reality is communicable. In other words philosophy has to deal with that which can be known and described. We get no philosophy in our sense of the term where we are not to know anything or, although we may know, we are unable to communicate our knowledge. If we can show that for the purpose of knowledge which is expressible in intelligible judgments, the conception of substance is absolutely necessary, we shall be satisfied that Philosophy cannot dispense with the notion of substance.

Now what do we understand by substance? We may take the view of Aristotle as explained by W. D. Ross, that a substance is that which can exist apart. This is what Descartes also seems to have meant when he said 'And when we conceive of substance, we merely conceive an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist.' I hope I shall not deviate from these classical views if I understand by substance what possesses a standing completed being. A substance is supposed to remain the same in its different states. This does not exactly mean that a substance should be quite indestructible. It means that its identity should be expressible or recognisable in its different states. A substance may be indestructible, but indestructibility is no part of its meaning. The important point is that so long as it exists, its identity dominates all its different states and gives them a characteristic unity. This idea I seek to express by saying that a substance has a standing being. The other important idea involved in the notion of substance is that of

self-subsistence. The states and qualities of a substance cannot exist by themselves. They require a substance of which they are states and qualities. A substance however does not need to be referred to anything else. This is what I call its completed being. A quality has no completed being because it requires to be completed by that of a substance.

If we are right in thinking of substance as that which has a standing completed being, I want then to ask whether it is at all possible to dispense with the notion of substance in giving an account of anything that we may be said to know.

I wish to maintain that there is no knowledge which is not, or does not imply, a knowledge of some standing completed being. It is easy to see that we can know only some form of being. Every knowledge must have its object completely given to it. The object must be definite, if it is to be known. Unless it is definite, we cannot say what it is that we know, and if we cannot say what it is that we know, we cannot say that we really know at all. An object still in the process of completing itself cannot already be definite and therefore cannot be known. A quality, which has an incomplete being, can be known only as part of a substance. A quality is properly known when it exists but it can exist only in a substance ; and so in knowing a quality, we have to know a substance also to which the quality belongs.

What is known must be held up before the mind's eye as a standing being. Even a movement, if it is known, has a standing being. As it is taken in one grasp of knowledge, the multiplicity of its different steps is subordinated to its unity which is its standing being.

It may be objected that if a standing being alone can be known, then a process as such cannot be known. We reply that a process can be known only with a background of some standing being. A process must admit of its different parts being held in knowledge in a unique relation of togetherness.

Otherwise it will surely collapse into a state of unrelated momentary points which can in no sense be described as a running process. A running process requires a running unity which can be supplied by a substance in one form or another.

Even if we suppose that knowledge is possible without the notion of substance, we find it difficult to conceive how we can express our knowledge, i. e. describe the thing we know, without implying at some stage the idea of substance. If we are to express our knowledge, we must assert something of something, and we can assert only what is true of something, if our assertion is to be an expression of real knowledge. Now what is true of anything can be most conveniently conceived, following McTaggart, as a quality of the thing of which it is asserted.

Here, it will be said, I am relying on the subject-predicate view of judgment which is discredited in modern Logic. But in spite of modern logic, I find it most natural to regard what is asserted as a character of the thing which is sought to be described by a judgment. A character may also be further characterised. But we cannot deal merely with characters. We must ultimately come to some substantive which is only characterised and is not a character, some given *that* which is the support of all our descriptions. This is our substance.

I recognise, as is shown in symbolic logic, that relational propositions have their own rules of inference which are not given in traditional logic. But I do not quite see how relational propositions are fundamentally different from subject-predicate propositions. It seems that from the point of view of real knowledge, a relation is but a character of the term related. Real knowledge is interested in characterising the actual. Without this reference to the actual, there is no real knowledge but imagination. When therefore we assert a relation between two or more terms, our assertion is significant only if we can regard the relation as a character of the real

as represented in those terms. Thus a relational proposition cannot amount to knowledge, unless in some sense it characterises the real, which is also the function of a predicative proposition.

We have already referred to Russell's rejection of the notion of substance on the ground that both physics and psychology have no need for a persistent entity. Matter is reduced to radiation or wave-motion. I do not know how the physicists conceive these ideas, i. e. radiation without a standing centre (not a mathematical point) from which it proceeds and motion without something that moves. But I know all psychologists will not be agreed that psychical phenomena can be explained without a persistent ego. Here I can do nothing better than to refer to what another Cambridge philosopher, W. E. Johnson, said in this connexion. Those, who reject the physical continuant, try to explain the facts 'by supposing that the percipient is observing a continuity in the qualitative changes of the object perceived. And when it is pointed out that they are all along assuming a psychical continuant—viz the percipient—which from their standpoint must be repudiated, they, in effect, retort that it is quite unnecessary to postulate any psychical continuant, inasmuch as the nervous system itself will take the place of the ordinary conception of an ego. Here then they only eliminate the psychical continuant' by reinstating the physical continuant'. (Logic Vol. III p. 101.)

What we call a persistent entity, Russell would call a string of events. But how is the string metaphysically to be conceived? Is it not a form of unity? And if it is a unity, will it not presuppose some identity of being? Then again, what is an event by itself? Has it any self-subsistence? or does it only hang by the string? Somewhere we must grant self-subsistence. Either the whole nexus of events alone is self-subsistent and an event is an abstraction, or the events alone separately enjoy self-subsistence and the nexus is a

construction. In either case it is difficult to get rid of the idea of substance. Russell grants a very brief duration to an event, but however brief it may be, so long as it lasts, it must have an identity of being and its own definite character. And if it alone enjoys actual existence, then an event is but another name for a substance.

This does not enlighten us however as to the birth and death of an event. We do not know whether and how an event inherits anything from its predecessors and leaves any legacy for its successors. For instruction on these points, we must turn to Whitehead. In Whitehead's philosophy an event has assumed the form of an actual occasion. All the predecessors of an actual occasion, under different degrees of abstraction, according to their relevance, enter into its objective constitution and it is in its turn taken up into the constitution of its successors. Every actual occasion is what it is because of its function in other actual occasions. This is the principle of relativity, and it is mainly on the strength of this principle that substance with standing being and private quality is denied. The idea of substance represents an absolutistic position, because a substance is supposed to be something in itself with its own private quality, whereas the idea of an actual occasion, as formulated by Whitehead, requires universal relativity. With all respect to Whitehead, I have to confess that I find his idea of an actual occasion very difficult to understand. I cannot comprehend how an entity can be anything in itself. If it is something in itself, it then becomes a substance with a private character. In any case universal borrowing of being does not appear to be a successful metaphysical operation.

True, Whitehead grants that every actual occasion is a unique unity of feeling which in its immediacy is absolutely private. But this unity of feeling comes into being and immediately perishes away on the attainment of its satis-

faction. If this private feeling defines the individuality and essence of an actual occasion, then it is difficult to see how the actual occasions can be anything but momentary particulars, the svalakṣaṇas of the Buddhists, essentially incapable of being related with one another.

We cannot however adequately discuss the complex and difficult idea of an actual occasion here. Let us see what Whitehead says about what we ordinarily take to be a persistent entity. All such entities are called enduring objects. An enduring object is a society of occasions. And we have a society when its different members exhibit a common form due to their derivation from one another. What we take to be a persistent electron is really a society of electronic occasions. These occasions possess a common form because of the fact that the later occasions are derived from the earlier ones. Roughly speaking, in an enduring object, instead of one persistent object, we have a repetition of many similar objects.

A later occasion is derived from what immediately precedes it and this derivation lays an obligation upon the occasion to conform to its predecessor. And the conformation takes the form of the repetition of the aspects of the earlier occasion in the later one. Now, either we have to suppose that there is altogether a new creation at every step and when an occasion perishes, it dies away completely leaving no legacy for its successors. In that case derivation, inheritance, conformation, repetition, memory etc. would be quite meaningless and unintelligible. Or we have to think that inspite of the emergence of some new elements, the past is really continued, without a break, in the present. If the earlier occasions enter into the constitution of the later ones and if the aspects of the former are found in the latter, have we no reason to suppose that there is some identity of being

between them? Thus an enduring object turns out to be a substance with changing aspects.

While I find it difficult to accept Whitehead's principle of relativity, I cannot deny the patent fact that the things of the world are related with one another. But I certainly deny that they are so related that in thinking of one, you have to think of others and there is no end to these others. If in thinking of one term, I am led out to others and then again to others, and if they never constitute a rounded whole, then it means that I cannot complete a single thought. And an incomplete thought is no thought at all. If such a state of things cannot be properly thought, then it cannot be asserted also.

I am not interested now to maintain whether there are many substances or there is only one substance or a whole of interrelated substances. I am agreeable to any of these alternatives because all of them allow the possibility of completed thought.

But although the critics of substance may not be able to do without it in their philosophy, it does not mean that the idea of substance is a consistent idea. If the idea of substance involves self-contradiction, then however widely it may be used in ordinary thought, we have to recognise that metaphysically it is an invalid concept and carries its untruth wherever it is used.

It may also be argued that we do not really know any substance. What we know are the qualities and there is never found any substance over and above the qualities.

But if the idea of quality is that it is a quality of something, then a quality by itself cannot even be conceived, far less perceived. What we really perceive is a qualified thing and never a mere quality. And if a quality could be perceived by itself, it would be but a substance. Moreover when it is expressly admitted that a substance is that

which has qualities why should you demand to find a substance without qualities?

But how is a substance to be conceived even with its qualities? The qualities are a multiplicity and the substance is supposed to be one. Is it not a contradiction to say that what is one is also many at the same time?

Moreover a substance is supposed to persist in midst of change. But can a substance change and also remain the same? How are its different states to be reconciled with its identical being? The problem of substance is also the problem of change. There is change only when something has remained the same and also become different. How is this possible? Both in regard to qualities and in regard to change we have the same difficulty of reconciling identity with difference.

Several ways may be suggested to get out of this difficulty. (1) If the different qualities require a unitary substance, and if the changing states demand a standing self-identical being, we should be more in earnest with its unity and identity and regard it alone as real, of which the qualities and states are only illusory appearances. And there is no contradiction between real identity and illusory difference. (2) Or we may suppose that identity belongs to one grade of reality and difference to another and so they do not contradict each other. (3) Or we may boldly declare that identity in difference is an undeniable fact and only abstract understanding finds contradiction in it and is itself thereby condemned. But higher reason finds no difficulty in this conception.

In the first view, we have really to deny all qualities and difference of states. This seems to be an extreme view. We require a substance in the interest of qualities and changing states; but if it refuses to accept them, it fails to discharge the very function for which it is intended.

In the second view there is no denial of reality either to

substance or to qualities and states. But they are separated in different levels of reality, so that the unity of the one does not conflict with the multiplicity of the other. There is much truth in this view. The unity of substance can conflict with the difference of substance, but not with the difference of qualities. Similarly the difference of qualities will conflict with the unity of qualities but not with that of substance.

The third view is to be understood largely in the light of this view. The contradiction between identity and difference can not be resolved merely by an appeal to superior reason. We can understand identity in difference only if we can see that the identity is of one kind and difference is of another, and so they do not conflict with one another.

But although we must recognise that the category of substance is of a different order from the category of quality, can we really suppose that they belong to two different grades of reality? If we keep them in different levels it seems hardly possible to get them related at all. It may be said that the unity is at once seen, involving the difference, and no need is felt for relating them again, because they are not separately available awaiting to be related. If one is content with an aesthetic perception of unity in the heart of difference, we have nothing to say against his position, because all that we are interested to maintain just now is that there is a standing unity over and above difference and this is allowed by this position. We feel however that many qualities have somehow to be related with one substance otherwise their togetherness (with the substance) cannot be comprehensible to thought. And if they are brought together at a point, then identity again will be faced with difference. Is that no contradiction? There will be contradiction if we say that identity is difference or that what is different is also identical. There is no contradiction merely in relating identity with difference or

one with many. Barring the case of identity, in every relation, a term is related to what is different from it. And so an identical being may be related with what is not identical. The many are not immediately to be thought of as one; that would be a contradiction. But through the mediation of an intimate relation, they are brought under a higher unity of which they appear as subordinate aspects. We may easily recognise the peculiarity of this intimate relation which has been variously called *samavaya* or *tādātmya*, but a little reflection will also show that thought cannot operate without positing this relation at critical steps.

It may be easy to combine qualities, which are not inconsistent with one another, into one substance. But how can incompatible qualities be confined into a single thing, as we have to do in the case of a substance that undergoes change? What is green becomes yellow. How can green and yellow belong to the same thing? Let us see in what sense there is incompatibility between green and yellow. There is no contradiction merely in saying that a thing is green and yellow, because it can be green and yellow at different times. There would be contradiction if we said that the thing was green and yellow at the same time. But we are not required to say so. We speak of change only in connexion with a thing which has temporal extension as a dimension of its being. The unity of such a thing is no static identity, admitting no change, but a running unity, expressed under different forms at different stages. Change introduces no doubt some complexity, but in principle we have the same case in change as in respect of qualities, namely, diverse determinations of a unitary being. That being may be temporal or non-temporal, and correspondingly its unity will be differently expressed. The unity of a temporal being means that its different successive states can be combined into a unity under the notion of a substantial being which

occupies a stretch of time. Change is only a name for the difference between two such states which are but different determinations or expressions of the same unitary being.

Change cannot be made intelligible either by mere passing states or by a static identity standing behind the states or again by dropping out and taking up, successively, certain unchanging elements in an unorganised whole. In the first case, we have one state after another but no real change. In the second case we have to say that change belongs to the changeless which is a contradiction. The third case, which may be represented as ABCD followed by BCDE, then by CDEF, etc. is really the same as the first change requires the whole life of the thing to be viewed as a unity.

We do not see the standing temporal whole, because perception is possible only of contemporary objects and so generally we see only a three-dimensional cut of a four-dimensional thing. But, in imagination or thought, we synthesise the different states and in a manner see the whole thing.

The Realm of Values.

BY

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

(to *Ethics and Religion Section.*)

I am deeply grateful to the Committee of this Congress for having asked me to preside over the section of Ethics and Religion, more particularly as I have the opportunity of inviting you to consider the significance of the realm of values.

Man possesses a valuational consciousness which immediately apprehends the world of values in some form or other, a world which is not the creature of his imagination but a datum no less objective and independent of his mental activity than the world of objects perceived by his physical senses. It is the task of the scientist not to create but to explore and interpret so far as he can the world of phenomena; it is the function of ethics, according to Scheler, to investigate the no less objective and important realm of values.¹

There are thinkers who tell us that the mind of man can only know the products of its own activity and that no knowledge is possible of objects as they are in themselves. Protagoras long ago taught that the whole content of perception is subjective and sought to reduce the world to the succession of man's sensations. He denied that there is any such thing as contradiction and thus destroyed any theory of objective knowledge whatever.

The absurdity of subjectivism was pointed out by Plato in his Theaetetus. "If truth is only sensation, and one man's

1. See Mary Evelyn Clarke's article entitled "*A Phenomenological System of Ethics*" in *Philosophy* Vol : VII No. 28 ; October, 1932.

discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of another is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom."²

In the Republic Plato taught that the ideas and among them the supreme idea of the good, the idea of value, have a real objective existence. When we turn from the half-real world of sensibilia—the world of change and shadows—we can contemplate the eternal world of ideas—a world which is in no sense the product of our mental activity. The world of ideas as completely rational is completely knowable.

The great modern champion of the theory that values possess self-existence is Nicolai Hartmann whose recently translated work on Ethics is a veritable treasure house for the investigator of the realm of values. "Values," writes Hartmann, "have self-existence...values subsist independently of the consciousness of them. Consciousness can grasp or miss them but cannot make them or spontaneously decree them...Knowledge of values is genuine knowledge of Being. In this respect it stands absolutely on a level with every kind of theoretical knowledge. Its object is for the subject just as independent a reality as spatial relations are for geometrical knowledge or things are for the knowledge concerning things."³

According to Hartmann the self-existence of values is ideal and our knowledge of them aprioristic. The values are not ontological categories which determine the actual world.

2. *Theaetetus*, 161, Jowett's translation.

3. *Ethics* by Nicolai Hartmann ; translated by Stanton Coit Vol : I pp. 218f.

This is clear from the fact that reality does not throughout conform to valuational principles. Persons alone are capable of axiologically determining the world. Values do not coerce persons but impose only a claim upon them while leaving them free. "It is only possible for man to have a task in the world, however restricted it may be, provided there are values which without his co-operation remain unactualized. But upon such a task depend the unique position and the dignity of man in the world, his difference from other entities which do not participate in the creative process."⁴

Teleology—the setting up and pursuit of ends is, according to Hartmann, the peculiarity of human nature. If the world-process is a purposive activity we are required to assume a personal Creator, an assumption which is beyond all verification. Moreover the hypothesis of a personal creator and the teleological determination of the universe destroys the freedom and dignity of man. Man can only be free in a causally determined universe where alone he can realise his purposes. An antinomy exists between religion and ethics, that is between salvation and freedom. Religion offers to save man from guilt at the cost of his freedom. "Ethics knows of no deliverance from guilt. Only religion speaks of it. And upon it alone falls the metaphysical burden of the consequences."⁵

While agreeing with Hartmann that values possess an ideal objective existence, I submit that Berkeley was right in maintaining that no ideas can exist apart from a mind that perceives them. Values are eternal ideal objects which man can discover but, as Berkeley says, "all objects are eternally known by God."⁶

I can find no meaning in an ideal self existence apart from

4. *Op : cit* : Vol : I P. 242.

5. *Op : cit* : Vol : II P 147.

6. The Third Dialogue between Philonous and Hylas.

any mind or in an object which subsists somehow as that which is not yet but some day may be discovered by a mind. Values which are not perceived by any mind can have no sort of existence, so that when they are first discovered they are created.⁷ Scientific, ethical and religious research postulates the existence of objects which are there to be discovered.

Experience is the stuff of which reality consists⁸ and if reality is a systematic coherent whole, if there is a cosmos and not a chaos, reality cannot be thought of as nothing but the partial experiences of individuals but as the complete systematic experience of a universal consciousness.

To repeat an empty formula to the effect that value determines existence is, wrote Professor Laird, nonsense.⁹ But if the cosmos is determined by a spirit ontologically it is sound sense to suppose that the spirit is determined by the values which it purposes to actualise. God, as Leibniz would say, is in all things guided by the *lex optimi*, the principle of sufficient reason.

The view of Hartmann that the hypothesis of the teleological determination of the universe destroys the freedom and dignity of man is open to serious criticism. It may well be that the personal Creator has created the causal nexus so that individual persons may enjoy freedom at least for a time within a causally determined cosmos. God created the world as it is because in such a world man is free to realise such values as Hartmann so finely describes. Indeed Hartmann himself writes, "This world is so constructed fundamentally, that a free and end-pursuing agent finds scope in it. One may cite as a chief feature of this valuational constitution

7. Cf. Wm. Temple, *Mens Creatrix* p. 84, "Good must mean good for somebody ; apart from consciousness, value is non-existent."

8. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics* P. 23 and F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 144f.

9. *A Study in Moral Theory* by John Laird p. 276.

of the world the causal structure of the order prevailing in it¹⁰.

The antinomy between religion and ethics, salvation and freedom is not so easy of solution. It is true that man does not avoid incurring guilt and that there is a value in heroically refusing to discard the guilt as a man throws off a load from his shoulders. But the salvation from guilt offered men by religion is not so easily obtainable. Man is required to pay the price in terms of remorse and agony of soul. He dies in order to live. He bows down his head in shame and penitence that he may be reconciled with his God. Freedom is not lost but regained. He loses the dignity of independence only to gain the exalted position of a son.

In the first part of "Religion, so far as it lies within the limits of Reason alone," Kant considers the radical evil in human nature. Evil arises when man falls from the state of innocence. A man who has fallen may become legally good by the gradual reform of his conduct but he can only become a morally good or God-pleasing man by a revolution in the mind, and he can only become a new man by a kind of new birth and a change of heart. Religions are of two kinds—favour-seeking religion (mere worship), and moral religion or the religion of a good life. In moral religion it is a fundamental principle that everyone must strive to the utmost of his power to become a better man. Only by such striving can a man hope that what is not in his power will be supplied by a higher co-operation. "It is not essential, and therefore not necessary for everyone to know what God does or has done for his salvation, but it is essential to know what he himself has to do in order to be worthy of this assistance."¹¹

Plato was aware of the fact that vice is the greatest evil of the soul and that this evil must be removed. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates argues that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice. For a guilty man it is a greater evil to escape

10. *Op : cit : Vol : II* p 157.

11. Abbott's translation p. 360.

punishment than to suffer it. The man who has done wrong ought to run to the judge as he would to the doctor in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul.¹²

It is the function of religion to offer men salvation by faith. "Your character," writes Whitehead, "is developed according to your faith. This is the primary religious truth from which no one can escape. Religion is force of belief cleansing the inward parts."¹³

In considering the significance of values it is imperative to be on our guard against what Sorley calls the fallacy of abstraction.¹⁴ The proposition "Justice is a value" can only mean that just acts are valuable to a person who contemplates them. The proposition "a good will is of value" is strictly hypothetical and means "If there is a good will or the idea of a good will in the mind of any man, then that good will or the idea thereof is of value to the person or persons who contemplate it." But, it will be said, surely the good will is of value to whomever or whatever unconsciously is benefited by it. It is of value to them as parts of a concrete situation but a subject is required for whom the situation possesses value. A merely instrumental value is only a value in so far as it subserves an intrinsic value.¹⁵

We have argued that values are discovered and not created by men and that therefore values exist in the universal consciousness of God. What are the objects that possess value for God? The ideas in the divine mind. What are these ideas if they are not ideas of reality completely cognised by the

12. *Gorgias*, 480.

13. *Religion in the Making* by Alfred North Whitehead, P. 5.

14. *Moral Values and the Idea of God* by W. R. Sorley P. 139.
Cf. *The Faith of a Moralist* by A. E. Taylor, Series I P. 37f.

15. Cf. Sorley *op cit* : P. 498.

divine mind just because it is a whole completely rational and seen to be very good.

The enigma of evil remains unsolved. The attempts of Leibniz and others to solve this problem are well known to you and perhaps considered inadequate. Lotze, in his lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, after explaining the inadequacy of the suggested solutions of the problem concludes :

"The above-mentioned incapacity of our speculative cognition for the solution of this enigma of evil had to be very plainly expressed. For there ought not to remain any seeming as if there were, in expressions which cannot be understood and which can only commend themselves to the imagination through intuitive images, any real speculative proof for the correctness of the religious feeling upon which rests our faith in a good and holy God, and in the destination of the world to the attainment of a blessed end.

"He who does not share this religious conviction, may on account of these last considerations of ours, very easily from a speculative point of view reach that pessimism, which is just now the order of the day, and for which there will be on speculative grounds no refutation. But this Pessimism, which reverts to the thought of an original energy without will, that produces the Good and the Bad alike without design, is not a profound view but is just that cheap and superficial kind of view by which all enigmas are conveniently disposed of—by simply sacrificing all that is most essential and supreme to the unprejudiced mind."¹⁶

Dr. McTaggart considered that the assertion that the universe, when looked at rightly, may be completely good means complete ethical scepticism.¹⁷ There is no judgment of whose truth we are more certain than that pain and sin cannot be completely good. Even if what we think evil were really good

16. Translation edited by George T. Ladd, pp. 127 –128.

17. *Some Dogmas of Religion* P. 209.

it would still remain a fact that we think it evil and surely such a delusion or mistake on our part would be evil. "If, again, the existence of the delusion is pronounced to be a delusion, then this second delusion, which would be admitted to be real, must be pronounced evil, since it is now this delusion which deceives us about the true nature of reality, and hides its goodness from us. And so on indefinitely."¹⁸

It seems to me that evil is a fact which cannot be denied so far as human experience is concerned. Can we reconcile the fact of evil with belief in the existence of a personal God? We might adopt the hypothesis of a finite struggling God or Professor Alexander's suggestion that though the world is pregnant with deity, God is not yet born. There is much to be said in favour of Rashdall's refusal to identify God with the Absolute. The use of the word "God" as a synonym for reality as a whole or for the idea of perfection has led to confusion of thought. An impersonal reality or *ens realissimum* that cannot be related to anything else actual or possible is not the God postulated by religious experience or the locus of all values. Moreover it is difficult to understand how the Absolute could possibly be regarded as a person. The Absolute should mean that which is freed from all relations but is sometimes taken to mean simply the one ultimate ground of all existence. In the former sense God is not the Absolute. There cannot be anything excluded from the Absolute which embraces all finite spirits in a systematic whole. A whole which is composed of persons or finite centres of consciousness cannot itself be a person. Persons are capable of entering into a fellowship which is a real unity but to call such a unity a person would be to commit the fallacy of composition.

The Absolute is sometimes regarded as that which is

18. *Ibid.* p. 210.

complete and perfect in itself. Thus Aristotle thought of God as pure thought eternally contemplating itself. "A second great mistake," writes Mr. Douglas Fawcett, "made by many idealists is to postulate the Absolute. The Absolute cannot be defined simply as 'the whole of reality', since disputes would arise as to the filling of this whole. It is the world-ground as certain idealists, in love with a spiritual re-reading of appearances, conceive it. The Absolute as this spiritual ground of appearances, 'complete, perfect and finished,' confronts us in the Vedanta philosophy of India. It may have been first conceived by tired, hot men in the plains, who liked finished tasks, rest and quiet, not only in their practical lives but also in the thought that matched them. *Brahman* accordingly is above change, but what of the changing world in which we ourselves are changing? The answer is that this world (like the Bradleian 'false' and 'contradictory' appearances showing change, causation, time, space, evil etc.), has only 'practical reality'; appeal to *Maya* saves the situation—for not too exacting critics. Professor Deussen of Kiel, it is true, welcomed this Absolute, would not allow that it belongs to the past. But he defends it as a student of Kant, asserting that space, time, causation etc. are merely features of our phenomenal world. The Absolute is above space and time, changeless, complete, finished; it is veiled by the forms of finite perception and judgment. I reply that a truly objective idealism accepts and stresses a real space-time world of change, and affirms therefore that the World-principle is manifest therein. A different hypothesis about the World-principle is required."¹

The doctrine of *Maya* does not necessarily involve the falsity of the world. *Maya* is the mysterious power of creation. Whether this power is that of producing illusions or realities

is disputed. It is usually considered that Sankara taught that the world is an illusion but Mr. Kokileswar Sastri argues that a great injustice has been done to that philosopher.²⁰ Whatever may have been the views of Sankara he cannot, as Max Muller pointed out, be accepted as the only infallible interpreter of the Vedanta-Sutras.²¹ The system of the great theologian Ramanuja is regarded by his followers as the Vedanta.²² In his view the creature is not identical with but absolutely dependent on the Creator. God indwells but is distinct from the soul of man. He could appeal to the great words of the Brihadaranyaka :

"He who tarrying in the *atman* is different from the *atman*
Whom the *atman* (so long as it is unilluminated) does
not know,

Whose body the *atman* is,

And who inwardly guides the *atman*,

He is "thine *atman*", the inner Guide, the Immortal."²³

Professor Webb is of opinion that no God that is explicitly distinguished from the Absolute can prove a satisfying object to the religious consciousness of any one who is able to ask the question as to what is behind and beyond the God whom he worships.²⁴ By the term Absolute Webb appears to mean the one ultimate ground of all existence. When he tells us that the religious consciousness demands that the supreme God should be the supreme Reality, the Absolute and nothing less, we have no objection provided emphasis falls on the word "supreme."

20. *An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy* Chapter III.

21. *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* P. 186

22. *Introduction to English Translation of Bhagavad Gita* by Lionel Barnett, p. 56.

23. Quoted by Rudolf Otto, *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity Compared and Contrasted*, English translation p. 41.

24. *God and Personality*, p. 218f.

The idea of a struggling God is open to the objection that it leaves us with no one ultimate ground of all existence. It does not explain the origin of the forces of evil against which God struggles. It fails to satisfy the demand of the religious consciousness for a being of infinite perfection, the fountain of all power and wisdom. Equally unsatisfactory is professor Alexander's conception of a God who is not yet born.²⁵ Such hypotheses do not help to solve the problem of evil and leave us with a universe which cannot be called rational.

We have spoken of a universal consciousness as the locus of all values but we must avoid the mistake of regarding the ultimate ground of reality as a person. God is personal but not a person. A person is in no sense complete in himself. He is a member of a society on which he depends for his development and the enjoyment of that life for which alone he is fitted—the life of a community. The religious consciousness demands a God of infinite perfection but a person in abstraction from society is unable to exercise his highest faculties and cultivate the virtues. Infinite perfection to my mind is a value which can only be assigned to a society whose members are so closely united by a common purpose and mutual love that they constitute a perfect unity. To such a unity belongs the richest life and the highest value. A person as such is not a whole but an organic part.

If God is thus a perfect society what is his relation to the world? We may suggest that He purposes to fashion persons who may be incorporated into the divine life. A world is made where men may be trained for membership in the City of God. It may seem to us that the suffering and sorrow and sin are too high a price to pay for the

25. For a good criticism of Alexander see S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 321f.

realisation of the goal but faith replies, "I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed to us afterward."²⁶ Incorporation in the divine life does not mean loss of personal identity but involves a loving union of will, intellect and feeling. The goal is no individual selfish aim but an ideal society, a kingdom of spirits. The ideal society which is God is eternal but in the time process are being developed the citizens of the future. This conception of God satisfies two seemingly contradictory demands of the religious consciousness, the demand for a reality already perfect as an object of worship and the demand for the future realisation of a great ideal as an incentive to self-sacrifice and devotion. Man has to strive for a kingdom which eternally is.

Dr. McTaggart argued that God, if He exists, could not be absolutely perfect so long as the society of selves of which He forms a part is by no means perfect. God might be regarded as destined to become perfect in the end.²⁷ There seems however to be no force in this argument if we regard God as a perfect unity of persons in His essence. Other spirits are incorporated into the divine society as they attain perfection. If there is an end of the world-process then God will become all in all.

I shall conclude my address with a myth, a story invented to convey religious truth, as I believe that Plato was right in adopting this method of trying to describe what lies beyond our human experience. Moreover the lover of myths is, as Aristotle said, in a sense a lover of wisdom or philosopher.²⁸ Listen to the story of Alethes :—

Many years ago there lived in the city of Syracuse a

26. St. Paul, *Epistle to the Romans*. viii. 18.

27. op : cit : p. 280

28. *Metaphysics Lib. I Cap. 2*, quoted by Webb, *God and Personality*, p. 167.

young Greek named Alethes who was a student of philosophy. One night as he was sleeping Hermes came to him in a dream and said, "Rise up, Alethes, put on these winged sandals and come with me to the palace of eternal truth." Alethes did so and flew away with Hermes till he found himself at the door of a golden palace. Entering with Hermes he was introduced to Photon the lord and owner of the place. "I have heard, Alethes," said Photon, "that you are an ardent lover of wisdom, no money-loving sophist but a sincere and honest soul. Here is the reward of your sincerity and devotion—a vision of eternal truth. But first take off your shoes and wash in the waters of Purity for only pure and reverent souls can see the truth. So Alethes went and bathed as he was bid. Then the two ascended the stairs of Desire and came to the chamber of Vision. With bowed heads they entered.

Alethes was immediately conscious of an atmosphere of profound love and goodness that filled the whole room and penetrated into the very depths of his soul. It drew him into the room as a powerful magnet and he realised that he was forever united with the presence that filled the room. The room was full of persons who were giving out and receiving waves of holy love.

The waves of love were carrying far and wide ideas of beauty such as no pen could describe. Alethes asked Photon to tell him the destination of the products of the divine imagination. "These ideas," said Photon, "are the components of your world." "But," said Alethes, "in our world there was no such beauty, harmony and love." "Look at those winged spirits proceeding from the presence" said Photon, "These are the souls of men sent forth into the world in order that they may learn to become humble seekers after truth and transmitters of love. Look again at yon idea that passes out

into the world, it is the value of suffering. In this atmosphere of love its sublimity and charm are plain to see but in your world men call it evil. It is the discipline of love. Without its help no soul can reach perfection and understand the mysteries of love."

Photon took Alethes to a window from which he could see the whole process of evolution. He witnessed the gradual formation in wondrous order of vast systems of stars and suns out of the filmy nebula conveyed far and wide by the waves emanating from the presence. He saw a gaseous ball break away from a larger body and cool down. On its surface appeared continents and seas. Living things soft and structureless emerged and from them proceeded tiny plants and small jelly-like creatures. He witnessed the parallel development of animals and plants: the emergence of brain and nervous system and consciousness, the higher intelligence of man, the formation of society, the growth of civilisation, art, literature, science and religion.

All this orderly development was seen by Alethes but he was quite unconscious of the passage of time in the divine presence. He could not believe Photon who told him that he had witnessed the passing of countless millions of years. And now Alethes saw that there was discord, fighting, cruelty, hatred and vice in the world. "Photon," said he, "how came these evils into the world?" "My son," said Photon, "the winged souls that go forth from the presence take with them the gift of freedom. Without this precious gift no soul can attain perfection. Men misuse their freedom but the presence does not take back the gift. Waves of love go forth bearing fresh gifts of remorse and sorrow. If men refuse these gifts they are sent after death to another place but the waves of love never leave them till they lay hold on remorse and sorrow and their sin is healed."

Alethes saw winged spirits returning. "These," said

Photon, "have accepted the gifts of sorrow and remorse. They have learned the mystery of love. Like yourself they have bathed in the waters of Purity and will forever remain united with their fellows in this holy presence."

Let us leave our friend Alethes in the realm of values to enjoy perpetual peace.

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Mystical experiences : Are they a reality ?

By

C. A. TULPULÉ,

1. The subject-matter of the present paper ought to be of great importance to all humanity, embracing as it does the question of the reliability and truth of higher human sensibility. Man's existence may be taken to be on three different planes of life, one above and the other below his normal sensations, in connection with the day-to-day world. He does not normally understand that he lives on all these three planes but is totally absorbed in his every day affairs ; but even there, engrossed in the pursuit of pleasure and pain and of all the dualities and conditions that make up human existence, he has to take note of the fact that his universe is physical as well as spiritual, embodied as also made up, of uncircumscribed force ; he can appreciate his surroundings for the effects that they have upon his physical system, but he finds those effects connected together on the mental plane. His appreciation of the physical world consists of the response and desire it awakens in his mind, and for him the world consists not so much in the objects themselves, as in the form of his perceptions about them. It is these perceptions of his that modify his mental outlook and dominate his physical existence. When these perceptions are simple and elementary producing only isolated results on the mental plane, the individuality evolved may be said to be also elementary and resting on a lower spiritual plane. The more complicated the perceptions with greater ramifications and inter-connections, the higher is the type of mentality produced ; until the wave-crest of complications is passed, and there begins a process of simplification and resolution into integral parts, which on account of the perspective it secures, becomes knowledge

and crystalises into power, this may be said to be the highest stage of mental development, attainable by man, and our object in this paper will be, to connect these three states together, and to ascertain whether the experiences which are described as having been attained by various mystics of all times and creeds correspond to this highest stage of human development and have a basis in unshakeable fact.

2. For this purpose, it is necessary to see what connection there is between matter and mind, for, the human existence is only an effect of these two. Scientists are engaged in proving the original unity of matter and finding out what effects energy has upon it. The ultimate unity of all matter is no more a question of doubt, and recent experiments have shown that the application of energy to atomic forms of matter produces a disintegration and a change of state, which comes under another classification and denomination of material things. An atom is held together like an immense solar system, by a central proton with a number of electrons revolving about, thus producing a state of equilibrium. Any change in this point and kind of equilibrium, produces a consequent change in the kind of matter. This means that material forms are only different manifestations of equiposed centres of energy of which the manifest universe is produced. It is the energy that really matters, and which, resolved into different manifestations by different arrangements of the energy centres, becomes matter. The energy that pulsates through universal life is shown in man in the form of his mind and that is why, to man the whole world is made up of mind-substance. The problem thus resolves itself into a question of how the mind energy, which has transmuted itself into the lower form of physical matter, can be tuned to show a higher pitch, and be made to feel as uncircumscribed energy alone.

3. Looking at the thing from another point of view, we have to see how man's experiences in the material as well as

the spiritual world are, as to the mechanism of perception, only slightly removed from one another. When we think of the material world, we think of it in terms of our capacity to feel it through the various senses and of the effect that is produced by their impacts upon our mind. Crude matter is thus nothing but a centre for transmitting and obstructing particular kinds of waves of energy, which are taken up and responded to by our various senses. To make the point clearer, an object which is felt as a physical object, causing obstruction to one sense, may not be felt as a physical object at all by another sense. Thus air is not an object for the eye but it is an object for the sense of touch, as it is in a different way, an object for our ears. But each in its turn is an object for the perceiving mind, to which the senses have been only so many carriers, each with a different set of powers and capacities. Living and moving in this world of objects, one naturally feels the truth of them, when they excite our different senses and is tempted to hold that whatever else may be perceived by the mind without exciting our senses, can not be accepted as true. But in thus thinking, we are only losing sight of the fact that objects are really perceived, not by the senses, but by the co-ordinating mind, as unconnected with it the senses by themselves have very little or no power to produce knowledge. And it is by the knowledge of things that we feel their reality. If in this way, physical perception is only one aspect of mental capacity helpful in producing knowledge, one can not very well say that the experiences of the mind itself which is the fountain of knowledge are not truths unless they are sealed by the stamp of the senses. The senses are, as it were, so many facets on the gem of the mind in which, the rays coming from outside objects are caught up and imprisoned, to form knowledge; but it is not a few facets that make up the gem, as there might be and must be others as well, of the existence of which we are unaware and all these facets, when worked upon the living mind substance

alone, are capable of producing illumination. Thus it can be said that, at best our physical perception is only one kind of perception, which is as capable of being true or untrue, as any other kind of perception to which our physical senses have not contributed.

4. This brings us directly to the question as to how we are to ascertain, which of our merely mental experiences, can be said to be true and which must be classified as hallucinations; or in other words, is there any test for discovering which aspects of our mental perceptions, have an innate connection with absolute truth and are capable of uplifting us and which are not so. We shall be only able to find this out by trying to understand the connection between our minds and that universal energy, of the manifestation of which, our minds are only a part. There can be no doubt that in the human mechanism, the non-physical is more powerful than the physical, and as in the physical world, the non-physical forms of energy are more powerful and more subtle than the physical ones, we must assume that the non-physical in man must be also of a pattern with the non-physical in the universe. The fact that man's mental outlook responds to the non-physical in the universe and that by a concentration of his mind, man is able to discover and understand the laws of this non-physical in the universe, goes to establish such an inter-connection. When this thing is once fully ascertained and appreciated, it is but an easy step therefrom to perceive, that our mental perceptions from the highest mystical experiences to the lowest manifestations of demoniac temper, are nothing more than the image of the working of the universal law, from the centre to the periphery. In thus understanding the limitations of our subject and its incipient nature, we shall be able to follow the question that we have set before ourselves, to elucidate.

5. Next we have to ascertain what are known as the mystical experiences and how they are brought about. Mysticism has been variously explained, but the definition or description rather, that appeals to me most, is that contained in the phrase "silent enjoyment of God". It is this something which brings a completeness and rounds off our incomplete existence. We are always craving, desiring with all our capacities, for fulfilment of our purpose, that will leave us, without a want any more. I am speaking, not of physical wants but spiritual deficiency. And it is this urge, that has led man throughout the ages, to search for something higher, something that is so illusive yet so desirable, that we, as it were, feel out his existence. This search has led him through a number of processes and experiments, which have formed according to his different inclinations, into schools of conduct and thought. They are his different attitudes to the eternal question, based upon his particular circumstance and platform. He approaches the question, either as a seeker of knowledge, or as an humble devotee, of the supreme law, or more practical and immersed in the world of forms about him, as a doer of things as his duty appoints them; or sometimes he may think of understanding the nature of the powers and capacities inherent to his own being, and through them, to approach the heart of things.

6. Mystical experiences therefore are certain states of the mind of the seeker both in relation to the outer world and to his consciousness of the presence of God. When man is trying to approach the Divine, he does so because he is confused and pained by the maddening diversity of his surroundings and the effect they have upon him. Not that he wants to get rid of his circumstances, but to find a peaceful co-ordination existing between them and himself. He wants to eliminate the jarring notes that are produced in his mind by the effects of things about him, and to find out how in the case of each isolated

experience, he can lead a life of harmony, which is not disturbed or destroyed by remnants of memory or imaginings of the future. To do so he has to cultivate an attitude of the mind in which there will be an extreme adaptability in relation to each consecutive thought, without in any way disturbing his mental equipoise, without which the adaptability will have been cultivated in vain. Finding that Nature changeful but eternally unchanged, the seeker seeks to effect a change in himself. Giving up the task of trying to be true to ever-changing and indestructible circumstance, he attempts to be true to himself, to such an extent that, in every single experience he is never taken out of himself and from that advantageous position, comes to find that the changes in his surroundings are only superficial changes, and the substance of things ever remains undisturbed. He is like a watcher on the sea shore; the face of the water is disturbed by innumerable waves large and small, sometimes dancing in merriment, at others lashing themselves in fury, always confusing, yet always explained. The waves are many and different, the ocean is one and the same. The watcher fixes his attention upon internal unity, rather than the outside diversity. He finds in himself another manifestation of the phenomena that are spread out before him. The innumerable ideas that form themselves upon his mind, disappear only to be succeeded by still others, leave changeless the spiritual substance of which he is formed and over which they have been only passing incidents. In this similarity of experience in the outer and the inner world, he finds an innate harmony and seeks to emphasize it and catch the surge of its increasing force, by removing his attention from the surface and fixing it upon the substance. This is in fact the seeker's attempt how best he can so adjust his mental outlook, as to be able to maintain his balance from moment to moment, yet leave himself and his faculties unbenumbed. His experiences are all gained in this search.

7. With his gaze thus concentrated upon his spiritual objective, he passes through a variety of experience. Beginning with an accentuation of the form of the particular idea, that is then present to his mind, accompanied by a wiping out, partial or total, of all other phenomena of thought a relaxation of senses and their objects, he goes to meet a world, with which he finds himself in growing sympathy; he finds his understanding becoming more full, his sympathies more universal and his joys increasing. There is a sort of mental illumination, a panormic picture in which, against a back-ground of the yet Unknown Dark, which holds forth possibilities of phosphorescent brilliance, are dotted the objects and individuals of the physical world; so many points of glowing lights, which warm the heart and delight the intelligence as manifestations of an all-pervading unity. This larger sympathy with life, this unclouded delight in all creation, is accompanied by a feeling that his own body is almost made up of something lighter than what it used to be; he feels that his outlook of life has become more impersonal and as such more truthful, that his thoughts are getting less and less soiled by his desires, that even his enjoyment of life has taken up the colour, not of hectic but short-lived passion, but of steady and sympathetic appreciation, a calm light sending out rays of cool and collected strength. Sometimes the seeker has a feeling that he has been, as it were, taken in hand by the Divine, that his acts and impulses are only manifestations of the Divine purpose, that he has been made the object of particular favour, as the mouthpiece of God. He feels that he is surrounded on all sides by the divine mystery and that even his heart is suffused by that Presence. He feels himself to be the particular object of Grace. God speaks to him in human voice and his eyes are blessed by being allowed to linger upon the beauty and majesty of His face. Passing from this stage of a personal and intensely human companionship, to that where he cherishes the Presence as

something above substance and form, his vision is sometimes wrapped up in brilliancy of light, and his attention is absorbed in the eternal music of the Unspoken Voice. More and more immersed in a contemplation of these signs, which he feels to be personal contacts with the Infinite, he feels that his whole being is immersed in the substance of nectarious peace, that whatever was crude and earthly in his composition is transformed and has taken up the lightness and life of untrammelled energy, that his narrow aelf has spread out to encompass all creation, and that he himself is only a sounding board for the playing of the Divine Tune. Peace on all sides, and universal understanding covers him up like a cloak and his nature partakes of light-life.

8. If we were to take up a simile from music and to divide man's mental experiences into three octaves, the notes sounded above may be said to form the third or upper octave, whereas his normal experiences would form the second or middle octave. There is a primary or lower octave of sensations which has got also to be considered. Our understanding of human experience will not be complete unless all the three systems are considered analysed and co-ordinated. If the capacity to go from variety to unity be the chief feature of the middle octave, as also a capacity to degenerate from the many to the numberless, the essential condition of the upper octave will be found to be a continuous and almost complete approach to an essential oneness. As against this, the headnote of the lower octave of mental phenomena will be its capacity to split up into innumerable distinctions, and so to emphasize them as to create an unsurmountable confusion in the mind. In this way every single idea becomes an obsession and a terror by itself, incapable of discipline, as it is incapable of conquest. The ruling note of mental experiences in the higher spiritual atmosphere is that of unity, joy, and peace. As against this, the ideas that dominate the mental experien-

ces in the lower stage make up for a religion based upon fear and pacification, diversity and turmoil. From the one to the many, from the many to the innumerable, seems to be the course which power takes in its manifestation and transformation from mere energy to mere matter, only from that stage to turn back upon itself once again, and retracing its footsteps to go back to where it came from. Mental energy in the form of ideas and knowledge also follows the same course, the same universal rhythm, in which it is but one little speck of light.

9. It has been said that mystical experiences, even though they might be real to the mystic himself, need not have any authority, over those who do not feel that influence. And one reason that is given of putting forward such a proposition is, as is said by William James, that mystical experiences are only one-half of man's mental appreciations. Before we can say that these experiences must be held to be authoritative over the whole world, we shall have to take into consideration the demoniac as well as godly experiences. But it has only to be seen, that these other experiences in the primary octave, have a place in the development of things, which is as real or otherwise, as the experiences in the other two periods. It is impossible to say that one is more true than the other, as it is impossible to say that one point on the rim of a revolving wheel, is higher or lower than another. The one which is on a level with our eyes at a particular moment, is the one which we feel to be the higher and the real, though there might be another which is at a different level, and which may be styled to be higher or lower along the line, as the mood fits us.

10. We have to see if this analysis of the situation is borne out by our study of man's mental and physical faculties and capacities. If we can find this central rhythm obtaining full sway in the sphere of our physical and mental perceptions, then we can definitely say that mystical experiences are as

real as sensory experiences. If we can convince ourselves of this reality, a great obstacle in our desire to achieve them will be over, in as much as mystics of all ages and climes have concurred in describing their experiences, as the source of their unlimited peace and happiness. None can want anything more.

11. In the human body, man seems to have been endowed with a powerful instrument, by which the transformation of energy into matter and vice versa, is noted, understood, and put into living thought. Perhaps that is the only difference which we can ultimately find, between man and other living organisms. This power, by which the amazingly fine processes of the production and manifestation of thought, in relation to its control over the body and the material world are made clear, seems to have been located in the nervous system, with its important centres in the brain, the back-bone and the cervical cavity, as well as the powerful networks of nerves, which the scientists describe as plexuses and which are known to yogic philosophy, as the 'chakras'. Each plexus seems to have control over a particular portion of the human organism, and all of them together governed by the nervous chords in the back-bone and reaching far into the brain have control over the physical, mental and even the spiritual processes of the human body. The mind though itself without form must operate with the aid of a formal machinery, and an instrument delicate enough for the purpose, seems to have been devised in the human nervous system. It seems as if, all the plexuses have for their own limited purposes a conscious power and control of their own and that those that are located in the lower portion of the human body operate the more material of man's functions. The plexus controlling the heart guides the system of breath, while those in the throat and near the eyes control the powers of voice and vision. When all these are made subservient to the

central will, and their connections with the world of matter and form through the senses severed, consciousness remains only in the plexus of the brain, detached from all sense-objects and all ideas of time, space, and matter. This consciousness is the embodiment of peace and harmony, in as much as, there is no consciousness of a warring duality. The attainment of this experience is rendered possible, by systematic study of the science of religions, or by accidental absorption of the thinking or worshipping mind. This is the analysis of mystical experiences, in all their forms and substance, which is provided by Dnyaneshwar, in the sixth chapter of his monumental work and is emphasized by him again and again at other places. As opposed to the experiences of grace and happiness which are the mystic's inheritance, we have the manifestations of a lower order of spiritual energy, where by the accentuation and isolation of a particular idea of materialistic import, a demoniac temper or an evil sub-conscious power is let loose. This is only done by reversing the process, which has been described above, and in place of developing a perception of unity and peace, attempting an isolation, that wars against an equally powerful diversity. That is the other half of spiritual experiences, the half in which, fear and discord, are the master. The same human instrument is capable of sounding all the notes, from the lowest to the highest, that can be conceived ; as Kabir says "Mind is one ; man alone can use it, either for his emancipation or eternal bondage."

12. The purpose of our inquiry has been to try and understand, if mystical experiences, which have been cherished by so many noble characters amongst us can be call living truths, or merely are manifestations of disease. This is a doubt, which has very often occupied our minds, and spoiled our enjoyment of a happiness, which we would fain achieve but are very often afraid to attain. The idea that these experiences, which are so rare, may also be unhealthy, has

been as powerful a deterrent in our quest, as the idea that, when a man attempts something, which is out of the common run, he is getting unnatural. It is easy to see from the analysis we have made above, that all these different manifestations in themselves result from the same organic machinery, and therefore can not be of a substance different from our normal experiences. This makes them out to be perfectly true, at least as true as any of our other perceptions. Whether one should attempt to achieve them, will depend more upon the place one occupies on the mental plane ; but if one is tempted to do so, he need not be deterred by vague doubts and disconcerting fear.

Perception and its object.

By

T. V. R. MURTI.

1. There are two main contentions—suppositions it may be, which lie at the basis of this paper : one that a subjective fact or state is nothing in itself but the relation of the subject or knowledge to the object, and second that knowledge is not the object of introspection even. The first contention militates against the self-sufficiency of any subjective fact, as perception, memory, ideas and the like; it is against the bifurcation into the world of ideas and the world of extension. Such a bifurcation may well explain certain things as perspectives and the relativity of *sensa* as no other theory does, but it leads to a very curious conclusion : there can be no subjective illusions. I can be mistaken about the outer object; it may not be there; but the fact that I had such a misperception is true, real as a subjective fact. If this were pushed further, it would mean that no illusion is cancelled at all; for the false belief would continue to exist even after the knowledge that the illusory is not there. The existence or the non-existence of the object has no relation to, or influence on, our ideas; we should indifferently consider all ideas real or illusory. Ultimately, no cognitive state should even refer to anything external. In contrast to the above, we should hold that a subjective fact is simply the relatedness of the subject to the object. A direct consequence of this is that differences in the state are traceable solely to differences in the object.

The second contention directly traverses the commonly received notion that knowledge is an object of introspection. There is first the perception and then the direct knowledge of it as such through introspection. We have only to appeal to introspection to determine the nature of the subjective state.

But all this is fallacious. The identity of the perceiving with what is perceived later on is vital to the validity of introspection. This identity, however, can never be proved, for admittedly no perception perceives itself any time. There is also an *a priori* consideration which would go to prove that knowledge is not an object, nor is it to be identified with the states. A distinction between one subjective fact and another, between perception and conception etc, is made; in fact a variety of them is readily accepted. If so it is at once subject to this argument: Differents, e.g. A and B, are also different from knowledge; if we distinguish one thing-A-from another -B-, we *ipso facto* distinguish them both from the subject or knowledge. Suppose one of the differents-A-were identical with knowledge, then when B is known the latter will not be different from A, unless it were held that knowledge knows the object and at once knows that as different from itself—an impossible feat. This contention, when analysed, would imply that knowledge itself is an object. So even if one of the differents were identical with knowledge, it will not be different from the other—B; and this is to violate the granted assumption that A and B are different. This is to say that knowledge excludes exclusions; unless knowledge were different from differents or exclusions, a knowledge of them as differents is not possible; the assertion that two things are different cannot even be made. As a necessary corollary it follows that differences in the subjective are traceable to differences in the objects. And perception to be different from other cognitive states, should have some object special to it. Besides, the precise position of perception among other states has to be indicated. To this end, a brief classification of the states based solely on their content is called for.

2. The classification that is essayed here is not based on the order of discovery, but is dictated by the exigencies of exposition; perhaps it would be more consistent to begin with

where we shall end. We shall begin with the logically simpler entities that are found in all states. Such simple entities are qualities or describable characters, anything that can be fixed upon thought as a definite something. They include a variety of things ranging from colours, tastes and other simple qualities to a feeling, image or verbal form; and to this class must belong the 'rope-snake' and other illusory appearances, as we shall see later on. Broadly speaking, they represent the 'what' of the judgment—that by which we are able to describe, doubt or even deny things. It would not be wrong to call them universals because of their free character, provided we did not confound them with generalities or generalisations; the latter are, strictly speaking, hypothetical objects or mere possibilities, while the universal is what is actually present in knowledge. It has also nothing to do with distributedness or applicability to, or occurrence in, a number of instances. A universal need not recur at all, though being definite and describable there is no limit to its occasions. Any cognitive state is describable just because of these characters, and as such the 'what' is never absent from any state; it is not thus the distinguishing character of any one state. Except in pure phantasy or contemplation, the 'what' is not encountered in its pristine form; it is always the what of a that—a judgment.

The general character of discursive thought or judgment is the invariable complexity of content. The distinction between the symbol —'what',— and the symbolised —'that'—, between an actually present character and the absent entity which is being referred to, is never lost sight of. The symbol we may say, is wholly within knowledge, while the symbolised is that which is sought to be reached, and is, to that extent, external. This contrast in the content itself facilitates the distinction of them both from knowledge in virtue of the rule —'differents are also different from knowledge'.

Judgment as the reference or ascription of a what to a that, which is identified with Reality or a specific portion of it, presupposes the prior experience of the that in a pure form. The 'that' does not fall within the judgment, being only referred to by it. In the last resort, the 'that' cannot be reduced to a 'what' without at once abolishing the judgment; it would become a pure phantasy or dream having no relation, actual or possible, to reality. This is to say that the 'that' cannot be understood as a character, universal. Our mode of grasping the 'that' must be different from that of the 'what'. To anticipate, we can say that the 'that' is the particular, as opposed to the 'what' which is universal, and that the particular is the object in perception. This serves as the sole feature distinguishing perception from other states.

That perception has for its object the 'that' or the particular and not a judgment is well brought out by an analysis of recognition—the least developed form of judgment. Recognition can be defined as the collation of two perceptions of the same object. We recognise an object as having been perceived before, e. g., *this* A is *that* A. In identifying the A now before me as the A that was experienced before, I am assuming that a certain character, may be the colour or shape of the object, as absolutely identical in both the cases. In fact this identity is not only not questioned, but is the very basis of my being in a position to refer the two experiences, which are admittedly different, to one and the same object. It can well be said that the identity of A acts as the middle term in arriving at the recognitive judgment — '*This* A is *that* A' or vice versa. It will not be wrong therefore to assume that A—a known character—is identical in the two experiences. Now the question is: how one experience of A is felt as '*this* A', but the other as '*that* A'; to what is the difference due? A ready answer is that A is experienced

at two different times. But it is inexplicable how empty time should be able to make any difference to A ; how can time be cognised along with A at all ? A correcter answer would be that A is encountered amidst different circumstances in different environment in each case. But the environment will not serve to distinguish the two 'A's unless it were held that the environment in each case contributes something to, or enters into, the constitution of A, thereby differentiating it. That is, when A was first perceived the environment at that time must have been cognised along with A, and must have contributed something to A, and then again when it is now recognised, the environment at this time must be performing a similar office. But can the environment serve to distinguish A, i.e., enter into its composition, if A and its environment were cognised separately in several acts of perception ? Even if given in close succession, it would be A and the environment, but not *that* A or *this* A, ; that is, it would not serve to *qualify* A at all. We may later on distinguish between A and its environment, but initially the two must have been given together. And 'given together' should mean the non-separability of the one from the other ; the one must be merged in the other, become quite a mode or adjective of it, so that when A is revived or recognised later on it may have the stamp or the flavour of the environment upon it as '*that* A' in contrast to '*this* A'.

3. Once we accept the ingress of the environment into the composition of A, there is no stopping anywhere ; any such stopping would be arbitrary. When a bright patch of colour is seen, we can all see the relevance of the flower, the flower-bed or even the entire garden to the colour ; we may not so readily accept the ingress of other and remote entities. But in the percept there is no evidence of any sharp demarcation ; the garden itself is one with the surrounding objects, and they with others and so on. We should not therefore

be greatly in the wrong if we take the object of perception as a character that is not sufficiently distinguished from the environment, even to the extent of its being ; it is to all intents stuck up, fixed up with and kept in position, by all other entities. It is like the point of a cone or the sharp edge of a blade supported by the whole surface and the base. We thus see why A experienced previously and subsequently recognised should acquire the unique incommunicable characters—*that* and *this*. The object of perception is a unique particular invariably. A particular can be defined as that in whose composition all other entities enter, of course with varying degrees of relationship and relevance. It is what it is entirely because of others. It is the absolutely conditioned, fixed irrevocably and inexorably by its position to other entities, both spatially and temporally. Such an object is not reversible ; we cannot have the object of any perception back again. For this would require the bringing back of the entire environment, and that too precisely in the same order. And even if we did succeed in so doing by any chance, we shall be left without the power to recognise that we are encountering the same object over again. There being no difference between the two objects, a sense of contrast, as was possible in recognition as *this* A and *that* A, is also absent. We cannot even say that there are *two* acts of perception ; for we have all along contended that difference in the objective is entirely due to difference in the object ; the subjective is nothing in itself but the relatedness of the subject to the object.

It might be thought that if all conceivable entities condition a particular—the object in perception—then when we perceive one entity we should at once be aware of all entities existing at that time. But this objection just misses the point. It is precisely because a certain entity is *not* known as distinct and freed from its surrounding that it is particular ; and as

there is no arbitrary demarcation of the entities from which it is not distinguished, it is safer to assume that it is not so distinguished from the entire realm of entities and not merely from some. The absence of any felt distinction of the object is itself a sufficient evidence for the particularity of the object. And this absence of the distinction itself we know by contrasting it with a later stage when such distinctions are made. In actual perception there is no consciousness of our perceiving a particular entity ; the whole thing is a continuum, from which distinctions arise later on, but in which actually there is none.

We have, in perception, no means of distinguishing knowledge from object or vice versa. For the rule—differentials are also different from knowledge—could not be applied here, as we did in the case of judgment. Moreover, there is no evidence of any gap between knowledge and object in perception. For, to be aware of a gap even we are to be aware of the entities between which the gap yawns ; then we are already acquainted with the entity between which and knowledge the gap is posited. This comes to mean that knowledge cannot know anything by keeping aloof ; to know is to identify, to be one with the object at least for the time being and to a limited extent. And this fact of identification is consciously known when the fact of identification has already ceased to exist ; that is when distinctions in the objective arise.

To define, perception as a subjective state is the identification of knowledge with an object that is unique and particular, with an entity whose position is fixed by its relation with all other entities. And as we have seen, no two particulars can be alike, each is exclusive of all others. We started with the notion that knowledge is distinct from object, and that it excludes all exclusions. In perception we find we have reached a level where knowledge is one with or has become identified with the object ; knowledge itself becomes a parti-

cular ; it does not exclude exclusions, but includes implicitly all exclusions. We cannot possibly sink lower.

4. Certain objections against this theory of perception have to be considered. It might be urged that perception, on this view, would hardly be a conscious psychic state. The least unit of thought is judgment; conscious life, even its less developed stages, is invariably purposive and interpretative. Perception can well be a rudimentary judgment; but it is not a state prior to, or more primordial than, judgment. It should be accepted that on our theory perception is not, like reflection or imagination, self-conscious, as the distinction between content and knowledge is completely absent in perception. All conscious states need not, however, be self-conscious too. And we claim that self-conscious reflection itself points, by contrast, to a state prior and basic to it. Reflection is to be defined as the consciousness of either the content as to a consciousness or the consciousness of content. In either case a distinction of knowledge from object is necessary. And for the possibility of such a distinction an acquaintance with object which in turn does not presuppose a knowledge of the distinction is needed.

Judgment as the ascription of a what to a that necessarily posits the transcendence of the that as its terminus of reference. We have already seen that the that cannot be reduced to the what without thereby doing away with the difference between statements of avowed phantasy and judgments—the judgment-form being common to both. The latter have reference to an actual or possible entity—the that. If this itself constituted a part of the judgment, no judgment need be false; and none can be more or less real; the subjective would be self-sufficient. If then the that were perforce to fall outside the judgment, how could we significantly refer to it invariably in all judgments if we denied ourselves any acquaintance of it except through judgment ? Such an acquaintance is made in perception or belief.

One more futile attempt at resurrecting "pure sensationism" long decently interred, it might be thought. Here also are all the well-known symptoms of sensationalism—the passive reception of the sense-data, the "simple ideas" followed by judgment engendered through the mechanical laws of association, etc. it might be said. But in our theory, perception has for its object, not a bare quality severely alone, but a continuum, a particular. To arrive at the bare quality we have to make distinctions and abstractions in the continuum presented—quite a complicated and highly reflective process and not to be confounded with our perception. Our theory conceives perception as that in which such operations are not present; it is just at the other end of pure sensation. If a metaphorical way of speaking is excusable, we can say that the object of perception is the thickest and least free. In the higher states there is a progressive thinning out and freeing of the object as it were. Discrimination really frees the object from its surrounding by effecting a contrast between it and the environment. To distinguish is to disengage; and this we see even at the level of recognition. Due to this distinction in the objective is the distinction of knowledge from object brought to the foreground. The object of discrimination has a reference to something external to it; it is still tied down by implication and interpretation; it is made to do the work of a symbol, and is not completely free. In contemplation, the object is freed from all suggestions and interpretations; it is a pure universal.

5. How does our theory accommodate illusory perception? The generic character of perception must be present in illusion, besides its difference from perception. In the state of illusion there is no distinction between the 'snake' and the rope, the this. And with the absence of distinctions in the objective, there is also non-distinction of knowledge with object. There is thus perception; the 'snake' is there taken as an ultimate particular, indistinguishable from all the surrounding empirical

objects; it is itself mistaken as an empirical object. In this respect, there is nothing to distinguish illusory from valid perception. Cancellation comes in; certain other percepts follow which are conclusive of the 'this' being the rope. If the two perceptions merely followed each other as temporal processes, there will not be any feeling of cancellation. Both of them are to be collated and contrasted, and the coercive character of the rope-perception has to be accepted. What happens then is that the 'snake' is freed completely from all its surroundings, from the 'this' etc.; its particular localisation then and there is found untenable. And the 'snake' is so completely freed at one stroke that the utter impossibility of its past, and future relations to the rope is realised. It now dawns upon us that the 'snake' is a pure universal. Universal because it has no abode; it is nowhere and everywhere. It was by a freak of accident that it got itself tied to the presentation before us. Cancellation merely brings out the absolutely free floating character of the 'snake'. Illusory perception therefore is constituted of a confusion of an absolute universal—the snake—with a particular object—the rope. Or as it is technically put, between two subjective functions pure contemplation and perception are confounded; the pure universal is directly intuited by the Sākṣi, the particular is known by the Pramātr.

On the analogy of the illusory, every normal perception can be considered as a case of illusion. The illusion here is that knowledge which excludes all exclusions and is, as one may say, the highest universal is identified with a particular object, thereby losing its universality; it becomes, as it were a mode of the object, getting localised and temporalised. In the stage of perception, as in the corresponding stage of illusion, there is no distinction between knowledge and object. When discrimination sets in, knowledge is at once sharply distinguished from the object. Every reflective knowledge cancels as it were, this false identification in perception. But

reflection brings in another trouble ; knowledge, though distinguished from object, is yet contrasted with it, as if the two were co-equals—objects that appear on the same plane of existence. And to that extent knowledge is still far from being realised as universal. The attempt to cancel the illusion of perception by reflection is like driving Satan with the help of Beelzebub. But it proves one thing : the right of knowledge can be vindicated; it can be freed; and discrimination shows the way, though the culmination of the vindication will mean the cessation of all discrimination in a stage of pure contemplation.



Substance and Attribute in Saiva Siddhanta.

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYAN SASTRI,

One of the crucial questions in metaphysics relates to substance and attribute. Common sense believes that while attributes are many and sometimes fleeting, the substance that possesses them is one and constant. Such a position, however, does not stand inquiry ; for the possession of attributes is itself an attribute ; the conception of substance as the possessor of this too launches us on an infinite regress ; and in any case we are left with a substance which is a "something I know not what", an irrelevant ghost, which merits no recognition whether on the ground of intelligibility or that of utility. Even assuming the existence of such a substrate, numerous problems arise as to its unity or plurality and as to its relation to the attributes. If substance is one, why should certain attributes alone be cognised sometimes and certain others at other times ? If there be many substances, how are they differentiated one from another ? To say that the attributes differentiate them would involve reciprocal dependence in that plurality of attributes requires plurality of substances, while there would be no plurality of substances but for the plurality of attributes. Again, how does the substance possess the attributes ? The relation between the two, call it inherence or whatever else you like, is it other than the terms related, or identical with either or both of them ? If identical with either, it cannot relate the other ; if different from both, we require a further relation to relate this to the relata ; if identical with both, there is no difference between the relata and consequently no relationing. The concept of substance as a substrate of attributes has, therefore, to be discarded. Either there is no substance at all or it must be conceived in some way other than as the possessor of

attributes. The former is the way of Buddhistic Idealism, which denies permanent substances, without and within ; the latter is the way of Vedānta Idealism, which recognises one supreme substance which is neither substrate nor quality, both substrate and quality being illusory manifestations thereof.

The Śaiva Siddhānta is not idealistic. It is pluralist in ontology and realist in epistemology. It accepts the independent reality of God, souls and the material world, and treats right cognition as that which corresponds to the object. It may be expected that in such a system the concept of substance as substrate will be kept on somehow in spite of the metaphysical difficulties. Strange to say, it is thrown out, for reasons that savour strongly of Idealism. We shall let the Siddhāntin (in this instance, Śivajñāna Yogin, the Tamil commentator on the *Sivajñānabodha*) speak for himself, and then offer our comments.

TRANSLATION.

Be this so : since it is said "that which is sound alone is Sabdatanmātra, that which is touch alone is sparśa-tanmātra, that which is colour alone is rūpa-tanmātra," it follows that the tanmātras are mere qualities ; for, if it were also possessor of the qualities, it could not intelligibly be called mātra, signifying the exclusion of all else. That being so, the tanmātras, which are of the nature of qualities, cannot be the causes of ether etc., which are possessors of qualities. If you say this, you speak in ignorance. You seem to have forgotten what was said about the whole world from the intellect down to the earth being the product of the three guṇas (qualities). Understand then the following : since the whole world is of the nature of luminosity, calmness and happiness constituted of the sattva-guṇa, of the nature of activity, fearfulness and misery constituted of the rajo-guṇa,

and of the nature of inertia, stupidity and delusion constituted of the *tamo-guṇa*, the material cause of what is thus cannot be anything but *mūlaprakṛti*; that being so, the whole world is but of the nature of the *guṇas* (qualities); just as in experience many men grouped together are called an army, and many trees grouped together are called a forest, the qualities themselves when associated *inter se* are in experience designated as the possessor of the quality or as substance; other than this, there is nothing called possessor of the quality; hence, the view of the *Vaiśeṣikas*; and others, who maintain a great difference between the quality and its possessor is not acceptable to the *Saiva Siddhāntin*; this being so, the origination of gross elements like ether from the subtle sound etc., which are *tanmātras*, is intelligible.

Further, the *Vaiśeṣikas* and others, not realising that the whole is but the aggregate of the parts, declare a great difference between the whole and the parts; they say also that activity (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*) are different from substance; these (doctrines) are not acceptable; this being so, there is no relation of inherence (*samavāya*) as distinct from that of identity (*tādātmya*); all this is to be understood from the reasoning set forth in respect of the quality and the possessor of the quality.

Be this so; since there is the experience "I saw that with my eyes; I touched the same with my hands", it follows that one thing alone is the object for both the sense of sight and the sense of touch; that following, since it is not possible for the eyes to cognise touch or for the skin to cognise colour, should it not be concluded that other than these and as the object for both the senses there exists a thing which is the possessor of the qualities?

If this be asked, that is not so; because of the rule that sense like sight cognise only colour etc. respectively, even if it

be assumed that other than the qualities, colour etc., there is a thing which is the possessor of the qualities, this can not be the object (of cognition) for the senses ; further, the evidence here offered to the effect that other than the quality there is no possessor of the quality is strong ; therefore the experience "I saw that, I touched the same", which occurs as if both senses had one and the same object, may be a delusive experience ; or it may be a figurative usage due to the qualities when aggregated being named the possessor of the qualities and standing as a unit ; instead of holding to either of these views, it is not intelligible to hold that because of that (experience) the possessor of the quality is a distinct thing.

This being so, it is to be understood that the qualities themselves from a collective point of view are called the possessor of the qualities, and from a distributive point of view are called qualities¹. A more detailed statement will be too extensive ; it is to be found in the *Pauṣkara* etc.

From this there result the following: the state where the five qualities from sound to smell stand collectively without differentiation is the tanmātra of smell ; the state where the four qualities from sound to taste stand collectively without differentiation is the tanmātra of taste ; the state where the three qualities from sound to colour stand collectively without differentiation is the tanmātra of colour , the state where sound and touch stand together without differentiation is the tanmātra of touch ; the state where even the one quality of sound stands in its general nature, without differentiation into loud sound, soft sound etc., is the tanmātra of sound ; hence quality alone is called tanmātra ; this being so, there follows the causality of these with regard to ether etc. respectively,

1. cf. Samudāye guṇi-vyavahārah, pratyekam guṇa-vyavahāro bhavati—
(*Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, P.459).

which have each one quality more (than the earlier in the series).²

It will be evident from this passage that the Siddhāntin is fully alive to the difficulties of looking on substance as a substrate in which attributes inhere. His consciousness of these difficulties leads him to treat it as a mode of looking at attributes. Just as we speak of men individually and of humanity in the aggregate, we speak of attributes individually and substance in the aggregate. Even what is called a single attribute may be treated as a substance, because that too is an aggregate of difference within itself; thus 'colour' is an attribute in relation to 'touch', 'taste' etc., while it is a substance in relation to 'white', 'black', etc. The difference between substance and attribute is thus entirely one of points of view. What is or is not a substance depends on how we look at it. Nor is this all; the every existence of substance depends on our experience; for, whatever one may hold as to the external reality of substance, it cannot seriously be contended that attributes are real independently of our experience. There is no colour or taste or smell except in and for experience. It is possible to imagine a material collocation that presents these experiences to us, but with this we are back at the stage of belief in a "something I know not what" wherein qualities inhere. If reason makes us discard this substrate, it cannot justify the ascription of independent reality to attributes. The path the Siddhāntin treads seems thus to lead to the inevitable conclusion that the one reality is experience, that substance and attribute are but abstractions therefrom dependent on the purpose and viewpoint of the observer; there is no fixed demarcation between substance and attribute; it is possible and indeed necessary to pass from one to the

2. The translated passage is from the *Māpādiyam*, pp. 184-186. A comparison with pp. 455-460 of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* will be found to be of great interest.

other until we rest finally in experience which is neither substance nor attribute though the substrate of both. This is Absolute Idealism, which, however acceptable to others, is the *bête noire* of the Siddhāntin. How, then, does he consent to adopt this line of criticism ?

It is not as though the Tamil commentator developed the argument for himself. He takes it over bodily from the *Pauṣkara Āgama*,³ and the commentary thereon ascribed to Umapati Sivacarya. It is not certain that the commentator is identical with the Santana-acarya of that name (14th century A.D.) but it is certain that the āgama itself should be of some considerable antiquity. And because of its age, its interpretation of the term 'guṇa' deserves some consideration. It will be noticed that in the passage cited above, reference is made to the Sankhya doctrine (which is common to the Siddhānta too), that the entire universe is the product of prakṛti which consists of three guṇas; as evidence therefor, we are asked to observe the qualities of the world luminosity, calmness, happiness, activity, fearfulness, misery and so on. By guṇa, we ordinarily understand a quality; to say that the world is derived from guṇas would therefore mean that it is made up of qualities. But this sounds rather absurd (at least to those with realist prejudices); hence the word "guṇa" is interpreted as a "subsidiary", "constituent", or "strand" (as of a rope); every attempt is made to give substantiality to the denotation of that term. But the result is not entirely convincing; the modern student at any rate finds that term a snag and wonders repeatedly whether the Sankhya Philosophy could not have used a less ambiguous word. When we turn to the *Pauṣkara*, however, we come across a doctrine similar to, if not identical with, the Sankhya wherein "guṇa" bears its ordinary sense of quality while providing a not unintelligible basis for the evolution

3. Cf. *Pauṣkara-bhāṣya*, pp. 455-460.

of the world from itself. It is possible to hold that the Pauṣkara misunderstood the Sankhya use of "guṇa" and based a fanciful metaphysics thereon. It is also possible to urge on the contrary that the Pauṣkara understanding of "guṇa" is the earlier and sounder, and that all the later difficulties about the interpretation of that term were due to the realistic prejudices. It is not possible to decide finally between the two, in the absence of conclusive knowledge as to the antiquity of the āgama. Philosophically, it is not possible to say anything decisive; for, while the Siddhānta is undoubtedly realistic, it also claims to be a higher synthesis of all systems; this synthesis may be due to its pristine purity or to its being a later compromise. In any case, the doctrine of substance is some evidence of its synthetic nature, its desire to combine idealist critique with realist demands.

Realism that reduces things to "logical constructions" is not unknown in the West. Earl Russell (at the stage of development marked by his Lowell Lectures) is an example; ... "the aspect is not the thing: the aspect—that is to say, that which is immediately experienced—is a set of sense data, and the thing—which is the system of all the different perspectives—is a logical construction and not a real existent. An analogy will be found in the logically constructed concept 'humanity', which is the system of all the real men who compose humanity, but which has no real existence in its own right."⁴ But Russell goes further on the Idealist path when in his later works

4. *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*: C. E. M. Joad (P. 28).

Cf. Also *Our Knowledge of the External World* (Open Court, 1914), P. 89. "Thus an aspect of a 'thing' is a member of the system of aspects which *is* the 'thing' at that moment... All the aspects of a thing are real, whereas the thing is a mere logical construction." For a criticism, see Radhakrishnan, *The Reign of Religion in contemporary Philosophy*, PP. 352-356.

he abolishes the distinction between sense data and sensation. "An object is the sum total of the appearances (of which the appearance which is a perception is one) presented by it at all places at a given moment."⁵ It is true that in this view, reality is reduced to a system of neutral particulars, and mind is only a certain arrangement of those particulars; but it is rash to conclude, as Joad does, that such reduction "is clearly opposed to any form of Idealistic interpretation of the universe"⁶ Idealism cannot subscribe to the independent reality of particulars, but it need not exalt mind over matter; both may be conceived as aspects of Spirit and this is what Vedanta Idealism does.

The doctrine in question is of some value to the Siddhāntin. He maintains that God is both immanent and transcendent, immanent as His śakti, but transcendent as God; He is the material cause of the world through His śakti; as God He is but the efficient cause, the predication of both sets of attributes is, however, justifiable, since between śakti and the attribute and the substance, there is non-difference. Such gain, however, is counter-balanced by difficulties elsewhere. The souls, it is said, are naturally omniscient, though the omniscience is veiled by connate impurity. This impurity is called *anava*. Both because of scriptural declaration and the principle of parsimony we assume only one *anava*. But souls are many and of diverse grades of spiritual progress. Some have been released, while others are in various stages of release. If *anava* be really one, with the release of one, *anava* should have been destroyed and all souls released simultaneously. We have therefore to assume that the one *anava* has many śaktis, that what relates to each soul is a particular śakti and that on release of any soul that śakti alone is destroyed. This is an interesting explanation, but not

5. *Ibid.*, P. 32.

6. *Ibid.*, P. 33.

good enough. The Siddhāntin maintains the external reality of all in three categories, pati, paśu and pāśa. Āṇava, which is one of the pāśas, is then never destroyed. But if its saktis are destroyed with release of soul after soul, how can the indestructibility of anava be maintained unless it is made out that its substance is something other than the attributes (the śaktis)? This is a serious difficulty; and it is noticed by some Siddhāntins like Śivāgrayogin who maintain therefore that what is destroyed at release is not a śakti or āṇava, but only its conjunction with the particular soul. This raises the question of the nature of conjunction, whether it is purely external, whether it is not in some sense a quality of the conjoined and so on; and this is not the place to go into that. But enough has been said, it is hoped, to show the presence of an interesting idealist doctrine in the realist *milieu* of the Siddhānta, a doctrine whose affiliations to other systems and inter-relation with the rest of the Siddhānta system will repay further and further consideration.

The Standpoint of Epistemology.

BY

KALI PRASAD.

Theories of knowledge have very often developed under the influence of definitely conceived metaphysical principles. In fact these latter have marked the limits within which the investigation of the problem of knowledge has been carried. A theory of reality is regarded as indispensable for any theory of knowledge. A prior inquiry about the nature and reality of experience, about its conditions and possibilities, it is urged, can alone justify an investigation about the 'knowledge-event.' If as the result of such an inquiry into the nature of the real, it is established that reality either does not exist at all or, if it exists, it is in its nature intrinsically unknowable, a theory of knowledge would become *ipso facto* impossible or futile. For, knowledge, it is said can be of what *is*; a knowledge of that which is not would be a contradiction in terms. In order that any intelligible discussion be possible at all, it will be said, the meaning and character of reality must first be determined. Having determined these the detailed task of drawing up the categories and establishing the principles of knowledge (which is supposed to be the business of epistemology) can be profitably taken in hand.

Now, whatever may be said in justification of such a position, it would be obvious that there is a confusion here about the relative fields of operation of metaphysics and epistemology. For epistemology the 'event' of knowledge is a fundamental postulate. That under certain conditions knowledge occurs like any other event is a fact beyond which the epistemologist (at any rate) need not go. Whether the knowledge that results is real or illusory in the ultimate scheme of the universe, whether it has a nature which is not ordinarily disclosed

to the mind, are wholly distinct questions. Pure speculative considerations can not be allowed to prejudice the irresistible fact of the experience of knowledge : an experience which comes with an urgency and inevitability all its own. The ultimate validity or invalidity of this event may be left to be determined partly perhaps by epistemology itself but mainly by metaphysics.

It must be remembered that this fundamental postulate of the knowledge event implies no reference to anything outside itself. For instance, it requires no reference to a self or substance, relation, space-time etc. , or other principles that may be found involved in the knowledge-event. Thus, when the epistemologist introduces any principles that do not strictly belong to the experience of knowledge he is falling a victim to the metaphysical prejudice.

Unfortunately, however, many epistemologists appear to have developed their theories of knowledge under the control of one or other metaphysical principle. A passion for unity or systematisation as an ultimate necessity, for instance, seems to have characterised many such attempts. The tendency to merge the manifold of experience into a systematic unity—to interpret and explain the knowledge-event in terms of a single and pervasive principle—is manifest in many philosophical systems. Very often this single principle is either an abstraction attained by speculative insight or an aspect abstracted from the same manifold which is sought to be resolved and ordered. In the former case the abstraction is erected into a supreme category and all knowledge is forced into its mould. Likewise, in the latter, the detached quality or 'nuance' is elevated to a privileged position so that all knowledge that fails to exhibit it is looked upon as illusory. The detachment or abstraction of the quality or aspect is not always determined by the rigorous demands of logical analysis but usually by the caprice of individual or circumstance. In this way the epistemologist is in-

clined to approach the problem of knowledge with the ready-made categories hammered out in the metaphysician's shop. And, in consequence, he discovers in knowledge many characteristics which but for his particular mode of handling he may never have found there at all. In the circumstances he also feels certain constraints which are wholly of his own making and proceed from motives which do not strictly belong to the standpoint of epistemology.

We shall try to show that epistemology has much to lose and nothing to gain either when it allows metaphysics to poach on its domain or, when, in its enthusiasm to present a grand and well-rounded system, it itself coquets with metaphysical categories. The confusion which thus results from the introduction of extra-epistemic concepts into epistemology may be characterised as the 'fallacy of identification': a fallacy which is as general and widespread in its influence as it is insidious in operation. We shall propose to call this confusion the Epistemologist's Fallacy. Here, we have, on the one hand, an identification of knowledge-event with objects, and, on the other, with the assumptions and hypotheses or constructions formulated for its interpretation. It seems to have assumed three principal forms:

- (1) It consists in the reduction of the whole of knowledge to one or more of its constituents which is then regarded as a reality transcending knowledge itself.
- (2) It consists in the identification of the laws and tendencies immanent in knowledge with transcendental and even creative principles of knowledge and reality.
- (3) It consists in the identification of conceptual constructions apriori employed for the explanation and interpretation of knowledge with realities presupposed in and determining the course of knowledge.

History of philosophy furnishes some very interesting illustrations of the three forms of confusion mentioned above ;

but the space at our disposal does not allow of any detailed discussion. It would be, however, instructive to make a brief reference to certain outstanding cases.

The various forms of empiricism which start from sensation as an element in the given and end by reducing all knowledge and all forms of experience to sensory basis would be instance of the first form of identification. In Mach, Avenarius and the 'pure experience' philosophers sensuous experience is looked upon as 'pure' experience. As if, once sensation has been divested of the categories and the 'work of thought', we get down to eidetic essence in its purity. It is forgotten that sensation implies as much a *theory* about the datum as any work of thought. Consequently, Mach's sensation and James' pure experience are still charged with much that would need 'purging' as Husserl would say. Besides, both James and Mach and also Avenarius are inspired by metaphysical motives and not by the epistemological interests. Thus, when Mach and Avenarius formulate the principle of 'minimum effort' or 'economy' they are introducing a purely transcendent principle which far from being warranted by 'pure experience' implies a further judgment or theory about it. Similarly, the relational theory of certain idealists illustrates the same tendency from the opposite side. Here, because part of experience appears to indicate relations, therefore the whole of it is reduced to relations. Sensational elements are relational and all knowledge is a system of relations under the guarantee of the principle of non-contradiction. In fact relations alone have meaning, for, apart from relations, and, relations of a specific type, knowledge falls into chaos. The sterility of such a line of thought is far too obvious for criticism and we shall proceed to illustrate the second form of the fallacy.

Here there is a further generalisation (and consequent departure) from the elements of the given or aspects of the

given. The element or the detached aspect in this case is at once elevated into pervasive and a universal principle. Hegel's Dialectic, Spencer's principle of development from the homogenous to the heterogenous, Mach's principle of economy, and Petzoldt's law of univocal determination would be well-known examples. Nor is this confusion limited to the field of metaphysics. It may equally well be illustrated in the domain of Psychology. The 'causal' and 'purposive' points of view here embody the same tendency toward illegitimate identification. Even the Gestalt principle of 'figure and ground,' taken as a universal, dynamic and necessary law would be an instance of impatience with data in spite of the phenomenological claim which this theory always puts forward.

The third form of the fallacy finds illustration in the tendency to introduce such constructions as self, substance, categories etc. with a view to effect simplification in the scheme of knowledge. Sometimes these conceptual constructions *apriori*, are treated merely as constructions (though even here they are confused with hypotheses and postulates and fictions) but generally they are viewed as transcendent or reality-principles, and as such prove extraordinarily fruitless when they are not utterly misleading so far as epistemology is concerned.

The main consequences of this fallacy, then, are : (1) the shifting of interest from the knowledge-event to the speculative entities that are supposed to make knowledge possible. So that the epistemologist is more concerned in elaborating their laws and forms rather than concentrating on knowledge as such ; (2) the tendency to regard these entities or principles (e. g., Platonic Ideas) as having real being and as constituting real conditions of the origin, growth and development of knowledge ; and (3) the tendency to apply these entities or principles to fields of experience other than those in which they exhibit themselves.

Thus epistemology is mainly occupied with these constructions, hypotheses and postulates etc, without coming to grips with the problem of knowledge. There would, of course, be no harm in utilising these constructions etc. , provided (1) we do not identify them with entities endowed with real efficacy and power and (2) we do not confuse one with the other. The whole character of epistemology is vitiated when, instead of considering them as purely *logical* entities, we regard them as ontological realities determining knowledge from without. While epistemology may still make use of them it will have to carry on a process of thorough purging in order to cleanse them of all 'reality taint' and make them useful in epistemic investigations. If 'suspension' is carried, to the limit of self-suspension or self-bracketing, a new science, as Husserl has said, would emerge viz., the science of 'eidetic' knowledge i.e. the science of ideas or theory of knowledge purified from the alloy of naturalistic or idealistic metaphysic.

Explanation of objectivity as Falsity.

By

Bhaskar S. Naik.

Philosophy is an ultimate explanation of experience. The positive sciences also attempt to rationalise our experience by confining themselves to their own particular data. But their explanation is not ultimate, firstly because their procedure is necessarily based on some presuppositions, and secondly because these presuppositions restrict their provinces, naturally precluding them from the consideration of the whole experience. This does not mean that philosophy is simply a synthesis of the presuppositions of the empirical sciences or that it is a sort of generalised science. Such a synthesis is an impossibility not only because of the absence of any synthesising principle, but also because of the spuriousness of such a demand. A generalisation which will comprehend all the details of the positive sciences seems to be impossible. But granting the future possibility of such a generalisation, it would not amount to ultimate explanation. Because a generalisation is simply the description of the *how* and not of the *why*, of things. Causation as applied in the empirical sciences does not in fact amount to any real explanation. Causation though an useful empirical concept becomes self-contradictory as an ultimate explanation. Philosophical explanation can not be also of the nature of a hypothesis in so far as philosophy claims to know the ultimate reality. It claims or should claim a degree of certitude unattainable by the natural sciences. Then how are we to conceive the ultimate ground of the world of our experience? Can we conceive it as a final ground? This ground of course should not be of the nature of necessary condition, for then we will have to define this necessity.

We should be able to find the ultimate ground of all phenomena only in that which is but freely, accidentally related to the phenomena. That alone can be said to explain the phenomena in the sense that the latter necessarily imply it, and not vice versa. An explicit recognition of this one-sided free character of the ground with regard to the phenomena is available in the case of illusion and its ground. The ultimate ground is ultimate not because of its necessary connection with the world of our experience, but because without it the world could not have come into being. The rope in the illusory experience has no relation whatsoever with the illusory snake, but the illusory snake could not have presented itself without the rope being there. Illusion without a ground unrelated to it is an impossibility.

Epistemology of illusion illustrates but the doctrine of Ajnana. Ajnana is to be conceived in such a way that it implies the real, but the real is not at the same time affected by it. A single instance of the correction of an illusion shows the possibility of the annulment of the given objectivity, the reduction of the whole empiricality to utter unreality. Absolute monism requires this, and all attempts to explain the dualism in our experience without reducing objectivity to unreality, to utter nothing, are doomed to failure.

It may be supposed that the dualism in experience is owing to the partial view of things, and so if we want an ultimate explanation of experience, we must conceive a coherent whole in which the opposition between knowledge and objectivity is reconciled, transcended or transformed. But this is unmeaning. Now this whole which is somehow said to comprise knowledge and object cannot, in keeping with the conception of knowledge as itself not known and knowable, be said to have knowledge as one of its constituents. For this assertion requires the presentation of the togetherness of knowledge and object consciously known. And this

awareness, it is evident, cannot figure as one of the components presented to it. At best, the statement experience is a whole etc. can be understood as an assertion that knowledge is the sole reality, and that it is the ground in the sense of a free and positionless basis for their being even the appearance of duality of subject and object. The whole is thus really pure knowledge without even a reference to objectivity. Or the whole may be purely objective. The demand on the part of knowledge to realise its own insignificance is impossible, and on the other hand the whole cannot be objective, because objectivity cannot simply be there except as distinguished from knowledge. If distinction from knowledge were the sole distinguishing feature of objectivity, then it cannot form a whole. The point is we cannot significantly conceive a whole which is neither the self nor the not-self, but at the same time includes within itself both the self and the not-self, retaining objectivity as it is and at the same time reconciling its opposition to knowledge.

Another attempt to conceive such a unifying principle is to lay stress on the knowability of objects, and thereby to maintain the existence of a spiritual principle or unity as the basis of both knowledge and its object. But can we posit a spiritual principle as the ground of the object only on the strength of its knowability, or only because it lends itself to knowledge? On the contrary can we not say that, spiritual principle to be spiritual, should never be knowable but self-revealing? Can we define this knowability of the object without reference to its knownness? If we cannot, then, knowability far from being the proof of any spiritual principle as the ground of any object, condemns it as utterly non-spiritual, unless we hold that knowledge is known, or that knownness can be the character of knowledge. The objections that are raised in connection with the "coherent whole" in which, they say, that the duality between knowledge and

its object is reconciled, can be urged here too. The fact is we cannot conceive a reality which is neither the self nor the not-self and still significantly embraces both of them. And so far as we cannot by any means persuade ourselves to disbelieve the reality of knowledge, our belief in objectivity is to be explained and interpreted accordingly. That is to say facthood and belief are to be defined in terms of each other.

What constitutes the facthood of cognition and its object? By cognition, the primary awareness of the object is meant here. Does the facthood of the content go to generate the facthood of its cognition? To conceive cognition like this is just to reverse the knowledge-situation; it is to turn the epistemic procedure of cognising into an objective symbolisation. Cognition to be cognition cannot be even taken to be evident simultaneous with its content, far less as generated by the facthood of its content. Epistemology demands this, and though we have to speak of two things namely knowledge and its object, these things are not objectively two. Though somehow or other we have to distinguish knowledge from its object, the distinction does not amount to any factual distinction. Then how do we know cognition at all? Introspection into cognition is impossible, because knowledge and its content cannot be said to be known simultaneously. To hope to know cognition as known is to misconceive fundamentally the function of knowing or the epistemic procedure of knowledge. If knowing and its object cannot be known independently, how can we hope to get the explanation of the "of" in the expression "knowledge of objectivity"? Will it not be a gross misconception to interpret this "of" as if it were a relation or a distinction, both of which stand on some objective togetherness? Can we ever conceive knowledge and its object to be objectively together? If cognition and content are not known as together in any sense,

how then do we come to speak of them even, as this speaking amounts to a distinction of the one from the other? We are required to hold that cognition is nothing but the confirmation of the facthood of its own content, and the facthood of the content in its turn is nothing but the content as confirmed.

Thus cognition, though apparently an apprehension of some content, though an *act* for psychological introspection, is not to be understood as a psychic fact in itself, in so far as the cognising or the cognitive function can not be introspected into. That is to say that though the content-consciousness is a psychic fact and lends itself to introspection as an act, the real *cognising* transcends the content-consciousness. This means that content-consciousness, in so far as it is transcended by cognising, presupposes a contentless consciousness. This transcendence of cognising cannot be conceived as a temporal precedence, far less as functional procedure. For, cognising is not in fact a function at all, as it does not arise in time. The very temporality itself springs up together with the psychological fact of apprehension, which is not cognising. Whitehead says that "knowledge in itself does not require time as containing the mode of consciousness; the mode of apprehension in consciousness of a temporal nature cannot be said to require that the mode itself should include temporal transition." In other words, we can say that the fact we come to have a knowledge of temporality means that knowledge itself should not involve time or should not arise in time. What we have to note is that the psychological fact of apprehension of the content is nothing else than the *knownness* of the content, but this knownness is not *knowing*. Can we hope to get any explanation of this knowing? All attempts to explain it should in fact result in the disbelief in knowing as a psychic fact. The so-called knowing as a psychic fact or function should be proved to be an illusion. That is to say the belief in knowing as a psychic apprehension of an independent con-

tent should be realised in the last resort as a subjective illusion.

But the attempt to explain knowing as constructing the object is like holding that the object is not an illusory appearance, but is a solid fact in virtue of the creative function of the subject itself. Why call it then illusory at all? Experience of illusion does prove that in the case of the apprehension of the illusory object the belief in that object was somehow of my own formulation. But this does not mean that there was any conscious formulating activity on the part of the apprehending consciousness. In the same way, we cannot posit any activity on the part of the subject prior to its apprehension of the object. Any presupposition necessitated by the analysis of the knowledge-situation, must be of the nature of conscious experience in so far as they are epistemological. Epistemology should be nothing but the laws of the behaviour of the conscious activity. This is simply to emphasise the fact that epistemological introspection is useful only to disintegrate the belief in the self-sufficiency of objectivity; it is not the description of the functional character of cognition.

If what we said is correct, if we really cannot posit any distinction between knowledge and its object on the purely epistemological level then the provisional distinction between perception and illusion cannot be taken to be ultimately valid. Texts say that there is not really any sequence (*Purvāpara bhāva*) between perception and its object in illusory experience. There is not even the instrumentality of the sense organs there. In the so called valid perception and its object also, we have seen that epistemologically no distinction can be conceived. We ordinarily ignore the fact that the distinction of the object from knowledge is itself objective. We forget the significance of the fact that the distinction also is *known*, and take it to be

prior to knowledge and at the same time as also *cognised* or *known*, the posterior knowledge apprehending the distinction which is prior to the existence of that knowledge. It is a question of what we understand by an epistemological analysis or explanation. Can we hope to bridge the gulf of the distinction between knowledge and its object, if we take that distinction to be ultimate? Or in other words, can we epistemologically conceive the possibility of the knowledge of the object as *known* even though the distinction between them were ultimate? If then the distinction is not ultimate, if we have to conceive a peculiar undistinguished epistemic identity as the basis of the distinction, can we not say that perception is only due to the false identification of pure consciousness with the *Vrtti*? It is only when the illusion is corrected that the false identification of consciousness with the empirical *vrtti* is known, and thereby the unreality of the *Vrtti* is realised. The distinction or detachment of the subject from the false empiricity, this freedom of consciousness from empirical subjectivity, does create a faith in the possibility of the annulment of the objectivity as such.

What is the nature of the annulment of objectivity? It is not an assertion of the non-existence of objectivity. Falsity is not negation. When I make the proposition "Elephant is not here", I disbelieve the content elephant but at the same time I believe in its existence elsewhere. To take another instance of a negative judgment—"A is not". Here the disbelief in A is nothing but the positive belief in the non-existence of A; the non-existence here is nothing less than a factual determination. Consciousness of falsity on the other hand is not a negative judgment in this way. Awareness of falsity is not the negation of a thought-content. When we assert a content to be false, the content has no reference to existence or non-existence at all. Assertion of falsity is no

judgment, but is a consciousness of the perceptual annulment, an experience of the reduction of the percept to unreality.

In the end, one thing must be maintained summarily ; and it is this. Spirit is born in the uncertainty about the facthood of objectivity, and it can realise itself only by correcting away the objectivity that sticks to it ; but at the same time in the absence of this spiritual feeling, objectivity cannot be felt to be unreal. This is a paradox seemingly, but a very significant one.

The Philosophy of Hans Driesch.

BY

D. G. LONDHE.

Hans Driesch is one of the most systematic thinkers in Germany at the present time. The following paper is an attempt to present in a brief sketch the main doctrines in the philosophy of Driesch. This paper is based upon an account of his own philosophy given by himself in "*Deutsche Systematische Philosophie nach ihren Gestaltern*".

Philosophy, as Driesch understands it, is a systematic knowledge of all Knowable. The category of the Knowable includes even the knowledge itself. Historically speaking, Driesch's approach to philosophy was through Biology. He was a student of Ernst Haeckel and his early work was confined to the field of Natural Science. The subject of his Gifford Lectures was the 'Science and Philosophy of the Organism'. His Vitalism sought to prove and maintain the theory of the Autonomy of the living. His experiments on the sea-urchins showed that organisms are not mere machines, i. e. sums of their respective parts, but on the contrary, there is an autonomous factor which determines their growth. This autonomous factor Driesch calls Entelechy, after Aristotelian terminology, though he tells us that he does not mean by Entelechy quite the same thing as Aristotle. Entelechy is an intensive manifoldness. "Entelechy either underlies the origin of an organic body, typically built of typical elements, or it underlies an action i e, a typical combination of typical movements." (*Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, P. 245) Negatively speaking, "Entelechy is not energy, not force, not constant" (*Ibid.* p 268). Driesch's Vitalism gave a death-blow to the mechanistic hypothesis in Biology.

Coming to his philosophy proper, we find that according to Driesch, philosophy must take its start from an absolutely certain and undoubtable fact. The so-called laws of thought, the experience of anything experiential, and the fact that I experience—all these three are undoubtable facts but the third, namely, the fact 'I experience', is the presupposition of all the others and so it is the most fundamental fact. This primal fact Driesch expresses in the form: "I know something" ("Ich habe bewusst etwas", lit. "I am conscious of something.") This primal fact of experience however, does not in itself contain the possibility of such a systematic structure of knowledge as philosophy claims to be. This possibility arises first only then when the Something known by the "I" is seen to be an 'ordered' Something and not a bare Something. Thus it is only the formal concept of Order which makes the primal fact of experience, "I know Something," capable of being the starting point of Philosophy. We thus get the improved formulation of the primal fact of experience: "I know ordered Something". What is exactly meant by saying that the Something known by the "I" is an 'ordered' Something? In other words, What is precisely this concept of Order? The '*Ordnungslehre*', the Theory (or Doctrine) of Order, aims at a solution of this problem.

The '*Ordnungslehre*', (pub. 1912, sec ed. 1923) represents the first part of the philosophy of Driesch. The Theory of Order is only another name for Logic. The Theory of Order wishes to view the Something as the object in which all is 'in order', and not to speak of the 'Something' as Objects in the plural. This is said to be the Ideal of the Monism of Order. But inasmuch as this ideal is bound to remain unfulfilled, the Theory of Order has to perform second best tasks. The realm of the 'Something', known by the 'I', consists of a multiplicity of particular objects.

A percipient calls a particular object 'This' which is discovered to have an existence, and this existence is further characterised as 'such and such'. The 'Suchnesses' are also found to be different from each other. How many, then are the ultimate forms of these 'Suchnesses'? Driesch, enumerates the following six elemental forms of 'Suchnesses' i. e, qualities : (1) The 'pure Suchnesses' such as green, red, warm etc. (2) those that are meant by the words 'pleasurable' and 'painful'. (3) The relational 'half-suchnesses' as 'near' 'then'. (4) The abstract concepts such as 'different', 'because.' (5) The notions of 'right' and 'true', and (6) the self-conscious 'Quality'—knowing. It will be easily seen that this doctrine of elemental forms of Suchness is not a doctrine of the categories of Being, but a doctrine of the categories of Quality, Quality itself being one of the categories of Being. The first category gives the qualities such as colour, temperature etc. The second names the different ways in which a quality 'affects' a percipient. The third comprises spatial and temporal qualities. The term 'half suchness' may be explained by the fact that the temporal and spatial qualities do not attach to objects in themselves as colour etc. but they attach to objects by virtue of their relation to other objects. The qualities so far considered are concrete but the fourth category gives abstract qualities as 'different', 'because', 'therefore', etc. Some difficulty is felt in understanding the significance of the sixth category, namely, the self-conscious quality 'Knowing'. The question is, Is Knowledge a Quality? It might be held with justification that Knowledge is a substance or an essence of which self-consciousness is a Quality. But this point may not be further discussed here.

The starting-point of all knowledge of the empirical reality, observes the Theory of Order, is to be found in the concrete data of the form : Now-Here-So. A relatively permanent

aggregate of the Now-Here-So data constitutes what we call a thing. Causality is the most important category in the order-imparting knowledge of nature. Driesch draws a significant distinction between Causality of the Part and Causality of the Whole. The former reigns in the realm of Physics while the latter reigns in the realm of Biology. According to the principle of Entelechy in the vitalistic Biology, an organism is a whole and becomes a whole even after disturbances from without. Entelechy acts in the manner of the Causality of the Whole, or individualising Causality, and not in the manner of Causality of the Part as in Physics.

While considering the psychical reality, the Theory of Order treats, among other things, the very important problem of the relation of body and mind. In a searching criticism of the doctrine of Psycho physical Parallelism, it is pointed out that it remains absolutely problematic whether in the series of events beginning with sense-stimulus and ending in a perception, the last physical event, namely, the particular state in the brain, is the 'cause' of the content of perception, or 'parallel'. At any rate it is certain that the case in point is not one of parallelism. Moreover, it can hardly be said that every abstract thought is parallel to a brain process. In a very characteristic manner Driesch reduces Psycho-physical Parallelism to a Psycho-mechanical Parallelism, and then gives two arguments which are subversive of the theory. Firstly, according to vitalistic Biology, though the brain is a materialistic system, it is by no means a mechanical system. Secondly, a comparison between the type of structure and the grade of manifoldness of the world of experience on the one hand, and the world of matter as a mechanism on the other, shows that any theory which explains these two as parallel, is untenable. As regards the theory of psycho-physical interaction, it is to be noted that the "I" does not 'act' upon

the Something it knows, but only 'has' the Something in consciousness. The vitalistic solution of the problem of the relation of body and mind is characterised by the introduction of the biological concept of Entelechy. My body is an organism. So the Entelechy of my body may be said to stand in the relation of interaction to the matter of my body. Thus there is interaction between the Entelechy and matter of my body. Now, the expressions "my soul" and "my conscious experience" are as legitimate as the expression "my body". My conscious experience, which, by the way, forms according to Driesch, a series of "points" and not of "stretches", is a series which is "parallel" to certain states (not of course to the arising of these states) of my soul. The being and becoming of my soul is set in a relation of parallelism to the being and becoming of the Entelechy of my body, in so far as it guides the processes of the brain and may therefore be called psychoid. In the vitalistic theory of the relation of body and mind there are three parallel series: The "point" series of conscious experience, the continuous series of Entelechy-activities, and the continuous series of Soul activities. Thus it will be seen that Driesch rejects the two-fold psycho-physical Parallelism of Body and Mind, and substitutes in its place a threefold parallelism of conscious experience, Entelechy and Soul. The vitalistic solution of the problem has no doubt an air of complexity about it.

The complex fact of "Body-Soul-Experience" forms a psycho-physical person. There is a plurality of such psycho-physical persons. This is what is called a community of men. History presents one of the many interesting problems. The behaviour of psycho-physical persons contributes to History. 'Do historical facts admit of any order or system?' is the central problem in the philosophy of History. The Philosophy of History seeks to discover and formulate the laws that

govern the process of historical events. But the uniformities in the course of History are sometimes found to be no more than the laws of mere cumulation of facts. Is there any real evolution in History ? The so-called "progress" in the course of historical events, be it of technical or ethical nature, is after all only cumulative. Is there any purpose in History ? If at all, this purpose appears, according to Driesch, to be nothing more than acquisition of knowledge. But then mere acquisition of knowledge is mere cumulation. In the history of particular states and peoples, in all the cases of war and peace, there is nothing present which may justify the belief in an Evolution in the proper sense of the term. All these happenings seem to be accidental to the essence of the World, as the 'behaviour' of animals. According to Driesch, there is no sufficient ground to postulate the existence of a super-personal Being that progressively realises itself through the course of History. The expressions such as the "Soul of a people", the "Spirit of the Time" are nothing more than metaphors and should be understood only in a nominalistic way. With this topic the '*Ordnungslehre*', comes to an end.

The '*Wirklichkeitslehre*'—the Theory of Reality—is Metaphysic. It concerns itself with the Real, the Being in-itself, the Absolute. That the Real exists and that it is knowable in rational knowledge are the postulates that make for the possibility of Metaphysics. The metaphysical inquiry begins with a critical consideration of the categories, such as Space, Time, Matter, Causality. Space is the three-dimensional structure of relations, expressed by such terms as 'near', 'far' etc. Matter is what is movable in Space. Time is a system of relations expressed in such terms as earlier, 'later. Causality is a system of relations expressed in such terms as 'Because', 'therefore'.

The problem of freedom is the problem concerning the question of Determinism and Indeterminism, not of course

Determinism and Indeterminism in the Spinozistic or Kantian sense, where freedom is determination according to one's own rational nature or abiding character. With regard to the problem of freedom, it should be noted that here nothing is said as to the Determinism or Indeterminism of the phylogenetic process as a whole. What we really have here as an empirical fact is a unique evolution, which is not yet completed, and the end of which we do not know. So far as the problem of the Freedom of the Will is concerned, Driesch says in a characteristic manner that here we have only Freedom of Assent (*Zulassungsfreiheit*), that is, Freedom as regards the 'Yes' or 'No'. For, the acts of will emerge out the dynamic of the unconscious soul, and what one can at the most do is to say 'Yes' or 'No' to their realisation. Our assent is more or less epiphenomenal, as the acts of Will realise themselves more or less automatically. One can easily see that Driesch's solution of the problem of Free-will tends towards a sort of Determinism.

Dualism of the Real: In spite of an irresistible urge towards a monistic apprehension of the world, we find ourselves faced with a dualism between the principle of Accident which remains embedded in matter and the principle of the Whole (*Ganzheit*) which rests in Entelechies. The Real in so far as it appears as Nature betrays a dualistic structure. The monistic urge remains after all only a pious wish, an unrealisable ideal. According to Driesch, a wish, even if a logical wish, does not carry us very far in philosophy. The great monistic systems, as of Spinoza and Hegel offer only a blank something, for the empirical has not received due attention at their hands. The dualistic structure of the real is a patent fact, whether we call it a dualism of Mind and Matter, Spirit and Nature, or *Ganzheit* and *Unganzheit*. But this Dualism of Mind and Matter is further affected by the dualism of Truth and Error. The dualistic structure of existence is further

complicated by a dualistic mode of apprehension. Apprehension of the existent is either right or wrong. Our knowledge is not only fragmentary but it is also liable to error. Error is apparently true but as a matter of fact not true, i. e. false knowledge.

The fact of death opens, according to Driesch, the door to a Metaphysic of the Beyond, to a Meta-metaphysic, so to say. The phenomenon of death opens great possibilities for reflection, perhaps only possibilities and nothing more. To be precise, two questions come up here for consideration: Firstly, Am I still in time even after death? Secondly, Am I still a person? The answer to the first question is indefinite. There is here a mere possibility but not a certainty. As regards the second question, there are two possibilities; *either* one may after death still remain a person, or one may pass into a super-personal existence. Any decision, based upon facts, concerning the problem of personal survival, is to be arrived at in the field of Parapsychology. But there will be some time before the important data in the spiritualistic hypothesis will get "official" recognition by the scientists. Driesch's recently published work on "Parapsychology" has concerned itself with the discussion and evaluation of the many theories current in the field.

The problem of God is one of the ultimate problems of Philosophy. God is the ultimate ground of all the phases of Reality. The proposition that there must be an ultimate ground is self-evident but very little is said with it. If God is nothing more than the ultimate ground in a formal sense, then, the idea of God does not carry us very far. Driesch thinks that on this problem it is impossible to speak in any positive manner with strict scientific accuracy. Whether there is any personal Being as Cause beside and over and above the Real, or whether there is any Entelechy of Reality in every phase of the Real cannot be asserted. Driesch gives a sound note of warning when he says that in such matters a conscient-

tious philosophy must be extremely cautious. It is indeed the chief purpose of philosophy to distinguish clearly between what is precisely known, what is known only with probability, what is known in a purely formal and hypothetical manner, and what is merely a matter of feeling based upon faith.

This very brief sketch of the main ideas of Driesch's philosophy cannot naturally be expected to do justice to the wealth of topics, the subtlety of argumentation and the easy felicity of presentaion for which philosophical works of Driesch are famous. But even this short account is a sufficient indication that Driesch is unexcelled in the clearest formulation of issues, in a bold intellectual attempt to tackle problems in all their comprehensiveness, and above all, in the art of building up a rounded philosophical system.

Causality in Modern Science and Indian Philosophy.

By

M. V. V. K. RANGACHARI.

To day science in the West supplies a sense of security to the Vedānta and the other Darshanas. While it is true that the progress of human thought had been 'through Metaphysics to Physics' the reverse process obtains as well elevating the mechanical sciences to misty pedestals of infinite intangibles. Einstein, Plank, Heisenberg, Bohr, and Exner are some among the scientists that initiated the doctrine of indeterminacy into regions above experiment, though Exner would restrict its operation to sub-microphysical phenomena like the behaviour of individual electrons, conceding to group-results what has been called statistical determination following the strict mechanical law of causation. I have already outlined the various view-points in examining the bearing of Modern Physics upon Theism. [The Incidence of Micro-physical Indeterminism. REASON (Bombay) Feb. 1933 pp. 6-13 & March 1933 pp. 5-8].

As indeterminacy involves the denial of the causality-principle, which is the basis of science the withdrawal of their support by Einstein and Planck causes little surprise. The Law of Relativity, and the Quantum Theory of light worked out by the mathematician and the physicist do not injure life in the scientific world of Europe while conservative England continues to retain the repercussions and tremors of the accidental earthquake received from the continent long after Einstein declared that "Indeterminism is quite an illogical concept." The religious predilections of Prof. Eddington and Sir James Jeans colour their work. The former is a quaker reared in the profound belief in the autho-

rity of 'inner light' with a 'religious sense' which is elevated even to the religious instinct' in all matters excepting his own special field, astronomy ; where his scientific sense 'warns theologians not to say any longer that the heavens proclaim the glory of God.' His predecessors, Galileo, Kepler and Newton detected certain laws governing bodies, and applauded the intelligence of the cosmic legislator. That was the age when God was visualised in the apparent harmonies in the Universe. Natural laws were then the venue for divine operation. 'Darwin himself went so far as to maintain most distinctly that his system of nature required a creator who breathed life into it in the beginning.' (Max Muller : *Six Systems* : P. 326) That this is the root of the god-idea is borne out by historians of philosophy. "The gods of the Vedic and indirectly of all the Aryan people were the agents postulated behind the great phenomena of nature. This was the beginning of philosophy, the first application of the law of Causality, and in it we have to recognise the only true solution of Indo-European mythology and likewise of Aryan Philosophy. (*Six Systems*, P. 36).

As science advanced natural explanations for these phenomena and traced their antecedent history, the postulate of theistic direction was excluded on the principle of economy of thought, viz, nothing that is unnecessary ought to be assumed. If the existence of God is inferred from the order of nature, we are compelled to find some feature which cannot be understood except by postulating supreme intelligence. If for that purpose we fasten upon some obscure phenomenon like embryonic development or electronic behaviour, we put theism in acute rivalry with science and make it vitally dependent on the ignorance of science 'which is apt to prove temporary.' Prof. Eddington occupies this position. The strong astronomer warns against basing religion on scientific discoveries as in his field he feels no need

to call in aid any extraneous agency. In the macrocosmic range, according to him, human wit is master, while in the microcosm of electronic behaviour the failure to detect uniformity in the deflection of these minute electrical charges caused by the quanta of light or photons, makes him suspect that free-will extends to the routine processes of inorganic nature. The weakness of this position was pointed out by Prof. Levy in his "*Universe of Science*." Scientific investigation is possible only through isolating the phenomenon under study from the rest of its environment. Experiments do not succeed unless performed under conditions neutral to the environment. If the apparatus employed is not sufficiently insulated to prevent all absorption or diversion of the subject-matter, experiments fail. On this footing, August Comte objected to introspection as a method for psychological study, since mental processes are themselves modified during their observation. But experience testifies to the possibility of examining mental isolates independently, though within limits. Thus, the limits of experiment are not an absolute bar to progress. If today science is not able to reach an electronic isolate without reacting upon light-quanta, it is no more than a warning that subtler methods are yet to be devised before it can pronounce on its character. It does not warrant the scrapping of the entire machinery of science built upon the bedrock of causality, nor an assumption of free-willist electrons. Einstein himself has condemned this tendency in unmistakable terms. To find in the alleged spontaneous jumps of electrons from one orbit to another evidence of their own volitions being independent of the law of causation is characterised by Einstein as being 'not merely nonsense, but objectionable nonsense'. (*Literary Guide*, London, August, 1933, p. 147)

While theism assures itself that the reign of law in

the universe is the great proof of cosmic intelligence, Sir Arthur Eddington comes along with a supposed discovery that there is no reign of law, no rigorous sequence of cause and effect. He sees God in chance, not in order, in accident not in design, in indeterminacy rather than determinism. When he deduces the freedom of the human will from electronic misbehaviour in the sense of the unpredictability of the direction of their movement, we are reminded of the type of argument in Gotama's Nyāya Sūtras, IV, 19-21. The doctrine of Karman is the religious application of causality. The hypothesis of *Īśvara* in the Vedic Darshanas becomes superfluous if every act of man produce the corresponding effect. But "the actions of men do not always produce an effect. Good actions do not always produce good results, nor bad actions, bad results, as they ought, if every act continued to act. Hence there must be another power that modifies the continuing acting of acts, and that can be *Īśvara* only." (*Six Systems*, p. 424) Thus *Īśvara* is rather the governor than the maker of the world, under whose superintendence every act of man invariably produces its result. It is the need to account for the failure of Karman that called forth *Īśvara* in Gotama Nyāya, distinct from the argument in Mīmāṃsā.

Those that rely on fortuitous effects to sustain the Nirīśvaravāda (non-existence of God) find themselves robbed of their weapon when theists have it both ways by seeing God in causation as also in its absence. Badarāyana in the Vedānta Sūtras (III, 2, 38) makes Brahman responsible directly or indirectly for the rewards of all works This is based upon Brih. Up IV, 4, 24, wherein the Lord is said to be the agent by whom all actions are requited. The causal principle is the working of the divine law in Uttara-Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta. But the school that maintains the identity of cause and effect, (Kāryakāraṇābheda) by denying

reality to a second entity beside Brahman, has no interest in Karman more than nominal or illusory. Through Avidyā, separateness as cause and effect, action and its fruit, is perceived. Granting (Vyavahārārtham) practically that one is born deaf, dumb or blind, this is not by reason of divine caprice, but in virtue of the law of Karman, which is the handy solution of the alleged injustice of God. He is above these dualisms of cause and effect, good and evil. The rigorous monism of Sankara pulverised causality into Māyā, the Avidyā to be shaken off by real knowledge. The second branch of Vedānta shooting through Bodhāyana and developed by Ramānuja gives a humaner colour. Its personal God Viṣṇu is the last cause of all that is. He is qualified by compassion or love in contrast with the "icy self-sufficiency" ascribed to Brahman. Divine attributes (Kalyāṇa Guṇas)—Śakti, Tejas, intelligence, power, mercy and love on the Saguṇa plane (with qualities) have place for Karman, yet help to temper the rigours of causal justice with mercy. In Viśiṣṭa-Advaita, we meet the Vedāntic analogue of the double-stringed argument of Gotama. God is law, its exception, even its denial.

In the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā, God is entirely dissociated from the rewards and punishments for the acts of men. A rigorous inexorable Karman produces its results, and exculpates the Lord entirely from the blame of cruelty, injustice, or partiality. "For the moral government of the world," according to Jaimini, "no Lord is wanted." (*Six Systems*. p. 211). The works themselves produce their fruit, and where the fruit does not appear at once, Apūrva a super-sensuous principle, produces fruit later. Einstein's relativity makes time the fourth dimension of the space-time continuum; hence, the production of fruit later may be equated to "action at a distance" as the spatial analogue in modern science of the temporal Apūrva of the Mimāṃsakas. "Jaimini would not

make the Lord responsible for the injustice that seems to prevail in the world and hence reduced everything to cause and effect and saw in the inequalities of the world the natural result of the continued action of good or evil acts. This surely was not atheism, rather was it an attempt to clear the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue partiality which have so often been brought against Him. It was but another attempt at justifying the wisdom of God" (*ibid*). In clearing God of the taint of injustice Jaimini is apparently more loyal than the king, more divine than God.

Causality is the shield in God's armoury that prevents attacks against His injustice reaching His Person. Withal, it is a thing apart, an instrument different from one who handles it.

But it would be derogatory to omnipotence to be unable to break away from Karman. It would restrict omnipresence if it were withdrawn from where the causal principle is apparently set at naught. While lay religionists sing the Lord's praise at the heavens that in their harmonies proclaim His glory, scientific religionists like Eddington who perceive the winding paths of astral evolution in all its imperfections search for Him elsewhere than in law, order, progress or design. (Cf. *Intimations on Comparativism* REASON, Bombay, May, 1933).

In denying causality, the new science revives Hume's Nihilism. Hume does not infer cause-effect relation from invariable succession. Karl Pearson in his "Grammar of Science" makes it clearer. These 'infidel' teachings are taken over as supports for religion by scientists who set their sails to capricious winds of 'indeterminacy'. Even Kapila, the Sāṃkhya atheist, condemns nihilism. "For in Sūtra 1, 4, 1, he says 'if it were only priority, there would be no law or hold (Niyama) between cause and effect.'" (*Six Systems*, P 159). His agreement with Vyāsa that cause and effect

are identical is only superficial. While the latter wipes out the difference as illusion (Māyā) the Sāmkhya system holds that effects pre-exist in causes which are never destroyed but rendered invisible only. As "SAT" (reality) is assured by Kapila to the Kārya (effect) in the Kāraṇa-Kārya (cause and effect) relation, his doctrine is named Sat-Kāryavāda. This is the point of contact between Vedānta and Sāmkhya where the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools differ with them both. These latter as also Buddhism take to the opposite, the Asat-Kāryavāda.

Sāmkhya endows nature (Prakriti) with reality, being looked upon by Purusha (self) through Aviveka (want of discrimination), Viveka (discrimination) enables the self to become independent (Kaivalya, lit. aloneness) apart from the dancing girl Prakriti (Kārikas, 59-62), but that is not the annihilation of nature which persists to entangle other purushas (*Six Sys.* pp 295 & 299) for there is a plurality of them. The qualities (Sattva, Rajas, Tamas) inhere in nature though Aviveka foists them on the self. And as Avyakta Prakriti is one, and one only, the identity of cause and effect is established, being the modifications of nature, the effect in all reality pre-existing in the cause. While Saṅkara argues (II,1,20) from the identity of cause and effect, its religious application that the world is the effect of Brahman is not different from it.

Though Kapila mentions eight prakritis, they are the Kārya modifications of the undeveloped primary Karaṇa, and in turn serve as causes. Prakriti evolves Vikāras in its parināma (evolution). This parināma-vāda (theory of evolution) is taken into the compound of the Vedānta by Rāmānuja whose Viśiṣṭa-advaita differs from the Vivartavāda (illusion doctrine) of Saṅkara. (Max Muller, *Six Sys.* p 81). "There is always something on which Vivarta (illusion) is at work and which cannot be deprived of its reality" (Ibid, p. 185).

According to Max Muller even Bādarāyana, whose Sūtras both Saṅkara and Rāmānuja take as their text, may have held to Parināma (evolution) rather than Vivarta (illusion) doctrine. "This view of the universe as the development of Brahman was possibly the original view taken by Bādarāyana, and it was clearly that of Rāmānuja and his followers who explain the world as an evolution (Parināma). But this was not Saṅkara's theory. He accepts the two facts that the world is changing and unreal, and yet that the real cause of it, that is, Brahman is incapable of change." (*Six Sys.* p.280) The fallacy underlying is exposed by Kapila's argument: "Every proof in support of an Iśvera as a maker or Lord, a Sat-kara, would break down. For if he were supposed to be above all variance and free, he could not have willed to create the world; if he were not so, he would be distracted and deluded and unfit for the supreme task of an Iśvera." (*Six Sys* p. 328). In dealing with Brahman as evolving (Parināma) into the world's goods, Rāmānuja brought Him down not only into conformity with the Sāmkhya and Yoga teaching but with the discoveries of science in the West. But Kapila's views on causality are of peculiar interest in that he included among the *Bandhas*, bondages or determinations, not only those resulting from nature, and its modifications (the Prakriti and Vikāra Bandhas) but that which results from superstition or belief in the supernatural, the Dakshinā-Bandha (gifts to priest) in ritual and sacrifice. From Dakshinā (fee) the priestly class is named Dakshinīyas. Gifts are made by those who are overcome by passion, delusion and misconception. It is an index of an important limitation, bondage or Bandha, on man whom Kipling defined as "an imperfectly denatured animal intermittently subject to the unpredictable reactions of an unlocated spiritual area." "That this feeling of a priest should have been considered one of the three bondages shows that the followers of Kapila

were above superstition, and looked upon sacrifice and priest-craft as hindrances rather than as helps to true freedom and Moksha of the spirit" (*Six Systems*, pp.272, 273). This contrasts from the tolerance of Saṅkara to ritual (*Vyavahārārtham*) from Rāmānuja, and also from Jaimini who preferred ritual to knowledge. But the nearest point of contact between the science of evolution and Kapila is the negation by the latter that Purusha (self) is the maker or agent. He is reflected in the moving mirror of nature whose emanations are operated by its Guṇas (qualities). But the self deluded by Ahamkāra (egoism) imagines that he is the operator (Cf. *Bhagavad Gita* III, 27). Kapila's Purusha remains neutral or non-active, though in him we do not yet see the biochemical product of modern science. The Sāṃkya Sūtras expressly declare that "the reward of every work done does not depend on any ruler of the world. The works themselves are working on for evermore. (*Six Systems*, p. 330). "If it were otherwise we should have to ascribe the creation of the world with all its suffering to a Lord who is nevertheless supposed to be loving and gracious." This is the same argument put forth by Jaimini, whose Pūrva Mīmāṃsā glorifies works (ritual and sacrifice) before everything

Nor does the expedient of the Yoga-Pātañjalas that superimposed an Ādi-Purusha (First Self) modify the rigour of the law of Karman. Devotion to Ādi-Purusha, according to Pātañjali whose system is significantly named Seśwera-Sāṃkhyā (i. e., Sāṃkhyā with God) is only one of the modes of attaining Samādhi among other Upāyās mentioned in the Sādhana-Pāda.

The religious application of causality, Karman, is also the central feature of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣhika schools. In these Sūtras Iśwera is not clearly postulated either as the author or as controller of the small Aṇūs (atoms ?) of which the world is supposed to consist. Only in one place, Gotama

advert to divine agency (Sūtras, Book LV, 19-21; see *Six Sys.* pp. 332 & 424). Both the schools adopt Ārambhavāda or the theory of atomic agglomeration, differing from evolution (parināma) and far removed from Vivarta (illusion). "If wholes are constantly divided and subdivided, we should in the end be landed in nihilism, but this is not to be. There cannot be annihilation because the Anūs or the smallest parts are realities (Gotama, IV, 8, 82) and according to their very nature cannot be further reduced or compressed out of being (*Six systems*, P. 426). This strengthens the theists who argue that atoms, unchangeable and indestructible, are "manufactured articles, bearing the trademark of divine factory. Balfour, Sturat and other physicists were until recently holding this view. (McCabe, "*Existence of God*", pp. 72, 73). But the atom today is the product of evolution (parināma) and no longer the primary that it was supposed to be. The objection to atomism that Ākāśa (space) is everywhere, and therefore in the atom also, and if the atom has figure or a without and within, it is of necessity divisible, anticipated the breaking of the atom into electrons circling round protons like minute solar systems. The atom itself is mostly empty space, Akāśa, at relatively large distances, tiny electrons fly about like bees 'in the Victoria Station.' Modern science defied emphatically the maxim *Regressio in infinitum* in regard to the division of the atom, which now is a cluster of feeble electric charges. We trace in Kanāda the seed of the notion of material atoms made up of energy. The Vaiśeṣhikas believe that "the impulse given to atoms comes from God." (*Six Sys.* p. 441).

Kanāda's Anūs are equatable to electrons, as the atom in the Western science no longer excludes further analysis. These invisible particles are held by Kanāda to be eternal in themselves, but non-eternal as aggregates (*Six Systems*,

p 446). The nearest approach to Exner's theory of statistic determination is disclosed in the Vaiśeṣhika thought. The Aṇūs (electrons ?) are unconditioned and indeterminate individually, they receive their impulse from God ; but as aggregates, they are non-eternal, i. e., conditioned, and determined. We feel the atmosphere of modern Heisenberg, Exner, and Eddington. The Aṇūs do not assume perceptibility till they combine in three doubles (Tri-aṇūka). The idea of a double-atom suggests the proton-electron combination. While the concepts of time and space according to Kanāda bring to mind Einstein's relativity, his Aṇū approaches the indeterminacy of modern physics.

Karman as the religious application of the law of causality is accepted throughout the Indian Systems. Even the law of Entropy has its counterpart in the idea that creation resulted from the upsetting of the equipoise of the Guṇas of Prakriti, and when their equipoise is restored, Pralaya occurs. (Sāṃkhya Sūtras, VI, 42 ; *Six Sys.* p. 110). Kanāda expressly says that dissolution (pralaya) ensues when atoms are separated, while creation begins when motion springs up in them, and they are united. India believed in cyclic universes, just as it believed in the immortality of the soul. Sir James Jeans would deny both. The universe will end, it had a beginning, there was a "creation" (*The Mysterious Universe*, Sir James H. Jeans, pp. 132, 133). And who is the creator ? "We are beginning to suspect that mind is the creator, and governor, of the realm of matter, the mind in which the atoms out of which our individual minds have grown exist as thoughts." "The old dualism of mind and matter seems likely to disappear... through *substantial matter resolving itself into a creation and manifestation of mind.*" (Ibid, p 137). While he thus appears to endow reality to matter in contrast with Saṅkara's Māyā and accepts evolution with Rāmānuja, his creative

Mind has nothing in common with man's emotion, morality, or aesthetic appreciation, but merely in the tendency to think mathematically. So long as human qualities are not there we may not much care whether Jeans' Mind is God or his brother in deeper colour. In his *New Background of Science*, however, the triple fundamentals of his *Mysterious Universe* (electrons, protons, and photons) vanish as sheer illusion. This is the rebirth of Saṅkara clinging to a "mind reigning supreme and alone". But the question remains : Who created the late Mathematician that faded in the *New Background*, if not the electrons in Jeans' material brain, the reality on which his illusion works ?

The Siddhantin's criticism of Mayavada.

By

MISS V. PARANJOTI.

To the Māyāvādin, the supreme reality is Brahman to whom he is led by more ways than one. He may doubt the existence of the outer world ; he may not credit his senses ; but in and through all these manifold doubts threatening to demolish every bit of reality, there is the doubting entity whose reality must be accepted because of the very fact of doubting. Here at last is something that cannot be assailed by scepticism. Inasmuch as the self is real, it is also independent, eternal and infinite. These qualities are implied when we say that the self is beyond doubt and therefore real. If the self were dependent, changing and finite, it would pass beyond itself and cease to be real. The self that is real, independent, eternal and infinite cannot but be identical with the Brahman spoken of in the Scriptures, and hence the self is Brahman.

There is another consideration which leads to Brahman. The empirical world is seen to be full of contradictions. Its reality is at best only relative ; and as ground of the relative, there must be the absolute. Our finite minds can grasp the world only through the categories of space, time and cause. But these categories do not lead us anywhere, for they end in contradictions. However, the mind is great enough to realise that it must follow a path different from the space-time-cause approach in order to reach the abiding real. It is possible in spite of our finitude to prepare ourselves by degrees so that we can intuit Brahman.

It is not possible for man as mind to comprehend Brahman or to describe it. The mind is finite, and Brahman infinite ; and consequently the mind cannot form an estimate

of Brahman. Any attempt to ascribe any quality to it would only particularise it. At most we can only say that it is infinite, immutable, pure, impartite, of the nature of intelligence and of bliss.

This supreme reality is all that there is. If so, how can this be reconciled with what is obvious to perception that there are a world and souls claiming independent existence besides the Supreme Being? Brahman is the non-dual spirit over against which there is nothing, either world or souls. All distinctions that arise are within Brahman and vanish within it. Considering the relation of Brahman to the external world, the Māyāvādin says that as ornaments arise from gold, so the world evolves from Brahman. The Siddhāntin condemns this analogy as unsatisfactory; for as ornaments cannot arise from gold without an agent,¹ so the world cannot spring from Brahman without a creator.

To his opponent's objection that *cit* can only produce *acit*, and that if the intelligent Brahman produced the world, this too should be intelligent, the Māyāvādin's reply is that as the intelligent spider produces the inert web,² so Brahman who is intelligent, can produce the material world. The Siddhāntin criticises this analogy saying that whereas the spider's web is uniform, the world is not thus uniform;³ and whereas the spider is unceasingly occupied in producing the web, the Supreme Being is not thus unceasingly engaged in creating the world.

A further analogy given by the Māyāvādin to prove that the material world can proceed from Brahman, who is pure intelligence, is that as the light of a lamp yields black soot,

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| 1. | L. 54. | Refutation of Māyāvāda—Sañkarppa Nirākaraṇam. |
| 2. | L. 16. | Statement „ „ „ „ |
| 3. | L. 77. | Refutation „ „ „ „ |

so the pure Brahman can give rise to the material world.⁴ The Siddhāntin's criticism is that soot arises because of external adjuncts such as wick, oil etc., and that the soot is not resolved in that light⁵ itself in the same way as the world is said to be resolved in Brahman.

To the question raised by the Siddhāntin as to how the host of the non-intelligent can proceed from the intelligent, the Māyāvādin offers further in reply the analogy of the one tree which produces leaves, fruit, root etc. ;⁶ similarly one Brahman can produce the pluralistic universe.

The Siddhāntin's criticism of most of these analogies is unwarranted. He presses the analogies in every respect so that absurd conclusions follow. This is not justifiable, for the analogy is used to make clear only the point or points mentioned by the writer, and need not compare with the matter to be illustrated in every respect. The analogy of the spider and web for instance, is intended to prove how the effect may be of a different nature from the cause so that it is possible for the inert world to arise from the intelligent Brahman. The Siddhāntin deviates into side-tracks saying that whereas the nature of the web is uniform, the world is not; and whereas the spider is unremittingly engaged in producing the web, the creation of the world by Brahman is not thus continuous. These criticisms are beside the point, and moreover, the facts stated are inaccurate, for neither is the web uniform, nor is the spider incessantly engaged in producing the web.

These analogies are open to other criticisms as well. It cannot be said that Brahman evolves into the world as

4. L. 93—94. Refutation of Māyāvāda—Saṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

5. L. 95—96. " " " " "

6. L. 78—80. " " " " "

gold is changed into gold ornaments. All such transformations are in time; and Brahman is above time. Evolution involves change; and Brahman is immutable. Further, is it part of Brahman that undergoes change, or the whole of it? If it is only part of Brahman this would be contrary to the scriptures, which declare that Brahman is impartite. If it is the whole of Brahman that is changed into the world, then the world is Brahman, and beyond it we need not seek a transcendent entity. Change means imperfection, and if Brahman changes, it cannot be Brahman.

Neither can the empirical concept of cause apply to Brahman. Gauḍapāda after his thoughtful consideration of the concept of cause, avows that neither can waking life be the cause of dreams, nor Brahman be the cause of the world. Causality, whether as conceived by the Naiyāyika or as set forth by the Sāṅkhya is not acceptable. The Naiyāyika's theory of ārambhavāda creates a cleft between cause and effect; for it maintains that the effect has no prior existence in the cause, but comes into being afresh. If the cause die before the effect, non-existence precedes the effect, and not any particular cause; if so, any cause whatever would do to explain the effect or rather, to be more accurate, non-existence will suffice to account for the effect. The sātākāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya is no more free from difficulties though it is certainly an improvement on the Nyāya concept. According to the Sāṅkhya, the cause and effect are not different but the effect pre-exists in the cause. If so, the effect existing in the cause is either manifest or unmanifest. If manifest, then there is no need for the causal operation; if unmanifest, something is required to manifest the unmanifested, and to manifest what manifests, something else is required; and so on *ad infinitum*. The Advaitin finds that the concept of cause is full of inconsistencies, and that, though a condition of finite knowing, it does not apply to ultimate reality. Cause

and effect are not simultaneous like the two horns of an animal. There is temporal succession here; and in trying to ascertain the cause of an event, we have to go back to discover the conditions that produced it; and if the investigation is to be thoroughgoing, we have to go still further back to find out the circumstances which gave rise to the cause, and so on *ad infinitum*. It may be said that there are unproduced eternal causes which give rise to effects, but which are themselves not the effects of anything else so that infinite regress is avoided in these instances. However, this suggestion is not free from difficulties. For, such a first cause that is eternal, cannot itself change in order to produce the world, and yet be unchanging. 'The real cannot be subject to change ; if it be, then the immortal would become mortal.' It is the considered conviction of the Māyāvādin that the concepts of evolution, causality and, all other such empirical concepts cannot apply to Brahman and, therefore, cannot explain the relation of Brahman to the world. If this be the Māyāvādin's view, it is strange that he should use the analogies mentioned above, such as, for instance, the gold ornaments coming from gold, the spider producing the web etc., which involve evolution and causality.

This difficulty is explained by the fact that one cannot straightaway realise the Advaitin's position that the concept of cause being full of contradictions will not serve to explain ultimate truths. At first one will think along with the Naiyāyika that the law of causation is a 'self-evident axiom known intuitively as it were, and corroborated by experience.' It will next be realised that there must be unity of cause and effect, which is the Sāṅkhya position of *satkāryavāda*. The pupil would now be ready to see along with the Advaitin that the causal concept is an impossibility, and that ultimate truth lies beyond all such finite concepts. As this advanced position of the Māyāvādin cannot be attained without suffi-

cient preparation, the analogies mentioned above are for those approaching the Advaita position. These analogies should therefore not be misconstrued as illustrative of the Māyavādin's final position. They help to lead to his standpoint, but do not represent that view-point.

If the Māyavādin believes that finite concepts such as evolution and causality do not explain the relation of Brahman to the world, then how does he conceive this relationship? It is important to remind ourselves that Brahman is essential to account for the world, for the latter is only relative or phenomenal, and as the ground of this is required the absolute and noumenal Brahman. The tests of reality are consistency and permanence; and judged by these, the world is found to be full of contradictions and to abound with change. Dissatisfied with the inconsistent and the inconstant, our minds seek to repose in what is consistent and constant. Beyond the relative and the changing, we long for the absolute and permanent. It is only Brahman, which, as mentioned in the Scriptures, is infinite and immutable, that can meet our needs.

Granting Brahman does not create the world, what is the relation between the two? Śaṅkara abandons the concept of cause, and adopts the philosophical concept of non-difference to explain the relationship between Brahman and the world. Śaṅkara's system cannot be classed as pantheism for he does not say that Brahman and the world are one, but that they are not different.

Why do we see the world as a multiplicity that is over against Brahman, instead of realising the truth that the world is not different from Brahman? Our finite knowing is responsible for this erroneous perception of plurality. Our finite concepts of space-time cause can never take us beyond the level of the phenomenal. If we wish to transcend this to reach upto the ultimate truth, we can only do

it through intuition. It is only this form of experience that will lead us to the non-dual Brahman.

The view that the world is non-different from Brahman does away with the difficulties of causation, evolution and other temporal processes of the kind. The problem of *cit* producing *acit* also vanishes, for there is no inert world over against Brahman who is *cit*. Brahman is the absolute, beyond which there is nothing. All distinctions arise within it and disappear therein.

To those who have not yet risen beyond the concept of cause, and who require an efficient cause for the fluctuations of the universe, there is posited *Īśvara*. On the one side is Brahman, eternal and unchanging; and on the other, is the world that is transient and changing. That we are faced with a changing world cannot be gainsaid; and this universe of becoming must be explained by material and efficient causes until causality is transcended. Neither the unchanging Brahman, nor the unintelligent *prakṛti* can account for the changes. The only way out of the difficulty is by positing *Īśvara*, who is neither immutable as Brahman, nor fluctuating like the unstable world. He shares the natures of both Brahman and the world. He is thought of as the efficient and the material cause of the world, for he is the agent that is responsible for the changes in the world, and to him belongs *māyā*, the material cause of the world. Whether *māyā* is conceived of as *Īśvara*'s *śakti* or as the world-substrate, in either case it is subject to him; so that he is not in any way limited by it. *Māyā* is thus conceived of in two ways. According to one school of thinkers, it is *Īśvara*'s *śakti* inherent in him. According to others, it is his subtle body. In the one case, it is his own *śakti* subject to his will; and in the other case, it is not something given, which being over against him, will be an obstruction, but some-

thing under his control. *Īśvara* in cooperation with *māyā* can explain the changing universe.

In trying to reconcile the non-intelligent world with the intelligent Brahman, the *Māyāvādin* is supposed to say that nescience attaches itself to Brahman even as clouds suddenly come to obscure the sun.⁷ The *Siddhāntin* points out that this statement of the *Māyāvādin* is inconsistent with a previous statement of his that nescience arises from Brahman itself⁸ as fine silken threads arise from the worm itself. The *Siddhāntin* goes on to say that if it be a sport of the intelligent Brahman thus to entangle itself in impurities as the worm weaves around itself a cocoon, then as this has no way of release from its imprisonment, so has Brahman no one to lift up, and save it from, obscurities which cause delusion, and it lies therein robbed of both knowledge and sovereignty.⁹ And if it is said that, as in the case of copper becoming bright on coming into contact with acid, Brahman's nescience is dispelled when knowledge arises, Brahman can no longer be maintained to be eternal and pure. Knowledge too becomes a further reality besides Brahman, and the Supreme Being becomes like one of us.¹⁰

It is not true that nescience attaches itself to Brahman as clouds obscure the sky. The *Māyāvādin's* position is that the non-intelligent world is explained by *Īśvara* functioning on *māyā*. As noticed above, *māyā* is subject to *Īśvara* so that he is in no way hindered by it. The non-intelligent world is accounted for in this way without either *Īśvara* or Brahman being robbed of intelligence or any other faculty in any degree whatever.

7. L. 100. Refutation of *Māyāvāda*—*Saṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam*.

8. L. 104—105 " " " " "

9. L. 106—109 " " " " "

10. L. 110—114 " " " " "

Another objection raised is that if the world arises from *Īśvara* and *māyā*, at the time of return all the limitations of the world such as non-intelligence, impurity etc., will pollute *Īśvara*. But though the effects be resolved into *māyā*, their evil characteristics need not affect *Īśvara*, for when thus resolved, their evil effects will also vanish. As *Śaṅkara* says, when the effects return to their causes, they lose their special features which marked them off as effects. If they still retain these, then the dissolution into the cause is not complete. So the world, when resolving into *māyā*, loses all its specific features of impurity etc.

The *Māyāvādin* has to explain the relation of the plurality of the *jīvas* to the Absolute. This brings up again the problem of the one and the many; the question of whether the suffering of the body will affect Brahman, and the problem of how the soul with all its limitations can be Brahman.

The *Māyāvādin* in trying to show how the *jīvas* are related to Brahman makes use of analogies which again evoke unwarranted criticism at the hands of the *Siddhāntin*. The *Māyāvādin* maintains that as one cord sustains the many beads strung on it,¹¹ so it is one Brahman that dwells in the various bodies. The *Siddhāntin's* criticism is that the gems do not of themselves unite with the string.¹² This criticism overlooks the fact that the analogy in question is intended to convey the nature of the relation between body and soul and not the origin of such relation to which the *Māyāvādin* has an answer elsewhere that the connection is beginningless and is determined by karma as guided by *Īśvara*.

The analogy that the one Brahman stands in the different bodies as the milk is the same though produced by different

11. L. 116. Refutation of *Māyāvāda*—*Śaṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam*.

12. L. 119. " " " " "

cows, is criticised by the Siddhāntin who says that in the comparison, the milk corresponds to Brahman, and the cows to the bodies; and the analogy could apply only if like the milk, Brahman were unintelligent, and if like the cows the bodies were intelligent.¹³ Here also, the Siddhāntin follows a side-track. For whereas the Māyāvādin merely refers to the relation of the one and the many, the Siddhāntin compares the nature of the intelligent and non-intelligent elements concerned.

The point intended to be brought out by these analogies is that it is the one spirit of Brahman that dwells in the different bodies as the various jīvas. The jīvas are Brahman itself. The ātman itself when bound, as it were, by the limitations of individuality such as a body etc., appears as the jīva. The space enclosed in a jar cannot be said to be either a part of the partless space, or a modification of it. When the jar breaks, the space in it is said to merge in the general space. Similarly, the jīva is not a part of the absolute. When its limitations are dispelled, it will realise that it is Brahman itself.

Let us now consider the relation between soul and body. Here again, the Māyāvādin uses a number of analogies to make clear the relation between Brahman and the world. As the magnet without itself moving attracts iron, so the soul without itself being affected makes the body function.¹⁴ As in a mirror the reflection appears, but does not mingle with the glass, so the soul dwells in the body without mingling with it.¹⁵ As the white moon remains unaffected while its reflections seem to move, so the soul stands unaffected while the body has various experiences. As the nature of the crystal is not in any way affected by its reflecting the colour

13. L. 120—121 Refutation of Māyāvāda—Sāṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

14. L. 127—128. " " " " "

15. L. 124. " " " " "

of the flower in the neighbourhood, so the soul is not affected though its body is modified by various experiences.¹⁶ These analogies are used to illustrate the one point that the soul is not in any way affected by the experiences of the body. But the Siddhāntin criticises them for various points which they were not intended to answer.

The analogy of the magnet is criticised as follows : 'If like the iron and magnet, the body could be active in the mere proximity of Brahman, then since there is nothing not in the proximity of the impartite, everything should be active, and nothing may lie inert.'¹⁷ This criticism would hold good if the magnet attracted everything else besides the iron. This not being the case, no more can the soul be expected to actuate anything beyond the body. Further, all bodies are not actuated in the same way. A piece of heavy iron is less likely to be pulled by a magnet than a light one. The extent to which a body is actuated is dependent on itself. Bodies that are heavily mala-ridden will be more difficult to be actuated than the ones that are less laden with *mala*.

The analogy of the reflection remaining unaffected in the mirror, and of the original eye sustaining no harm though the eye of the reflection in the mirror be hurt,¹⁸ is criticised by the Siddhāntin who says that the soul remaining unaffected as illustrated by the above analogies, would hold good if when the tip of the finger is stung by a bee, only the part stung suffers pain¹⁹. We must note, however, that even should the pain extend to a greater area, still it is only the body that suffers. The Siddhāntin by

16. L. 143. Refutation of Māyāvāda—Saṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

17. L. 129—130. „ „ „ „ „

18. L. 163—164. „ „ „ „ „

19. L. 159—163 „ „ „ „ „

his analogy cannot prove that the soul is affected by the pain, since he has not established that body and soul are related as organ and organism. The analogy of the moon and its reflections²⁰ is not any more thoughtfully handled by the critic, for he makes the irrelevant criticism that the analogy would be in place only if the moon could realise that while it remains unaffected, its reflections move. The point in question is not the cognition of any fact on the part of the moon or the soul, but the point of the soul remaining unaltered though the body suffers, as the moon is unchanged though its reflection moves. The analogy of the crystal and its reflection also calls forth the pointless criticism that the analogy splits up the unity of the Māyāvādin. It is not unity that is here illustrated by the Māyāvādin, but the isolated condition of the soul.

The Māyāvādin says that though the soul may seem subject to pains and pleasures, on enlightenment it will be clear that these never affect the soul, just as one who in dreams seems to undergo suffering, on waking realises they were unreal. The critic replies that the fruit of dreams as of waking is the fruit of karma, and that it need not be said to be false²¹. He fails to note that though no doubt the fruit of dreams as of waking is the fruit of karma, the soul is not affected by the fruit of karma whether it attaches to the waking state or the dream state.

The Siddhāntin crowns all his criticisms relating to this section by stating that to say that the jīva is not affected by suffering is to contradict both perception and the Scriptures²². The Māyāvādin's reply to this would be that the sufferings that we see and which are spoken of in the

20. L. 208—209 Refutation of Māyāvāda—Saṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

21. L. 134—135 " " " " "

22. L. 165—166. " " " " "

Scriptures as affecting the soul are only adventitious. If it were the essential nature of the soul to suffer, it could never at any time be released from suffering. It should not be difficult to conceive of the soul remaining unaffected by the sufferings of this life, for as space does not catch fire when something in it is burning, so the soul is not affected by the experiences of the body. Brahman's relation to the world is open to criticism when conceived of on the analogy of the magnet and iron. It amounts to placing spirit over against matter. Brahman is finitised when conceived of as spirit that is opposed to matter. Brahman should rather be conceived of as having transcended spirit and matter.

We may now consider the problem of how the individual jīvas can be said to be Brahman. The Māyāvādin not merely asserts that there is a divine element in the jīva, but that the jīva is Brahman. God and soul are one according to the Māyāvādin.

To the Siddhāntin this seems to be the very height of absurdity, and he raises various difficulties which we may now consider. How can Brahman the impartite undergo avasthās? How is it that Brahman can know only with the help of the karaṇas? How is it that knowledge comes to this Brahman only at a certain stage? This Brahman is deluded by dreams and by darkness, and after realising the unreality of these experiences, should dreams and darkness occur again, it is again subject to fear.²³ Is it not derogatory for Brahman to be thus subject to these limitations?²⁴ Brahman seems to be hopelessly compromised by being identified with souls.

It must be remembered that the jīva is Brahman defined by the limitations of māyā and karma. So long as these

23. L. 141—142. Refutation of Māyāvāda—Sāṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

24. L. 140. " " " " "

appear to be real, it cannot be one with Brahman. The space in the pot cannot be realised as one with the space outside unless the pot that bounds the space within be destroyed. Similarly, the soul cannot be realised as Brahman unless the limitations are known to be unreal by destroying the ignorance that posits them. The appearance of the limitation is for the time being. If the limitations were real, they could not be destroyed by knowledge. Embodiment is no doubt an evil, but ignorance is worse. When knowledge comes, the embodiment is seen to be unreal. So long as the limitations appear to be real, the jīva will be subject to the avasthās; it can discern only with the help of the senses; knowledge will come only in the wake of experience; the jīva will be deluded by dreams and darkness and be subject to fear. When the limiting conditions are transcended, it is Brahman, the omniscient and supreme. The Māyāvādin's conception of release is that as when a pot breaks, the space enclosed by it becomes one with the space outside, so when the finite limitations of a physical body and karma are shed through the realisation of their being consequent on nescience, the jīva is realised as one with Brahman.

The Siddhāntin here again raises the senseless objection that this analogy cannot apply here as the space in the pot experiences no pain on being confined, and no joy on being released in the same way as the soul experiences, sorrow on embodiment, and bliss on being released.²⁵ This criticism is not to the point for the Māyāvādin's intention in introducing the analogy is to illustrate the mode of release without reference to the attendant circumstances of pain or pleasure.

A further criticism of the Māyāvādin's conception of

25. L. 214—215. Refutation of Māyāvāda—Saṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

release is that if the *jīvas* are identical with the one Brahman, then when one of them is released, all the *jīvas* that are so identical with the impartite Brahman should also be released.²⁶ Śaṅkara in speaking of release says that as when the limitations caused by a jar are removed, the confined space becomes one with the cosmic space, so when the limitations of space, time and causality are removed, the *jīvas* lose themselves in the absolute self. Further, though the space that is enclosed in one jar be mixed with dust and smoke, it does not affect the other parts of space. Similarly, when one *jīva* experiences pleasure or pain, the others need not be affected by them.

It is true that the limiting condition (e. g. embodiment) is due to ignorance, and that when the root-cause is removed all its consequences also should cease. However, ignorance is not one; they are many, associated each one with a particular *jīva*. It follows then that, when one ignorance is destroyed, there is release for that *jīva* alone, not for the others. Even if ignorance be regarded as one, plurality should be admitted of its *śaktis* or of its conjunction with *jīvas*; so that when a single *jīva* is released, the other *śaktis* or conjunctions are left unaffected and the other *jīvas* continue in bondage.

When the Māyāvādin speaks of bondage as grounded in difference, and of release in non-difference some who misunderstand it think that as difference is spoken of as the locus in the one case, and non-difference in the other, there is not the same locus in the two cases, and that it is not the bound person that is released. This difficulty arises from a superficial view of the matter. It is indeed the bound person that is released. Difference and non-difference are not conceived by the Advaitin as exclusive

26. L. 216—217. Refutation of Māyāvāda—Śaṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

and independently real. Difference has non-difference for its substrate, for difference is super-imposed on non-difference. Every soul is one with Brahman ; the separation is only apparent. Release is eternal ; and bondage is only superimposed. The soul that is released is the soul that was bound ; hence, there is no difference of locus in the two conditions of bondage and release.

The Māyāvādin bases his absolutism on the Scriptures which for him are eternal. His opponent says that if non-duality were the purport of the Scriptures, there should be no mention of difference. This objection, however, is not valid. For before estimating the purport of any work, there are various tests to be applied such as the consideration of the beginning and the end, repetition, novelty, fruit, glorification and reasoning. Where there is mention of difference in the Scriptures, it is with a view to refuting it by restating it. Non-difference is the purport as determined by the above tests.

Brahman and the jīva should be the same. Otherwise, how could it be said of the latter that it is immortal ? Our finitude is such that it seems impossible we could be the infinite. But with our finitude dispelled, we enter into the heritage of the infinite with which we are one.

It is knowledge that helps us to attain such union with Brahman. When the goal is reached, all erroneous duality vanishes. Rituals, when performed without a view to rewards, are useful for those who do not directly study the Vedānta ; for they gradually lead up to the knowledge that the jīva is one with Brahman, and he who knows Brahman becomes one with it. From now onwards, his privileges are many. There is no conflict in his soul, for his victory over the world is complete. It is natural for him to lead a good life that is perfectly acceptable. He is filled with a consciousness of the 'most high', and his mind and soul being thus

uplifted, there is nothing for him to wish or avoid. He is above all ordinary obligations, and he is exempt from all performance of rituals.

The Siddhāntin declares it is ingratitude on the part of the Māyāvādin to dispense with the rituals that paved the way for knowledge that leads to the goal.²⁷ The Siddhāntin overlooks the fact that rituals are not an end in themselves. Their value is only instrumental; and when the purpose for which they were intended is accomplished, their function is over, and there is no point in retaining them. Moreover, for one who knows that he is Brahman, there is no duality. Knowledge destroys conceit of agency; and in the absence of this, the performance of rituals is impossible. When their function of creating knowledge is over, they die out without requiring anything to remove them. For example, clearing nut-powder not only precipitates all the mud in the water, but it also precipitates itself. So rituals die out of themselves.

With regard to the Scriptures, the Siddhāntin raises the difficulty as to how the impartite Brahman that has no teeth etc. can produce the Vedas. This question need not arise as these sacred books are eternal. They are the utterances of Īśvara, who however, is not absolutely free in respect of them, as he has to reproduce them in their original form from aeon to aeon at the re-creation of the world after every periodical destruction. Īśvara's utterance of the Veda is not less intelligible than Siva's alleged authorship of the *Sivāgamas*. This duality of Īśvara and the Veda does not militate against the unity of Brahman, for this is only one more of the many differences superimposed on, and somehow transcended in the non-different Brahman. Though from the absolute point of view, Scriptures would thus be phenomenal, it is yet

27. L. 230—231 Refutation of Māyāvāda—Saṅkarppa Nirākaraṇam.

possible for them to give knowledge of the Absolute ; for it is found that the phenomenal gives rise to experiences of a greater degree of reality than itself e. g. dreams and delusions produce fear and trembling which persist even after waking or the cessation of the delusion.

The Problem of Time in Indian Thought

BY

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The problem of Time is as important as it is ancient. Very early in philosophy we find the human mind occupied with the question of the relation between the changing and the changeless—the perennial question of becoming and being. Since the emergence of the problem in Greek Thought, we find it appearing again and again in some form or other in physics as well as in philosophy, until we come to quite recent times when, thanks to Bergson, Alexander and Einstein, it has acquired a new significance and a fresh importance. Time and Change are involved in each other. We cannot think of change without time and the essence of time is succession. Perhaps we can think of Time without phenomena, as Kant contended, but after all it is an abstraction. In any case, the idea of change and that of time are closely associated. And hence the temporal and the changing have always meant the same thing. That which is in time, is subject to change.

On the contrary, the unchanging is what is beyond reach of the ravages of time. The unchanging and the eternal are the same. The contradiction between the changing and the changeless thus implies the contradiction between the temporal and the eternal. And that in its turn leads us to the opposition between the Becoming and the Being. May we not add to this another pair of opposites, viz., Appearance and Reality ? That which *appears*, is in time and is, therefore, subject to change; the *real* is beyond time, eternal, and is, therefore, unchanging. It is obvious that these ideas have occupied very important place in philosophy since its very dawn.

In the philosophy of Plato—and as a matter of fact in ancient philosophy throughout—Time is considered less real than eternity. And it would not be altogether wrong if we said that the tendency is rather to regard Time as unreal. Degrees of reality may be an inadmissible conception. In that case, Time is unquestionably unreal; but if reality may be conceived as less and more, then time is undoubtedly less real than eternity. The temporal order is an appearance—the changing is passing and unstable. And Reality is the changeless and the eternal; it is Being, while becoming is only a passing show.

The difficulties which such a view of time has involved are well-known. To decry time is not to solve the problem of time. What appears may not be ultimately real, but how to account for it? Is Time real? Or, is it pure illusion? And what after all is the eternal? Is it not only what lasts for *all* time? If so, then the eternal is not timeless and eternity is only *unending* time, but after all, *time*. Is Plato's eternal order of things, therefore, a negation of time or an affirmation of all-time?—a beginningless and ceaseless flow of time?

Kant gives a new turn to the problem of Time. Time is only a form of intuition. The things-in-themselves are not in Time, though we have to think of them as in time. The fact of Time is recognised, only Time is now purely subjective, having no objective reality.

Since Kant, Time has either been conceived as an *apriori* condition of knowledge or, as common-sense would rather have it, as an objective *possibility* of change and motion.

But in recent thought, the Time-idea has undergone interesting modification. For Bergson, Time is the stuff of which reality is made. Time is not only not unreal, but is reality itself. It is a force that creates. Succession,

we are told, is an undeniable fact. And "if I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have to wait...is an absolute. What else can this mean than that the glass of water, the sugar, and the process of the sugar's melting in the water are abstractions, and that the whole within which they have been cut out by my senses and understanding progresses, it may be in the manner of a consciousness?" *

Again, "If succession, in so far as distinct from mere juxtaposition, has no real efficacy, if time is not a kind of force, why does the universe unfold its successive states with a velocity which, in regard to my consciousness, is a veritable absolute?" **

All this implies an idea of time very much different from the ancient idea.

In Alexander also we find an equally interesting idea of Time. With him Time is the soul of Space, and Space-Time is the soul of all reality.

As to Einstein's theory of Relativity and its effect on our Time-idea, we may just quote a paragraph from Wildon Carr's exposition of it.

"The principle of relativity declares that there is no absolute magnitude, that there exists nothing whatever which can claim to be great or small in its own nature, also there is no absolute duration, nothing whatever which in its own nature is short or long. I co-ordinate my universe from my own standpoint of rest in a system of reference in relation to which all else is moving Space and Time are not containers, nor are they contents, they are variants." ***

* *Creative Evolution*, P. 10.

** *Ibid.* P. 358.

*** *The Principle of Relativity*—by H. Wildon Carr, P. 190.

Space forbids us to enter into a fuller exposition of these new theories of Time. But it is obvious that all these imply a concept of time radically different from what has hitherto prevailed in philosophy. Now that the time-concept has acquired this new importance, may we not turn to the ancient heritage of Hindu thought and see what it has had to offer regarding this problem ?

About Space, Indian Thought offers two distinct views : one is that space was created, the other is that it is un-created. In the Vedānta Sūtras ii.3.1 *et seq.* the doctrine is definitely laid down that space was created and that it was created at a particular stage in the process of creation. But against this doctrine, we have the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school that space is a *dravya* and is thus ultimate.

But what about Time ? The account given of Time is somewhat wavering. Commonsense had its own view about Times as about Space; and some of the systems also give a clear and definite theory about Time. But still, as in Europe so in India, Time has offered difficulties which could not be so easily overcome. And hence about Time we find more diverse views than about Space.

Time is a more difficult and complicated idea than Space. We can think of a space-less reality—such as a soul. But can we think of any existence without time—or, as Bergson would put it, without duration ? A time-reference is more inevitable in our thinking than a space-reference. Besides, the fact of change cannot be accounted for by Space. Time alone can explain it. Whether ultimate or not, change is a fact. And Change and Time are correlated ideas. This also adds to the difficulty of any clear definition of the time-idea.

Popularly, in Indian thought, time, for which the word *Kāla* is the usual name, has been variously described. In the *Gita* X. 30 we are told that God was himself the time (*Kāla*) that is used in reckoning and in X. 33. He is identi-

fied with the *changeless* time (*akṣaya Kāla*). One is time that is measured, and the other is absolute time. And, again, in XI.31, Time which is identified with God, is spoken of as the destroyer of things (*lokakṣayakṛt*). Commentators would not take these passages as a theory of time but would rather take the time and *Kāla* in its half-mythological and half-mystical sense of a power and a deity. Yet the way in which Time or *Kāla* is spoken of in other places as well leaves little doubt as to the fact that all these statements presupposed a more or less definite theory of time. In the *Mahābhārata* itself there are scores of passages where some such theory is advanced. Thus: (in V. 32. 24.) Time is spoken of as the *cause* of things; VI. 14. 60. also speaks of time as a determinant—as a cause of things; and in VII. 78. 6. Time is described as the force that rules and regulates all things.

In XII. 25. 5. *et seq.*, we have a long discourse on the omnipotence of time, which reads like a passage from Bergson.

"Man owes everything to time. Nothing happens out of its turn, but everything in its time. Time determines the course of things. Time brings fast winds and time again is the cause of rain. Time makes flowers to bloom. The phases of the moon—the full and new moon—are all determined by time. Rivers do not flow more swiftly than their allotted time. No one is born except in his time and no one dies before his time. The sun does not rise before its time and nor does it set after its time."

In XII. 139. 49 *et seq.*, we have a lecture on 'Time in a similar strain, viz., that time is responsible for man's birth and death, his sorrows and sufferings as well as his enjoyment and happiness. Similar thought is expressed in numerous other places also.

In XII. 274. we have what is apparently a philosophical discourse. There, too, time is spoken of as an element

which, along with the five well-known elements of earth, water, etc., constitutes the material cause of the world. The passage is somewhat obscure, but the recognition of the elemental character of time is clear.

In iii. 312. 118, Time is described as the great consumer of all things. The same idea is repeated in xii. 321. 92, (*"bhūtāni Kālāḥ pacati etc."*) and also in xi. 2, and xvii. 1. 3.

In these and plenty of other passages, the theory of time advanced seems to be that it is a force—a driving power—a kind of necessity—which determines the flow of things; and that it is not controlled by any power beyond it, because there is no power above and beyond it.

But in V. 68. 12-13, a passage which has been approvingly quoted in some of the Vaiṣṇava writings, specially of Bengal, we have a statement that the wheel of time is controlled by God of the Universe. Time is not an independent reality, it is under the direction of God. But still it is a force that determines the events of the world, and not a mere form of perception.

A consideration of these views leads us to the conclusion that the prevailing popular view about time was that it was a potent agent—a kind of necessity—that made each event of the universe appear in its proper place in the series, and the sequence of things was determined by it either independently or under the guidance of God.

In the Purāṇas, Time or *Kāla* is also identified with the God of destruction. That time destroys all temporal things—all things that have a beginning—is a common experience. It is no wonder, then, that it was regarded as a force that brought about the end of things and that the end of things was a necessity that could not be evaded.

Can we brush aside these views as mere mythology or as mere figures of speech? There is a tendency to think that the Purāṇas including the Mahābhārata are full of

mythological and allegorical statements. Without entering into the merits of this view, we may remind ourselves that these very books were regarded as the expression of sober truth by many men : and that texts of the Mahābhārata—specially the *Gita*—have been taken in their literal sense and have been referred to as authority by no less a person than the author of the Vedānta-Sūtras. This fact stands in the way of our summary rejection of the views about Time that have found expression in the Mahābhārata. And if we accept them as an expression of sober beliefs, we cannot but conclude that in India time was regarded by many as a *force*, just as it is regarded by Bergson today.

This conclusion finds some collateral support in the doctrine of *Karma*. Karma also is a kind of blind necessity that determines the course of a man's life. Apart from the question of free-will, which did not assume in India the proportions it did in the West, and even assuming that *Karma* was originally a free act of the agent, it cannot be denied that, according to the leading opinions, *Karma* once done was a necessity that must work itself out : it was a force that must spend itself out in consequences ; it may be neutralised or given a new direction by a contrary force ; it may even be consumed—reduced to ashes, so to say, (cf. *Gita* iv. 38) by knowledge. But until this is done, it is a *force* that works, and works with a relentless necessity.

It is no wonder, then, that a series of parallel observations led the Indian mind to view Time also as a force. Death occurs when death is due and a flower blooms only in its proper time. The course of events has a regularity—an order, which cannot escape notice. What determines this order—this clock-like regularity ? Each thing happens in its *time*. Time, therefore, determines every happening.

A popular view there was that time was a force. How was Time accounted for in the systems ? Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards

Time like Space as one of the *dravyas*—and as such ultimate. How does Vedānta account for it ? In the chapter on creation, (V-S. ii, 3), we have space accounted for as created, and the order of creation also is fully discussed. But nothing is said of time. Of course when we remember the general position of Vedānta that Brahma is the sole cause of the world and when we further remember that the world is viewed as in space and time, we may conclude in a general way that time like space also owes its origin to Brahma. But, however logical such a conclusion might appear at first sight, it cannot be so easily reconciled with other aspects of the Vedāntic position.

In the first place, there is the *order* of creation. If the order is not logical—and there is no indication to think that it was logical—clearly it is a temporal order. And if creation is a process in time, time is beyond creation and is uncreated. Secondly, there are the passages in Śrūti (e. g. Br. up. i. 4. 1, &c) which speak of the existence of Brahma *before* creation. Now, before and after imply time ; Brahma, therefore, in so far as he was existing *before* creation, and created the world at a point of time, was himself in time.

Add to this the conception of eternity. Brahma is universally described as eternal or *nitya*. Now, what is the meaning of *nitya* ? We have a categorical statement of Rāmānuja that *nitya* means existing for all time—(*sarva-kāla-varttitvam hi nityatvam*’, under i. 1. 1.). Can we really doubt in the face of these facts that the Vedāntist understood eternity as *all-time* ? If so, was not time an ultimate reality ? And if this view of time be accepted as correct, what becomes of the absolute monism of Śaṅkara and his School ? Brahma has a second in so far as there is time which is not himself. Or shall we take time as identical with Brahma ? In that case we sink back into the *purāṇic* conception of time.

It will perhaps be admitted that the Vedāntist view—or, rather the absence of any view in Vedānta—of time is not

quite satisfactory. But to the ordinary man and the religious mind, the ravages of time appeared as quite real, and time, with or without a God to guide it, was considered to be a potency—a force—a necessity that ruled the fate of things. That the processes of the world were determined by time, was clearly recognised. The evanescence of individual life and its joys and sorrows, the fickleness of the ‘boast of heraldry’ and the ‘pomp of power’ led the Indian mind quite clearly to realise that the “paths of glory lead but to the grave.” The temporal character of the world was perceived; and with it was also perceived the destructiveness of time. This in itself, however, does not give any comprehensive account of time and its relation with the world. Admitting in a general way that time is a determining condition of the world, its relation with the world may be understood in either of two ways :

We can think of time as in the world and also we can think of the world as in time. The two do not mean the same thing : they are alternative views, though according to both, time determines the world. According to the first view, the finite mind alone has to think of the world in time, but strictly speaking it is not in time. According to the other view, even to the infinite mind the world appears as in time. If time is in the world, whatever its importance in it may be, time is not real beyond the world of phenomena and hence we have to think of the Creator of the world as himself above time, yet imparting to the world its temporal character. But if, on the other hand, time is believed to be real beyond the world of phenomena—if it determines the world-processes from outside and the world is in time,—then we can hardly avoid thinking of it as an ultimate reality; and of God as living *in time*. That appears to be the view of the Vedānta. Brahma is *nitya* in the sense that he pervades all time but still he is in time. Indian thought does not appear to have gone beyond this point.

Again, taking Time as a *real*, Indian thought has emphasised ever and anon the fact of its destructiveness. It has often been described as a force but a force that kills. That time not only makes the present past but also ushers in a future—not only destroys things that are but also brings new things into existence, does not appear to have impressed the Indian mind. Time not only destroys but also creates. But Indian thought seldom recognised this creativeness of time. It was left for the genius of Bergson to discover it. Perhaps the fuller view of time is that it destroys in order to create and creates in order to destroy.



Some Problems in connexion with the Nyaya Theory of perception.

By

JAIDEVA SINGH.

In this paper, I shall briefly indicate some problems that arise in connexion with the Nyāya theory of perception, refer to their solution as given in ancient commentaries, and interpret them in terms of modern Logic and Psychology. The first problem that arises in this connexion is that of the 'Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka pratyakṣa'. Which is the more correct account of Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa—that given by the earlier school of Nyāya or the one given by the later?

The earlier school believed in Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as a matter of psychological experience, the later as a matter of logical inference. The view of the earlier school is certainly truer to facts. The later school is entirely atomistic. It believes that we must first have a separate knowledge of the subject and the predicate, of the qualified thing, (Viśeṣya) and the qualifying attribute (Viśeṣaṇa). This, according to it, is the Nirvikalpaka state, and later when the subject and the predicate, the thing and the quality are related in the perceptual judgment, we have the Savikalpaka stage. And since we always find the subject and the predicate so related in experience, the Savikalpaka is alone 'pratyakṣa'. The Nirvikalpaka is a matter of inference, an hypothesis to account for the Savikalpaka pratyakṣa, and never a matter of direct perception.

Hampered as the later school was by an atomistic scheme of knowledge, this was bound to be its deliverance. But reality is not thus known piecemeal. We do not know a thing and its qualifying attribute separately first, and then

relate them into the unity of a judgment. The thing and its attribute are implicated at the very start of knowledge ; the judgment only explicates them. The relation of the thing and the attribute is already present in the Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) perception, though we consciously formulate this relation to ourselves in Savikalpaka (determinate) perception. The earlier view, is, therefore, more sound.

Another problem that arises in this connexion is :—How are we to interpret Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka in terms of modern philosophy ?

Athalye says, "We may very well call Nirvikalpaka jñāna sensation and Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa perception or rather percept" (page 220 *Tarkasamgraha*, *Bombay Sanskrit Series*)

Is Nirvikalpaka really sensation ? At least, this is not borne out by commentators like Vātsyāyana and Vāchaspati Miśra. Vātsyāyana believes in a rudimentary perception before we are able to put it in a verbal proposition. (यादेदमनुपस्ते शब्दार्थसम्बन्धेऽर्थज्ञानं तत्र नामधेयशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते ।)

Vāchaspati Miśra definitely calls this kind of perception 'Nirvikalpaka'. It is clear, therefore, that the earlier school, at any rate, did not take Nirvikalpaka as sensation.

According to the earlier school, Nirvikalpaka may be called perception and the Savikalpaka—perceptual judgment. It is not true that we have first the knowledge of a mere particular, and a mere universal at the Nirvikalpaka stage, and then a knowledge of the relation of the universal with the particular at the Savikalpaka stage. Even at the Nirvikalpaka stage, according to Vāchaspati Miśra, the universal and the particular are implicated. But since we may not yet be acquainted with separate names for them, we do not formulate our knowledge consciously in a subject-

predicate or substance-attribute relation ; we take in the particular and the universal together at this stage. Vāchaspati Mīśra's remarks in this connexion are so lucid and unequivocal that there can hardly be any room for doubt in this matter.

“तत्र व्यपदेशो विशेषणमुपलक्षणं वा नामजात्यादि तत्कर्म व्यपदेश्यं विशेष्यमिति यावत् । तद्यथा द्रिश्योऽयं गौरयः शक्नोऽयं कमण्डलुमानयः गच्छत्ययमिति, सर्व्वं हि सविकल्पक विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन वस्तुषु प्रवर्त्तते । अविद्यमानं व्यपदेश्यं यस्मिंस्तदव्यपदेश्यं जात्यादिस्वरूपावगाहि, नतु जात्यादीनां मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यभावावगाहीति यावत् ।” *Nāyā-vārtika tātparyatikā—Kāshī Samskrit Series ; Page 125*

It is clear, therefore, that Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa is *perception*, and Savikalpaka is *perceptual judgment*. It is the same reality appearing, we might say, in an inarticulate way at the Nirvikalpaka stage, and in an articulate judgment at the Savikalpaka stage.

Jayantabhaṭṭa goes so far as to declare that really speaking there is no difference between the Savikalpaka and the Nirvikalpaka ; only the former is bound up with a linguistic scheme, whereas the latter is not ; the reality presented in both is the same.

“तस्माद् य एव वस्त्वात्मा सविकल्पस्य गोचरः

स एव निर्विकल्पस्य शब्दोक्तेषु विवर्जितः ।

किमात्मकोऽसाविति चेद् यद् यदा प्रतिभासते

वस्तुप्रमितयस्यैव प्रष्टव्या न तु वाहिनः ।

क्वचिज्जातिः क्वचिद् द्रव्यं क्वचित्कर्म क्वचिद्गुणः

यदेव सविकल्पेन तेदवानेन गृह्यते

इह शब्दानुसन्धानमात्रमभ्यधिकं परम् ॥”

(*Nyāyamañjarī*, Vizay, S. S. page 99).

So the Nirvikalpaka can not be mere sensation. Mere sensation is a psychological myth. As all commentators of the earlier schools argue that the Nirvikalpaka is psychologically experienced, we cannot call it sensation. We should rather call it *perception*. The savikalpaka is a *perceptual judgment*.

In modern Logic, we may find a close parallel to the distinction between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka pratyakṣa in Bradley's fruitful distinction between 'that' and 'what'. We may say, in Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, we perceive 'that' it is, in savikalpaka, 'what' it is. Vāchaspati Miśra says, "अविद्यमानं व्यपदेश्यं यस्मिंस्तदव्यपदेश्यं जात्यादिस्वरूपावगाहि न तु जात्यादीनां मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यभावावगाहीति यावत्" and "सर्व्वं हि सविकल्पकं विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन वस्तुषु प्रवर्त्तते ।" *Nyāyavārtika-tūtparya-tikā* p. 125. Kashi Sanskrit Series).

Compare with this a very closely parallel statement of Bradley :

"For a fact to exist, we shall agree, it must be something. It is not real unless it has a character which is different or distinguishable from that of the other facts. And this, which makes it what it is we call its content. We may take as an instance any common perception. *The complex of qualities and relations it contains, makes up its content, or that which it is ; and, while recognising this, we recognise also, and in addition, 'that' it is.*" (*The Principles of Logic*, Ch. 1 page 3).

The later schools of Nyāya, bound, as they are to their atomistic scheme of knowledge, take the Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as something hypothetical. It has been only assumed to account for the Savikalpaka pratyakṣa, as they conceive it according to their atomistic scheme. Perhaps,

according to the later schools, sensation would be the nearest word to express the conception of Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Prof. Keith rightly observes :

“The latest development of this view definitely severs indeterminate perception (Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) from all other forms of apprehension at the root of which it lies, and thus approaches the psychological conception of sensation as opposed to perception.” (Keith : *Indian Logic and Atomism*—page 74)

It appears to me that when Mr. Athalye equated Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa with sensation and Savikalpaka with perception, he was led solely by the view of perception as propounded by the later school of Nyāya. I have already said that sensation is a psychological myth. The later schools themselves do not admit that Nirvikalpaka is a matter of psychological experience. ज्ञानं यन्निर्विकल्पाख्यं तदतीन्द्रियमिष्यते । (*Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, 58th Karika).

I have, however, argued above, at length, that the view of the earlier schools is much sounder.

Before I take up other forms of pratyakṣa for consideration I should like to add a few words about the Buddhistic position in this connexion.

As is well known, the Buddhistic Nyāya believes only in Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, and rules Savikalpaka out of court. It is impossible to do full justice to the discussion of this question without a thorough examination of Kṣaṇabhangavāda and apohavāda. And as these are outside the scope of this paper, I leave this question out of consideration. This can be a subject for an independent paper.

The next problem is that of ‘Alaukika pratyakṣa’. Firstly, we have to consider why these pratyakṣas have been called

'Alaukika'. And if they are Alaukika, how can they be pratyakṣas ? Secondly, how are these pratyakṣas to be interpreted in terms of modern Psychology and Logic ?

This kind of pratyakṣa is called Alaukika, because it transcends the sense-datum of the moment ; and the experience is pratyakṣa, because it is still sense-bound. Yogaja pratyakṣa is not sense-bound, but it is something like an internal sense. We may, however, take pratyakṣa in this context as immediate awareness, as defined by logicians of the later schools. (Compare the definition given by Gaṅgeśa प्रत्यक्षस्य साक्षात्कारित्वं लक्षणम् or that given by *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानमप्रत्यक्षम् ।)

Now the question arises—how are we to interpret these pratyakṣas in terms of modern psychology and logic ? We have, of course, to leave out Yogaja pratyakṣa as falling beyond the scope of Logic or Psychology. Let us, first of all, take the Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa. We have seen that in this there is only one kind of sense-contact, but along with it, we seem to be having perception pertaining to a different sense. For instance, a piece of sandal at sufficient distance cannot be smelt ; we can only perceive the colour through the visual sense, yet it appears we are experiencing the smell also (the perception belonging to the olfactory sense) along with the visual perception.

Now, how to characterise this phenomenon in terms of modern psychology ?

Dasgupta says, "Jñānalakṣaṇa contact is that by virtue of which we can *associate* the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense." (*A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. P. 341)

Keith : "The modern school, however, has advanced beyond this doctrine by insisting on the peculiarity of the form of contact and accentuating the part played by mind, which in

the first form of supernormal knowledge (ie. the *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*) frames the general concept, and in the second (i. e. *Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*) is responsible for the *association* of ideas which constitute it. (*Indian Logic and Atomism*—page 84).

Dr. Radharkrishnan also seems to be inclined to the same view. Says he : "Modern psychology accounts for this phenomenon by the doctrine of the *association* of ideas." (*Indian Philosophy*—Vol. II. P. 69)

Athalye also says, "the first two (*Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and *Jñānalakṣaṇa*) are varieties of *associated* knowledge." (*Tarka-Samgraha*—p. 214).

While it must be admitted that some of the writers of *Nyāya* have described this kind of perception in a way that may lend colour to the view that this is a kind of associated knowledge, I believe that to interpret it as 'association' is simply a blunder. The views quoted above appear to me to be entirely erroneous.

I think this should be called *complication* rather than association. I am giving my reasons below :—

(1) There can be 'association' only when the presentations or ideas to be associated have acquired distinctness and individuality of their own. But at the perceptual level, the so-called representation, e. g. , smell of sandal-wood that we experience in connexion with its visual perception is only a part of the complex perception. It is not a free or explicit idea which we are associating; it is still sense-bound.

(2) If it were not sense-bound, there would be no meaning in including such a phenomenon under perception, as in fact *Nyāya* does. Even if we interpret '*pratyakṣa*' to mean only immediate awareness, we can hardly be justified in calling the experience of smell of the sandal wood a case of association ; for the *immediate* awareness of smell comes as an integral part of the total perceptual experience in this case; it is not a

distinct free idea bound to the perception of sandal by a special tie of contiguity.

Dr. Ward's illuminating observations in this connexion deserve to be quoted at length. Says he, "And not only does such reproduction as suffices for perception fall short of that involved in reminiscence or memory in the narrower sense, but the manner in which the constituent elements in a percept are combined differs materially from what is strictly to be called 'the association of ideas.' To realise this difference, we need only to observe first, how the sight of a suit of polished armour, for example, instantly re-instates and steadily maintains all that we retain of former sensations of its hardness and smoothness and coldness; and then to observe next how this same sight gradually calls up ideas now of tournaments, now of crusades, and so through all the changing imagery of romance. Though the percept is complex, it is but a single whole. and the act of perception is single too. But, where, as is the case in memory and imagination, attention passes—whether voluntarily or non-voluntarily—from one representation to another, it is obvious that these several objects of attention are still distinct and that it is directed in turn to each. The term 'association' seems only appropriate to the latter. To the connexion of the partial presentation in a complex, whether perception or idea, it will be better to apply the term 'complication', which was used in this sense by Herbart, and has been so used by many psychologists since". (*Psychological Principles* p. 168) Commenting on the above example of a 'suit of polished armour' Dr. Stout says, "The armour looks hard, smooth and cold. But this peculiar appearance to the eye does not necessarily involve any distinct representation or idea or separate sensation of hardness, smoothness, or coldness. The corresponding tactile and other experiences are not reproduced as separate and distinct modes of consciousness.

They are not discriminated from the visual experience itself. The reproduction manifests itself rather as a modification of the visual experience—an addition to its unanalysed complexity. Similarly, ice looks cold, because we have felt it to be cold. If it had been always warm to the touch, it would have looked warm. Yet its cold look is not a suggested idea; nor is it a distinct temperature-sensation. It is something which is presented as if included in the visual appearance as an integral part of it. Any attempt to separate it destroys both its own specific character and that of the visual experience. (*Manual of Psychology*—p. 207).

Dr. Stout also calls this phenomenon *complication*.

Let us now take up the Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa. Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa is that by means of which the perception of the generic nature follows immediately that of the particular. This has been of the greatest use to Nyāya in tiding over the difficulties connected with formation of Vyāpti—the major premiss. The formation of the major premiss naturally leads us to the problem of induction. How are universal propositions arrived at? Nyāya offered the following suggestions for the solution of this problem :—

1. If we observe the connexion of smoke and fire in a number of cases, we are on the way to generalisation. Bhūyodarśana—repeated observation—is an important element in generalisation.

2. We may observe fire wherever there is smoke. But we should also see that there is no smoke where there is no fire. Sāhacharyajñāna and Vyabhichārajñānaviraha—both are essential. The Vyabhichārajñānaviraha is known by means of Tarka or reductio ad absurdum.

While these may help one to assume a Vyāpti, they cannot form a certain ground for generalisation. We can observe only a limited number of instances. The question is :—“How do we pass from the few particulars that we observe to the

conception of a concomitance that will hold true between entire classes?" This is the crux of the whole problem. Vyāpti is not the outcome of simply a collection or aggregate of the observed cases of concomitance between smoke and fire. How then do we arrive at a generalization that will hold good in every case?

Tarkadīpikā raises this question and gives the famous Nyāya solution in reply :—

“ननु सकल वङ्गिधूमयोरसंनिकर्षात्मकयं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न ।

धूमत्ववङ्गित्वरूपसामान्यलक्षणं प्रत्यासत्ता सकलधूमवङ्गि-

ज्ञानसंभवात् ।”

(p. 38—*Tarkasamgrah*—Bombay Sanskrit Series).

Though we cannot observe every case of fire or smoke, we can on the basis of the perception of even a single instance know immediately the generic nature (Jāti) of smoke and fire by means of the Alaukika pratyakṣa known as Sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti. And once the generic nature is perceived, the necessity of observing every single instance of the class does not arise at all.

So Nyāya very clearly points out that we arrive at generalisation. We get the major premise not by enumeration, but by discovering the universal. On the basis of the perception of smoke the mind can leap up to the general notion of smokiness, and when we have the general notion of smokiness, whatever we assert about this general notion will be true of all cases of smoke.

Modern Logic also maintains that generalisation cannot be got by enumeration; enumeration can give only an enumerative or collective judgment, not a true universal judgment. Bradley, Bosanquet, Joseph and all modern logicians have maintained the significance of the 'universal' in generalisation.

Universal propositions are those which show connexions of content.

“A universal judgment has nothing, as such, to do with *numbers* of instances, if the connexions affirmed in it be necessary, the judgment is still universal, whether there be a million instances of the truth, or only one.” (Joseph : *An Introduction to Logic* p. 179)

The First Principles of a Rational Religion.

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR.

Religion has been variously defined and accounted for by thinkers of all ages and climes. Max Muller defines it as "a mental faculty or disposition which enables man to apprehend the Infinite." Prof. Menzies defines it by saying that it is "the worship of spiritual beings from a sense of need ;" while Pfiederer believes that it consists in "the direction of the will which corresponds to the idea of the Deity." Prof. E. B. Taylor clinches the whole position by saying simply that the essence of religion is "a belief in spiritual beings." While these definitions profess to give the *sine qua non* of religion when once it is born, certain other theories attempt to determine the logical and the psychological conditions of the birth of religion itself. Such is the well-worn theory which traces the genesis of religion in the operation of motives like fear and wonder. Such also is Dr. Otto's contention expressed in his *Idea of the Holy* that the element of the "numinous," the 'wholly other,' the feeling of the "uncanny," the "fascinating" the "awful" is necessary for religion. Durkheim thinks that it is the internally felt power of the society—symbolised in the worship of the totem—that first gives rise in the individual's mind to the sense of dependence upon a supreme power. Recently Prof. A. S. Woodburne has held in his *The Religious Attitude* that the essential element in religion is the socialising attitude of man whereby he endeavours to socialise with his cosmic environment in order to obtain support, security, companionship in his hour of need. And Prof. Höffding has laid down that religion is essentially faith in the conservation of values.

It is the contention of this paper that none of these theories really explains either the constitutive feature of religion as such or the determining condition of the origin of religion. A theory which professes to explain the *rationale* of religion must hold true not only of one or two developed religions but of all religions—of the crude magico-religious rites of primitive cults as of the imposing services of the Catholic Church, of the plain simple ethical codes of Islam and Buddhism as of the highly philosophical doctrinal systems of Vedantism. It must again do justice to all the factors of psychical existence—to the cognitive, emotional and volitional aspects of human nature. And above all it must not commit the mistake of approaching the problem of religion from the objective side since the object of the religious relation differs from religion to religion, nay even from man to man. Such a theory must confine itself to stating the ineliminable characteristics of the religious consciousness as such, of universal religion, of religion as a felt need of humanity, and not of this or that particular type of religion. Thereby we may be able to formulate the fundamental principles of a rational religion without the dogmas or doctrines that generally go to make up the content of the so-called religions of the world.

I think we may hope to obtain the leading thread of such a religion if we remember that the idea of salvation and redemption, however conceived or misconceived, is the dominating idea in every religion. And if we ask the question, what is the need for salvation or why is it so imperatively felt in all religions, I think we are fairly on the road to the solution of our problem. Redemption or salvation is in all cases looked upon as a state in which the individual is in some sense freed from the weaknesses and limitations, the struggles and shortcomings, the lacerations and *lacunae* of present life as it is lived. A sense of dissatisfaction with the present life then—for whatever reason, even if it be only for

its shortness or impermanence—is the compelling or negative element in all religion while the desire to transform oneself into something higher or better—again in whatever sense this may be understood—into a state in which the individual would be liberated from the imperfections of the present life—is the propelling or positive element. Pessimism of some sort is thus the beginning of all religion: if at any time man had been perfectly satisfied with his immediate environment, he would have ceased to be religious. It may be pessimism about the inadequacy of the supply of game for hunt, or of one's powers to hunt; or it may be about the convinced preponderance of evil over good in life. In whatever light this imperfection of the present life be conceived, at any rate a sense of this imperfection as such is the *sine qua non* of religion. It is small wonder then that beginning in such an inchoate sense of dissatisfaction, religion in its most developed form—in Buddhism, in Christianity, in Hinduism—has come to proclaim the utter emptiness of all life's pursuits, their sheer incapacity to procure the required satisfaction.

But a mere perception of the insufficiency of present life cannot constitute the religious spirit though it is an indispensable condition of it. Pessimism by itself is not religion in any sense; by itself and unsupported by the positive movement in religion, it may convert the individual into a cynic, a misanthrope, if not a world-hater. The joy, the peace, the blessedness of religion is not here. Religion proper begins only when this pessimism is overcome by a faith in the possibility of attaining a better, a higher state in which the imperfection of the former state is conceived to be annihilated, a state whose keynote may be said to be "freedom" (cf. the Sanskrit term "*mukti*"). This positive movement in religion is not necessarily a socialising attitude. The individual in this frame of mind is not necessarily seeking to establish social relationships with his cosmic environment:

all that is required to make him religious is that he should *believe in the possibility of transforming himself entire*, by some means or other, *of transfiguring himself*, so to say. Is this liberated state, *when attained*, exclusive of, or incompatible with, the world and its concerns and values? Does religion negate life? Is the religious attitude opposed, for instance, to the economic attitude, to the aesthetic attitude, to the moral attitude etc.? By no means. Religion negates nothing, denies nothing. Religion is not sundered from life and its values. Only, and on the other hand, it transvaluates those values giving them a new appearance, a new colour, a new significance. What is sacrificed in religion is the old outlook, the old perspective of things and events with all the weakness and discontent it engendered; this is replaced by a new vision, a new *Weltanschauung* which brings with it joy, strength, peace and blessedness.

The attainment of this new vision in which things put on a beauty that had never been sensed before is the objective correspondent to the subjective transformation which was spoken of before in which all sense of weakness, dissatisfaction and pessimism is cast out. Both, of course, are achieved in the same process of realisation, both are inseparable aspects of one and the same end. The attempt to supplicate a cosmic power or powers by worship, prayer and sacrifice is one way, one mode of effecting this end, and this mode may be social, followed by the majority of religions. Some religions like Buddhism and Jainism do not *in principle* believe in the existence of a supra-cosmic God or gods who should thus be propitiated to confer the beatific state on their devotees : they simply believe in the possibility of transcending, by self-effort, the human, and rising to the divine heritage. The Buddha taught nothing but the way, the path, of liberation from the world process and this way according to him consists mainly in acquiring the eight-fold virtue described as right

knowledge, right aspiration, right speech, right actions, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right meditation—a list which is merely an expansion of the trinity of ideals originally emphasised by Jainism under the well-known appellation of “Ratna-traya” or the “Three jewels”—right knowledge, right faith and right conduct.

Prof. Galloway, in his monumental work, *The Philosophy of Religion*, comes very near to recognising the true inwardness of religion in so far as it involves an initial sense of dissatisfaction of the individual with his immediate environment.¹ But in defining religion proper as “Man’s faith in *a power beyond himself* whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life and which he expresses in acts of worship and service,”² and in other connections also,³ he lays such exclusive emphasis on the “other” of the religious relation as “a power beyond (man) himself” on the inability of man to help himself which makes him “desire for more powerful helpers,” that it must be said that he too has not disentangled the *universal* element in all religions. In religion, man certainly seeks a power other than what he ordinarily possesses as man; and this power which he seeks and which yet is not, or which the individual does not yet possess, or which yet he is not, constitutes the “other” term—the object of the religious relation. But this power may be *either* his own self-power slumbering within (Buddhism and Jainism) *or* a power that is without (theistic religions like Christianity and Islam) *or* both (philosophical Hinduism and Sufism). By means of such a power, whether external or internal, whether coming down on the individual by grace or sought after by him with effort, the individual believes he can reconstitute

1. *Philosophy of Religion*, P. 185.

2. Ibid, P. 184. (Italics mine)

3. Ibid, P. 185.

himself, rise superior to the cosmic environment and reign unthwarted, either as a god himself or as a sharer in God's glory and power.

What now, in sum, are the characteristics of the religious spirit, *qua* religious, as a universal attitude finding a variety of outward form and expression such as are illustrated in the numerous and diverse religions of the world? A sense of deficiency of human nature as such, of human life as a whole, as incapable of yielding that abiding satisfaction for which man's spirit craves and which may be expressed in many finite and imperfect forms in human life; a sustained faith in the *possibility* of achieving a transformation of human life with a clear consciousness of the lines along which it is to be so transformed, and a working out of that faith in concrete activities so as to transform that possibility more and more into actuality—these three elements are it seems, the irreducible minimum characteristics of the religious spirit. If we would now express the nature of the religious spirit in the form of a definition, we should say that religion is an attitude of the human spirit in which, prompted by a sense of the utter deficiency of human capacities and the human outlook on the world, the spirit achieves an emotional faith in the possibility of its own life-transformation which it attempts to realise by means of concrete activities. It may be pointed out with respect to this definition that it combines both the negative and positive movements of religion described above, that it brings out the transcendent character of religion (required by Galloway) in that the very spring of the religious impulse is said to be the desire to transcend the human outlook and limitations and achieve a superhuman standpoint (which supplies also the 'object' term of the religious relation) and that it recognises in due measure the importance of all the three aspects of man's life—the cognitive, the emotional and the volitional. Such then are the universal elements of

the religious spirit: the rest is merely auxiliary or complementary. The socialising attitude in which we are seeking the help of possible human agencies is one mode of realising the religious faith in practice; the awareness of the numinous, of the mysterious, which evokes fear and wonder and approval in us, is another form of such self-realisation, for unless the awareness of the grand and the sublime results in a process of assimilating ourselves to its own nature, there is no religion but only stark amazement or dumbfoundedness; the sense of worship, prayerfulness, dependence and resignation so much insisted on by theistic religions is again only of an auxiliary nature in so far as it is hoped that such an attitude would better enable the individual to achieve the desired self-transformation. If an individual feels that he has nobody to depend upon in the matter but himself and so worships or contemplates only the ideal he has placed before himself, he is, it must be maintained, no less religious.

The emphasis, in the above description of religion, is, as can easily be seen, upon the acquisition of strength, the perception of a beauty in the universe, and the enjoyment of a peace that not only passeth all understanding but passeth all present sensing. It is not physical strength or beauty that comes with religion, but a strength and beauty born of the perception that the human is not *merely* human but has his arms encircled within the divine, that the finite is rooted in and supported by the infinite, that there is more in the passing shadows of the world than appears on the surface. It is not to a different world that religion takes us, but to this world itself transfigured by a light that would be too dazzling for these poor physical eyes to behold—a light that always *has* been on land and sea, but, alas! unseen by us. This transfiguration wrought in ourselves and in the world at large—this is the kernel and quintessence of religion. It is more than economic elevation, more than aesthetic enjoy-

ment, more than moral exaltation, more than intellectual apprehension or philosophical contemplation, more than practical scientific manipulation—it is *spiritual realisation* which includes all these but which is more than all these. It is not magic, which *qua magic*, attempts to gain power only in certain particular directions, in controlling the production of rain, for example, in getting good crops etc. Religion is magic applied to the whole of life—the desire to transform life itself into something higher, nobler, more worth while. It is not humanism which indeed improves the quality of human life, but only as *human* life. Religion begins only when the inadequacy of the humanistic standpoint has thoroughly gone home to the individual. In short, religion cannot be reduced to any other term, it is religion and nothing else.

The Mādhyamika Theory of Dialectic.

By

RAMA KANTA TRIPATHI.

A study of the Mādhyamika School is very important for its general philosophic outlook and uncompromising scientific spirit. As a thorough-going dialecticism it would not hesitate in adversely criticising even those tenets which it holds high and sacred otherwise. This School has greatly influenced the later development of Indian thought. It is under the impetus of the adverse criticism of this school that Indian philosophy has attained its highest logical and epistemological subtleties. This paper proposes to confine itself to two main issues : the elucidation of the Mādhyamika theory of Dialectic and its justification as a philosophical position.

§ 1. The Mādhyamika is a thorough-going dialectician. We meet other dialecticians in the history of philosophy both in the East and the West ; but they are so only to a limited extent. Dialectic with them is sub-ordinate ; it is adopted only as a means towards the establishment of a certain position. The Mādhyamika alone plays the game without any ulterior motives, logically to a finish.

The Mādhyamika Dialectic is the logical conclusion of the movement that begins with the early Buddhism. The Buddhists started in a spirit of revolt against the orthodox views : they were critical from the very beginning. Even the realistic schools of the Vaibhāsikas and the Sautrāntikas began with denying permanence, substance wholes, universals etc. The Sāmkhyas were holding that the permanent alone manifests. The Nyāya-Vaisesikas were fast trying to crystallise common-sense into common sense theory ; they were justifying the belief in a substance over and above the qua-

lities, in a whole in which the parts inhere and in universals which inhere in the various particulars. The Buddhists questioned the plausibility of these, directing their polemic against them. "In contrast to all these views, they held three distinct but inter-connected theses, viz., momentariness, unitariness and uniqueness of all things in general. The first of these militates against permanence, the second against complexity, i. e., against substances and wholes in which qualities and parts inhere and the third against identity or repeatability. The main nerve of the argument in each case is this: 'that is not one which is invested with two or more opposed characters' (Yo Viruddhadharmādhyāsavān nāsāvekah); or more positively, diversity of content implies diversity of entity. For instance, the acceptance of permanence implies that it is at once efficient and inefficient; it cannot be the cause of any change. The conception of substance involves its difference and non-difference from its attributes".¹ Similar contradictions are involved in the conceptions of whole and universal.

We are not concerned here with a detailed account of the arguments which the Buddhists put forth to maintain their theses. What we are interested in is the conclusion at which they arrive. By their denial of substance, wholes and universals they completely dispense with internal relations, and reduce all entities to some sort of atomic structure. These entities they regard as unique and particular. The entities are what they are in and by themselves; each is independent of all the rest. The only relation, if it can be so called, recognised by them is that of causal dependent origination—Pratītyasamutpāda. That is to say, the different entities follow one another in succession, without entering into and affecting the constitution of each other. Thus they recognise pure terms without relations, and establish

1. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. VIII No. 2.

a sort of "radical pluralism". They are critical no doubt, but not sufficiently so. Their criticism is one-sided ; they question only the relations, taking the reality of the terms for granted.

It is at this stage that the Mādhyamika enters into controversy with the realistic Buddhists. His objection is that pure terms without relations are pure abstractions, and are in no way less unreal than the rejected relations. Pure terms by themselves are simply inconceivable. The main thesis of the Mādhyamika is that "all things are relative, and hence indefinable in themselves ; and so there is no way of discōvering their essences. Since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any essence of their own".² They are characterless—Niḥsvabhāva ; and in the last resort, they are void, nothing—Sūnya. Consequently, neither pure terms, nor the relation, nor again the complexity of the two—each by itself or combined—is real or fact. They appear facts only through an inherent false belief—Samvṛti satya. They are what they seem to be, not by themselves, but in virtue of others.

The Mādhyamika argument against the independent facthood of an entity is as follows. An entity is not what it is by itself. If it were, it would have an absolute existence of its own. But this cannot be proved to be the case; for then it can neither affect nor be affected by any other entity; it would be as good as nothing. Nor can it be said that it is what it is, not by itself but because of others. For, the same question will arise as regards these others. Are the others what they are by themselves ? Certainly not; for then this alternative would be reduced to the former one. Nor again can it be put forth that an entity is what it is by

2. Das Gupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. II. p.p. 163-64.

itself as well as because of others. For it can be easily shown that this alternative is vitiated with the defects of the previous two combined; we shall be required to determine how much one entity owes to others and how much is its own. Nor in the last resort can it be said that it is neither what it is by itself nor because of others nor otherwise. For, it will be tantamount to accepting it and yet not speaking of it.

In a similar spirit and ruthless logic, the Mādhyamika proves the utter untenability of the facthood of each and every thing on which the early schools rely, and cuts the very root of their radical pluralism. To illustrate his procedure a bit more, let us briefly consider his examination of causality. He says that only four alternatives are possible about the production of a thing. It may be said that it is born of itself; secondly, that it is born of others; thirdly that it is born of itself as well as of others; and lastly that it is born without any cause. No fifth alternative can be conceived of. And all these alternatives, singly or collectively, cannot stand criticism. To take the first. There is no sense why a thing should be born of itself; there is no purpose in self-duplication. If it were admitted, it would lead to an infinite regress. Nor can it be held that it is born of others. Then any thing and every thing would originate from any thing and every thing, there being an absolute gap between one entity and another. Moreover, the same question may be asked of the other and this too would end in a regress. Nor again can it be held that it is born of itself as well as of others. For, this alternative is open to the shortcomings of both the former views combined. Lastly, it cannot be pointed out that an entity comes to be without any cause. For, this would mean that anything should come at any time without regard for its cause.

The Mādhyamika applies the same logic to the various

theories that claim to establish the nature of ultimate reality. He asserts that only four alternatives can be formulated about reality. It may be said, in the first place, that it is Sat; secondly, that it is Asat; thirdly, that it is both Sat and Asat; and lastly that it is neither Sat, nor Asat, nor otherwise. Here too there is no possibility of a fifth one. He examines and rejects all these alternatives in a similar spirit, and says that all these alternatives, singly and collectively, cannot be predicated of reality without involving contradiction; Reality transcends all these :

Na San nāsan na Sadasan na cāpyanubhayam

Catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ tattvam Mādhyamikāḥ viduh.

The Mādhyamika in this four fold negation seems to reject all the actual and possible philosophical 'isms' claiming to determine the nature of ultimate reality. Under the first head he includes all those schools of realism or positivism which characterise Reality as Sat. The second alternative exhausts all the views of negativism which hold that reality is Asat. The third is the view represented by the Jaina. The last is the position of pure agnosticism. Thus we see that the Mādhyamika rejects all views without positing any one of his own.

§ 2. This attitude of the Mādhyamika gives rise to certain serious considerations as regards his starting point, procedure and the result he arrives at. As we have seen, he starts with doubting everything, rejects all views and ends with pure negation. The question arises whether universal doubt is possible or favourable for the starting of an enquiry. Secondly, it may be asked whether negation is possible without any position, and lastly, if negation can end in pure nothing. Let us consider these objections one by one.

To begin with the first. Universal disbelief can be questioned on three grounds. It may be objected, in the first place, that such a disbelief would not provide even for the

very start of an enquiry. This objection is based on a lack of understanding of the true spirit of criticism. Universal disbelief is not a wrong procedure; it is the very implication of criticism. To be thorough-going, Criticism must doubt everything. Nothing is to be taken on trust; it would be failing in its duty as criticism if it admitted, without question, anything.

The second objection may be advanced on the plea that the function of philosophy is not to doubt everything, but to re-affirm or justify what we unreflectively believe. If philosophy is only to reaffirm or justify what is already believed, what is the use of such an ineffectual show of criticism? Criticism should not be predetermined. It may or may not come to re-affirm or justify an old belief. It is only in the actual procedure that it can be decided whether it can do so or not. Even if it re-affirms a belief, it is not that it does not bring about any change in the believer. This re-affirmation is to be understood as the rejection of a conscious disbelief in a previously believed content. It is thus the rejection of the rejection of a belief, and as such, re-affirmation too presupposes disbelief.

Nor can it be contended that an enquiry should lead to certain positive results, i.e., give us a knowledge of certain entities, etc. For, this demand, when analysed, would be tantamount to a dictation that every philosophical enquiry should accept the reality of certain entities to be arrived at. It is not even possible to say that some positive entity would be the result; for, *a priori* we cannot say that. At best we can expect only a false notion cancelled. And this is possible whatever be the result. Thus there is nothing to prevent the dialectic movement from starting with universal disbelief.

If the first objection has reference to the starting point of the dialectic, the second concerns itself with its procedure. We have seen that the Mādhyamika rejects all views without

holding any one of his own. The objection against such a position can be stated thus : negation is not possible without position, or, to refute a thesis we must have a counter-thesis.

The first objection brings in the consideration of negation. Negation has been differently conceived by different classes of thinkers. The different interpretations can be roughly classified under three main heads. In the first place there is the naive realistic view which regards negation as but a counter-part of affirmation. Secondly, there is the view, commonly shared by realists and idealists, that negation, though not a counter-part of affirmation, presupposes certain position attempted or suggested. Opinions, however, differ as regards the nature of the position. Some hold that it is a determinate and specified one, whereas others say that it need not be so; it may be unspecified or unformulated. Nevertheless, all of them are unanimous in this that this position is a content on the objective side. In the third place, there is the view suggested by the Vedāntin according to which the only necessary condition for negation is the disbelieving consciousness; no other position on the content side is required. The Mādhyamika shares this view of the Vedāntin on practical considerations, but differs from the latter when he proceeds with further implications of this. The first view should not detain us long. For it is a flat contradiction. "Both fact and theory," says Bosanquet, "protests against such a view. We have not always judged a matter to be true before we deny it. And if the affirmation of the same content is to subsist as a condition of negation, it seems doubtful whether a negation would not always have to be self-contradictory."³

The second view is an advance on the first. "Negation", in the words of Bosanquet, an able exponent of this view, "does not presuppose the affirmation of that which is denied. But it does presuppose some affirmation, that is the affir-

3. Bosanquet's Logic ; Vol. I. P. 278.

mation of a state of facts which, being judged true as a whole carries with it the problematic affirmation as a conception in the world of meanings, of the idea 'suggested': The world must have positive content judged to be real as a condition of anything following from the removal of a positive suggestion."⁴

It is clear from the above statement of Bosanquet that a negation is possible only on the presupposition of the existence of the subject and the predicate involved in the judgment. According to him, to say that "A is not B" we should have already been in possession of a positive knowledge of what A actually is,—that it is C or D and so cannot be B. But this is not true to experience. There is no logical flaw in the form and import of the negative judgment even if the existence of the subject is not granted. To elucidate the criticism by an example on the perceptual level. To formulate the judgment 'A is not in this room', one need not find out and locate A somewhere in the world of existence. The judgment will hold good even if A were non-existent. What is negated here is the co-presence of A and the room. The existence or the non-existence of A is not involved by the judgment; nor is it material to the import of it. Thus we see that this view is based on a confusion of logical validity with metaphysical assumption.

To come to the Vedāntic view, negation according to it need not presuppose any positive content on the objective side. The only necessary condition for negation is the presupposition of the negating consciousness. Negation, according to this view, is not a content. We cannot speak of negation, but we speak negation. Negation cannot be distinguished from the negating consciousness.

From the foregoing considerations it is evident that much importance cannot be attached to the objection that negation

is not possible without position. On the other hand, we have seen that negation need not presuppose any position, but only the disbelieving consciousness. Let us now take up the other form of this same objection, namely that to refute a thesis we must have a counter-thesis. This objection is similar to the first one. But it should not be confused or identified with it. The first refers to the possibility of negation without position, whereas the second concerns itself with the result to which negation would lead. The objection, in other words, is that we cannot reject all the alternatives. When one alternative is accepted or rejected, the other is *eo ipso* rejected or accepted. For example, when we say that A is B, we reject that A is non-B.

This objection is based on the Law of the Excluded Middle. But the law itself is defective. "It assumes a sort of omniscience and makes capital out of our ignorance. That any two alternatives as the contradictories together exhaust the realm of discourse and that no third is possible cannot be known from the alternatives themselves. For, it is always possible to suggest one other alternative in all cases; besides being and non-being we can admit the indefinite; affirmation and negation do not exhaust all attitudes towards an assertum; we may not assert anything at all, but simply entertain a datum without these two modes. The illusory snake is an example in point; it cannot accept the predicates *sat* or *asat*, for it is not an existent. If we want to formulate the contradictory of any proposition—'S is P'—, it is not merely 'S is not-P', but also 'S is not' i.e., the proposition is contradicted if the subject does not exist. It is clear that because there are two contradictories to any position, we can never pass from the denial of the position to any one of the contradictories or vice versa. This is tantamount to giving up the Excluded

Middle.”⁵ And with the rejection of the Excluded Middle the objection itself stands rejected. That is to say it cannot be held that to refute a thesis we must have a position of our own. This ends the difficulty regarding the procedure of the dialectic. We are now in position to consider the objection concerning the result of it.

It may be asked whether this negation itself would not be a content and stand over even if all contents are negated. This objection it may be pointed out, is raised under the impression that the negative attitude were itself a judgment. But it is not so. It is only a symbol ; it is as it were put in a judgment-form on the analogy of affirmation. As already pointed out, speaking the negation and negation are not different. We do not speak *of* negation, but speak negation. Hence this negating attitude should not be mistaken for a content in the last resort. The Mādhyamika warns us not to have any attachment to negation—Sūnyata—itself ; Sūnyata is Sunya. It is a contentless, positionless negation. It cannot be appreciated on logical grounds ; it is extra-logical. This negation is a permanent illusion. It cannot be the ultimate position ; this too is to be got rid of. But this cannot be accomplished by thought. Thought can only formulate a demand for the negation of this negating. It can only acquaint us with the permanent illusion. The removal of it is beyond its power. It is to be effected by actual realisation. This is precisely what the Mādhyamika has in view in regarding thought as incompetent to judge reality.

5. *Nāgārjun's denial of Motion and Rest*—a paper read, at the sitting of the Philosophical Congress held at Mysore, by Mr. T.R.V. Murti.

The Problem of Moral Autonomy

By

DHIRENDRA LAL DE.

§1. A full discussion of the problem of Autonomy belongs rather to a general system of Metaphysics than to a treatise on Ethics. But it is hardly possible for any moral philosopher to ignore the subject, indissolubly bound up as it is with the very conditions of intelligent existence. The acknowledgment of Moral Law implies a distinction between a merely sentient life and an intelligently directed existence. Viewed in this light, the subject of Autonomy is the central issue of Ethics, and it is by no means possible to minimise its importance. The suggestion which is sometimes made that the problem should not be treated in Ethics can never be reasonably defended ; first, because a complete analysis and synthesis of conscious activity is the task of philosophy ; and second, since morality is a matter of practice, a moral philosopher should attempt to interpret to the utmost possible extent the laws of activity belonging to ethical life.

§2. Let us begin our enquiry by clearing away one great misconception, namely, the expression—freedom of will—and also by noticing distinguishable senses in which the word freedom has been used.

The phrase “freedom of will” is a misleading one. The concept of freedom is a generalisation based upon actual instances of volitions and volitions are always referable to persons. Thus there is no will that wills but only a person that wills. In other words, freedom belongs to the man, not to the will. The proper question to ask is “Am I free” ? not, “Is my will free” ? or “Have I a free will” ?

The term “freedom” has been a prolific source of confusion. It has been employed in the following three sharply distinguishable senses :—

(a) Sometimes it means that an act is done in obedience to reason or to the higher self : since only in such acts is the agent conscious of no discord between the higher and the lower self : because only then is man's deliberate conviction of what is highest and best for him not dominated and controlled by passing desires, capricious lusts, and fleeting passions. In this sense it is clear that good acts alone are free. Freedom in this signification may be called freedom of self-realisation.

(b) Good and bad acts alike may be regarded as free by all who recognise a difference between mechanical causality and the causality of a permanent spiritual self. Freedom in this sense may be called the freedom of self-determination or self-direction—a sense which we shall attempt to work out in our paper.

(c) Freedom may be used to imply a power of absolutely undetermined choice in the self—the power of originating acts which have absolutely no connection with or relation to the self as it was before the act.

§3. Now we shall attempt to make plain the nature of the problem at hand. It may be stated in some such language as the following : Is the individual a moral agent in any proper sense ? Is he capable of lifting up before himself Moral Law as the representation of an ideal of life, contemplating it as an imperative, and setting himself deliberately and persistently to govern his impulse ? Is man capable of governing his impulses in accordance with Duty ? Any fruitful attempt to solve the problem should be accompanied by an analysis of the notion of freedom, in order to bring out the essentials involved in the concept. The conviction that we ought to act in one way rather than in another, that one kind of action is good or right, another bad or wrong, is deeply rooted in our moral consciousness. There seems to be sufficient truth in Kant's assertion that there would be no meaning in an "ought"

if it were not accompanied by a "can". It does not follow, however, that the "can" refers to an immediate possibility. For instance, when we say that a man ought to be patriotic we do not thereby refer to immediate possibility; because, patriotism is a quality which cannot be produced at will. What we can do at once is just to put ourselves in the way of cultivating the said virtue. Be it noted, however, that there are certain *prima facie* cases which must be excluded from the realm of duty, e.g., it cannot be obligatory on a man's part to add a cubit to his stature. If the moral imperative is to have any significance, the will of an individual must not be absolutely determined by circumstances, but must in some sense be free.

There is a sense also in which necessity is required for the moral life. And without this element of necessity, "freedom is incapable of being construed to thought, is something as impossible as walking without ground to tread on, or flying without air to beat" (MIND, Vol. V. p. 252). The moral life consists in the formation of character; and to have a character is to live habitually in a definite universe of desires. Hence the more decidedly a character is formed, the more uniform will be its choice and action. Necessity, therefore, is simply another name for uniformity. And such a necessity is required for the moral life.

It may, however, appear that there were a certain contradiction between these two demands of the moral life. But this apparent contradiction is sure to disappear if we observe precisely what is the nature of the freedom and what is the nature of the necessity that is demanded. The necessity, as explained above, is simply the uniform activity of a given character. The freedom, on the other hand, means the absence of determination by anything outside the character itself, i.e., an individual is free to do anything which nothing but his own nature prevents him from doing. A vicious man in

a sense can, and in a sense cannot, do a good action. He cannot, in the sense that a good action does not issue from such a character as his. But he can do the action, in the sense that there is nothing to prevent him except his character — i.e., except himself. To be free means that one is determined by nothing but oneself. What this means, however, we shall endeavour to explain somewhat more fully.

Freedom evidently means the absence of certain restrictions. What then are the typical restrictions which make us unfree ? Principally they seem to be the following :—

(a) We are not free when our limbs are set in motion by some external agency, human or non-human. An action to be free must be done by us and not for us and must be the embodiment of our actual interest or purpose.

(b) Again, we are not acting freely where the circumstances are not such as to admit of formation of purpose. Impulsive actions come under this category. As such actions do exclude the possibility of reflection they cannot be free.

(c) Again, we are not said to be free when we act in ignorance of special circumstances.* If I shoot a comrade by mistake for one of the enemy it is true that I purpose to shoot, and so far the shooting is an act, and a free act, of my own. But I did not purpose to shoot my comrade, and so the result, in its concreteness, is not the expression of my purpose. Consequently I am not morally accountable for the act.

We are now in a position to draw certain important consequences from the foregoing review of facts. Freedom is a fact, i.e., genuine, and, in actual experience, is limited — a fact which is inseparable from our position as finite beings. From the possibilities of internal lack of unity of purpose and external conflict with rival purposes, it cannot but follow

*Circumstances are not anything merely external to the man, but only external conditions in so far as they enter into his life.

that we are never more than partially or relatively free. Absolute freedom we as finite beings can never possess. Freedom absolute is conceivable only in experience which is the infinite whole, devoid of conflict, internal and external.

We may now sum up our position by stating that we are free in so far as our experience is the expression of our interest or purpose. Hence freedom does not mean absence of rational connection or absence of determination, but does mean, for us finite beings, self-determination.

§ 4. Incidentally we shall here analyse the concept of cause, inasmuch as the latter has an important bearing upon the problem of Moral Autonomy. The source and primary meaning of cause we find in ourselves as active or efficient. Consciousness testifies to the fact that by the drawing of attention to one impulse we strengthen it, and by the withdrawal of attention from another we weaken it. The effect of attention upon any fact is to raise it in point of vividness, clearness and distinctness, and to weaken in these respects other competing impulses. An impulse is but a modification of the mind. When one such modification is intensified by the expenditure of personal energy, any other modification inconsistent with it is naturally weakened and finally suppressed. We are thus immediately aware of ourselves being the causes of our own determinations, when prompted by conflicting impulses: it is left to us either to persist in a course of action or to desist from it. Cause is not to be viewed as a movement but what produces the movement. Although we cannot answer the question how we are active, we can say why in a special case we act at all. The reason for acting is what Aristotle called the final cause and identified with the good as the end alike of all process and motion. Thus we may say that in the case of conative subjects the concept of cause implies both immanent efficiency and purposiveness, while in the case of inanimate

objects it implies neither. Nature is conceived as an aggregate of diverse laws which converge upon the production of definite results. For all physical sciences, the principle of causality is nothing more than the idea of necessary connection according to law. But in what sense can this uniformity of nature be called also a case of necessary connection ? There can be no logical necessity about a law of nature. It is neither intuitively certain nor it is logically deducible from premises which are themselves intuitively certain. The denial of this law of nature, therefore, entails no contradiction. Scientific knowledge is possible only on the assumption that events actually happen with strict and uniform regularity. Accordingly, the postulate of the uniformity of nature is converted into the theorem that nature is a mechanical system, and thus a methodological principle becomes an ontological dogma.

In the case of conative subjects determination implies efficient causation, self-direction and purpose. In the realm of nature it means just the conformity to law. Here there is no reference to efficient causation. Self-direction and purpose are either denied or treated as meaningless. Thus the two forms of determination remain as different as ever. A self determinist would explain his conduct by describing the end at which he aims and the value that it has for him, as the reasons for his determination. The physicist, on the other hand, would explain a phenomenon by describing its antecedents, tracing these to their antecedents, and so on indefinitely—i.e., by determining its place in a single rigorous mechanical system. Such teleological categories as personality, utility and worth, dominate all our interpretation of the world as a realm of ends. The above categories are ruthlessly extruded from the description of nature. The categories of mechanism underlie all our scientific explanation of the so-called realm of nature. The course of history we refer to

self-determination, the course of nature science regards as due to mechanical necessitations.

§5. Here we propose to explain the relation of will to causality. But before we do so we may say a word or two regarding will. Will, to put the whole matter in a nut-shell, is the executive power of the soul which brings credit or discredit to an agent according to the way in which he exercises his power. Conscience supplies the light in the moral sphere, but will supplies the energy. The several impulses suggest but courses of action. Conscience enables us to discern which of these courses is eligible at the time. It depends on will whether to act according to the dictates of conscience or not. It is impossible to present an adequate account of the phenomena of intelligent life which does not include exercise of determination in the guidance of thought, government of impulse and direction of external conduct. Causal energy inherent in the activity of an intelligent life provides for a synthesis working into harmony under the name of moral character, the multiplicity of motive forces capable of being harmonised on a rational basis. This causal energy we take as a primitive fact in the intelligent life—an essential characteristic of the type we call human—incapable of explanation by further prosecution of psychological research.

Now coming to the relation of will to causality, we may observe, that we have an immediate knowledge of the letter in the exercise of the former, and, having gathered the notion there, we extend it to the external world for the interpretation of its changes. "When man begins", says Zeller, "to reflect on the grounds of things, the question of the why is forced upon him, first by the particular phenomena of the more striking kind, and in course of time by continually more of them, and in answer to this question the first notions of causality are formed; he is at the outset guided in this matter by no other clue than the analogy of his own willing and doing.

For we ourselves are the only cause of whose mode of action we have immediate knowledge, through inner intuition. In the case of every other, though we may perceive its effects, we can only infer from the facts, and cannot immediately learn by perception of the facts, the mode and kind of way in which these effects arise, and the connection of them with their cause." "Causality", says Martineau, "is identical with our self-knowledge of the exercise of will ; and that exercise, presupposing the presence of two or more possibles, consists in turning one of them into an actuality, and so replacing what was previously contingent by what is now necessary (*Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 241).

§ 6. The foregoing considerations make it abundantly manifest that the moral agent is inherently a free-will agent within the limits and under the conditions which intelligent life implies. To admit a categorical imperative, as Kant has urged, is to grant that the life is that of a free-will agent. Our philosophy of will is that of self-directed activity. Either there is self-directed thought, motive, purpose and action, or there is no such thing as moral agency. To a being who is simply a result of natural forces an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning. Hence freedom is the *conditio sine qua non* of moral agency. The categories of mechanical determination are not the expression of real fact, but limitations artificially imposed upon facts for special purposes of a kind which have nothing in common with the ethical and historical appreciation of human conduct, and therefore irrelevant and misleading when applied out of their rightful sphere.

§ 7. We may conclude our paper by considering a few objections which are likely to be urged against our position. In the first place, it may be alleged that our position is incompatible with the judgments of obligation. Now if the truth of self-determination were inconsistent with the truth of any proposition logically presupposed in judgments of obli-

gation, it is clear that it would be incompatible with the validity of these judgments, since they cannot be valid unless their presuppositions are true. Every judgment of obligation seems to have two such presuppositions. (a) Something is such that its existence would be good or bad. (b) The person as to whom the judgment of obligation is passed can exercise, by his will, some effect in determining the existence or non-existence of that thing. No one would say that a man ought to will the existence of anything unless the thing willed was judged to be such that its existence would be good. And, again, no man can will anything (though he may desire) if he knows that he cannot possibly have any influence on the matter.

Would either of these presuppositions be necessarily false if self-determination were true? We can not see that either of them would. Would the existence of anything cease to be good or bad because it was completely determined whether I should will its existence or not? Would my acquisition of knowledge, or the relief of the distress, cease to be good because it was absolutely certain that I should will to bring them about, or because it was absolutely certain that I should not will to bring them about? Surely this cannot be maintained.

As to the second presupposition, it is clear that the determination of my will can make no difference to the question of the effect of my will on the result contemplated. Whether my will is completely determined or not, it is clear that I shall not satisfy my hunger unless I will to do so, while it is quite possible that I shall do so provided I will to do it. Again, if I will to relieve the distress of others, it is at least possible that some distress will be relieved which would not have been relieved otherwise, and this is not in the least affected by the question whether my will is inevitably determined to take the course which it does take.

In the second place, it is said that it is inconsistent for a self-determinist to take duty as a motive for action.

We cannot see any ground for the assertion that the belief in self-determinism makes choice unreasonable. Of course, if the belief of the self-determinist was that the end at which he was aiming was completely determined to occur or not to occur, irrespective of what he chose, the choice would be unreasonable. But the self-determinist believes when he chooses any course that his choice may have some effect on the event. And he is quite consistent in this belief. He is a self-determinist because he believes that, while the event may well be determined by his choice, his choice is in turn completely determined by his nature. Why should the belief that, if I choose to shut the door, my choice to shut it was completely determined beforehand, make it unreasonable of me to choose to shut it? For, so long as I am not omniscient I can never be absolutely certain beforehand what I shall choose. My certainty may be very great but it can never be quite complete. The contention that the acceptance of self-determinism cannot but have some paralysing effect is due to a confusion of this belief with fatalism which treats the choice as impotent to affect the result.

In the third place, it may be contended that on self-deterministic principles the notion of responsibility cannot be accounted for.

What does responsibility really mean? It means the liability to be called upon to answer for an act, with the implication that, if the agent cannot make a satisfactory defence of it, the doer may justly be punished. A man is said to be responsible for an act for which he might justly be punished. But whichever side of punishment we look at, self-determinism does nothing to make it unjust or irrational. To allow the man guilty of a crime to prey upon society, because that crime was in the circumstances the inevitable

consequence of a bad character, would be unjust, because it would be treating that individual's freedom from pain as of more value than the well-being of many thousands, which it is not; and justice means treating every one according to his true worth. To refuse to make him better because the process of making him so is one which involves some pain would be to treat freedom from pain as of more importance than moral character, which it is not. No greater kindness can be shown to a bad man than to make him a better one, though the process may be a painful one. If punishment be social surgery for the individual, the fact that a bad man was produced by causes is as poor a reason for refusing to apply it as it would be to condemn a needful operation because the patient's disease or accident was no fault of his own.

Comparison (Upamāna) as a source of Valid Knowledge.

BY

N. C. KELKAR.

In this paper the writer puts in a special plea for upamāna or comparison based on resemblance as an independent source of valid knowledge. This kind of proof is, in his opinion, almost as fundamental as perception and inference and certainly more fundamental and important than testimony. The essayist distinguishes between upamāna and metaphor. In upamāna there is no transference of the qualities of one set of objects to another set. It is perception of such resemblance as may exist between the two objects. But in metaphor there is a pretence of an accomplished transference of attributes. Comparison based on resemblance serves a great purpose in the acquisition of knowledge, based as it is on perception of resemblance or agreement between attributes or sense-qualities of objects. He then cites the authority of the author of Vedānta-paribhāṣā to prove that upamāna pramāṇa is a separate and independent pramāṇa. "Analogy may be explained in this way. In the case of a person who has seen the object (or form of a) cow in cities, and who has gone to the forest, is produced first the apprehension (after a contact of the sense-organ of eye with the gavaya viz.) that this object or form is like a cow ; and then afterwards the apprehension viz, my cow is similar to this one, Now here owing to the rule of presence and absence (or affirmation, positive and negative, such as if A is present B is present—positive, and if A is absent B is absent—negative) the knowledge of the resemblance to the cow, residing in the gavaya, is the instrument of cognition (upamāna) and the knowledge of the resemblance to the gavaya residing in the cow is the fruit of the cognition." The essayist is of opinion that upamāna is not a pramāṇa subsidiary to perception or inference. It is an independent

means of proof of valid knowledge. He then considers the claim of testimony as an independent means of proof. The vedic word is no longer regarded as authoritative. As for the oral testimony of a person, it cannot be accepted without question. In the science of Jurisprudence testimony is subjected to rigorous tests. No sound judicial decision will depend upon testimony unless objectively corroborated by circumstantial evidence or otherwise. The essayist also refers to the unquestioned utility of upamāna in literature. He lays emphasis on the use of illustrations or analogies in philosophical literature. In a syllogism of five propositions the third proposition is a definite illustration. Lastly the essayist demands that upamāna should be given greater importance than what is accorded to it at present in epistemology.

Shri Vallabhacarya—His Life, Works and Philosophy.

By

J. G. Shah.

Vallabhācārya is the founder of Suddhādvaita philosophy. His religion is called Puṣṭimārga. He was born in Śaṁvat 1535 at Champaranya.

He travelled throughout the whole of India three times. During the first travel he was involved in a philosophical controversy with the Māyāvādins at the court of Kṛṣṇadeva Rāja of Vijayanagar, and scored unprecedented success. In recognition of his abilities the king invested him with the title of Āchārya and performed what is called Kanakābhiṣeka Ceremony. He has produced an immense

body of religious and philosophical literature—both original and critical. He died in Samvat 1587.

His philosophy is called *Suddhādvaita*. It is *Advaita* but 'Suddha' i. e. unconnected with *Māyā*. *Cit* (human soul) and *Acit* (universe) are parts of *Brahma* and exist in *Brahma*. The doctrine of objective phenomenalism did not appeal to him. He is a realist out and out. He believed in subjective reality as well as objective reality. According to this philosophy *Brahman* is both *Pramāṇa* as well as *Prameya*. *Bhakti* is the means for the attainment of The Lord.



The Method of Indian Philosophy.

By

P. R. DAMLE

Science is distinguished from art by its emphasis on method. In philosophy the importance of method is even greater because of the abstract character of its subject-matter. We find that great importance has always been attached to method in European philosophy. It has been maintained that Indian philosophy lacks such a method. The formal characteristics of method are (i) objectivity, (ii) impartiality, (iii) system and continuity, (iv) lack of dogma, (v) theoretical rigour. It is proposed in this paper to consider whether in view of certain admitted features of Indian Thought, the status of methodical and systematic philosophy can be properly given to it.

The characteristics of Indian philosophic reflection are—(i) Supreme authority of *Sruti*, (ii) Judgment that Intellect is inadequate to the knowledge of Reality (iii) Prescription of certain mental and moral disciplines as a preliminary (iv) The

goal of philosophy described as cessation of pain and everlasting bliss.

Sruti is recognised as authoritative on the intrinsic quality of its content and not dogmatically. This is clear from the fact that the Karma-Kāṇḍa is not relied upon as authoritative. Karma-kāṇḍa belongs to the region of avidyā. Sruti is never made to contradict perceptual or inferential knowledge. Consider again the *apaurusa* character of the Sruti. It is a direct vision of the objective truth. It is above all subjectivity and relativity.

Indian philosophy considers intellect as inadequate on objective and theoretical grounds. But it is not abandoned from the start. The negative value of intellect is always recognised. Rival theories are found fault with not only on the ground that they are inconsistent with the Sruti but also on the ground that they are inconsistent with perceptual and inferential knowledge.

The happiness and cessation of pain referred to above are seen from the context to mean nothing else but a state of perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge alone imparts wisdom and gives us an insight into the character of the Real. The practical discipline preached is not part of the method but a preparation under the existing human conditions for efficient pursuit of knowledge.

The essayist then concludes by saying that the lack of system in Indian philosophy is not essential or intrinsic.

Activism in Maharashtra

By

M. D. VIDWANS.

It has been the tradition of Mahārāshtra ever since the time of Dnyanadeva to base practical activity on philosophical foundation. The first enunciation of activism is made in the upaniṣads. Philosopher kings like Janaka and Shri Krishna favoured activism. The Gītā synthesises the three tendencies, viz. knowledge, action and devotion.

Dnyanadeva laid the foundations of activism in Mahārāshtra. He says that a man must offer his floral offerings of duty to God. If Dnyanadeva was the patron-saint, Ramdas was the patriot-saint who preached militant activism. Tilak was a scholar-patriot. Metaphysically all the three are monists. If Dnyanadeva was a believer in the absolute reality of the world as a part of God, and if Ramdas was a māyāvādi Vedantin, Tilak believed in the relative reality of the world. If Dnyanadeva preached activism as a duty, for the pre-self-realisation period, Tilak holds that the Gītā insists on post-self-realisation activism. Tilak compares the Gītā with the philosophies of Kant and Green and says that Kant and the Gītā agree in the emphasis on purity of motives and that Green, like the Gītā, lays down correctly the foundation of altruism by pointing out the identity of spiritual principle in man and nature. Tilak says that the wheel of life must run its course of actions even after self-realisation. To escape the effect of actions we must do things without attachment. Giving up attachments is not equivalent to cessation of desires. To show a preference to inaction is unnatural. Our intellect must influence our actions *sub specie eternitatis*. If not for his own self, a person with self-realisation must do things for Lokasaṁgraha, which has been interpreted by Dynandeva and Tilak to suit their peculiar times.

Vidyaranya and Pratikarma Vyavastha.

By

H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR.

The doctrine of pratikarma-vyavasthā appears in the work with a view to remove the inconsistency between the fundamental principles of Advaita that Caitanya is one in all knowers and objects, and the fact that an individual knower perceives a particular object under a given condition. The author explains how finite knowledge is possible though Caitanya is one in all. He affirms that because the conditions of perception, antaḥkaraṇa, etc. are different in different individuals, the manifestation of Caitanya also is different. This means that when there is manifestation in a single individual, the same may not be the case with other individuals. If knowledge is conditioned by such manifestation, then it is quite possible that a single individual has it when the others have not the same. Then the author suggests some criticisms against the doctrine, pratikarma vyavasthā.

I. The doctrine makes the manifestation of Caitanyas in antaḥkaraṇa the basis of finite knowledge. But Caitanya and its manifestations are irrelevant to each other.

II. The doctrine characterises finite knowledge by the revelation of the object in question by Caitanya underlying it. But the revelation is impossible because it means omniscience itself, since the identical Caitanya has to reveal all objects in revealing a particular object.

The author tries to remove the objections.

I. It is the nature of antaḥkaraṇa to manifest Caitanya.

II. By a particular activity of antaḥkaraṇa only a particular veil of ajñāna is removed and therefore only that object which is obscured by that veil is revealed.

The essayist is of opinion that the answers to the objections are based on unconscious assumptions and faulty observations.

The Samuccayavāda ; Its Origin and Development.

By

P. C. Divanji.

The Hindu tendency to preserve unity in the midst of diversity is the cause of the rise of different Vādas (theories) in almost all the branches of learning in Sanskrit. This is especially so, in the domain of philosophical thought. Thus in the epic age of what we have satisfactory records, there arose the Sāstravāda (scripture theory) and Yuktivāda (reason-theory). Then amongst the advocates of the Sāstravāda there arose the Ārambhavāda (creation-theory), Pariṇāmavāda (evolution theory) and Vivartavāda (illusion theory). The advocates of the third were known as the Mīmāṃsakas.

The philosophers of the third group differed amongst themselves as to whether the acknowledged means for the attainment of salvation, namely the knowledge of Brahma was or was not to be accompanied by acts, and although Bādarāyana, the author of the Brahmasūtras, and Jaimini, that of the Karmamīmāṃsāsūtras, seem to have been tolerant their followers were divided into two different camps, those of the first being known as the Mīmāṃsakas and those of the second as the Vedantins, from the fact that the former gave prominence to the texts in the Karmakāṇḍa portion and the latter to Jñānakāṇḍa portion of the Vedas. The latter again became sub divided into those who advocated the Kewalajñānavāda and those who advocated the Samuccayavāda.

This Samuccayavāda appears to be a very live issue in the time of Saṅkara and his pupil Sureśvara as we find an elaborate refutation thereof in the standard works of those two philosophers. The latter pushed the masters doctrine too far, laying special emphasis on the process of Śravaṇa

(study) as opposed to those of Manana (reflection) and Nididhyāsana (meditation).

Another set of followers of Saṅkara, advocated the view that though knowledge was the immediate cause of emancipation and arose from Śravaṇa, it arose only as the result of the perfection thereof by Manana and Nididhyāsana which Sureśwara looked upon as acts.

Lastly the Yogavāsīṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa deserves a separate mention in a disquisition on the Samuccayavāda because it is neither a philosophical work of any particular school nor an Itihāsa work nor Purāṇa but is a philosophical work expounding the Advaita doctrine independently of the views of any particular school of thought and recommending the development of character and the reasoning and initiative faculties for the realization of the truth contained in the Mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads, has been written in the Paurāṇik style and has made use of some historical and some imaginary stories in order to train up the aspirants in the application of the principles of the science of Brahma. There are many striking points of resemblance between it and the Bhagavadgītā and Gauḍapāda's Kārikās and the Bhāgawata Purāṇa.

The Samuccayavāda in slightly altered form can be held to be the foundation of the modern Hindu culture and to continue to guide the Hindus along the path of truth even to-day.

Absolute Science.

By

P. V. S. NARAYANA

The paper attempts a critical survey of some prominent tendencies in philosophy in their bearing on the problem of knowledge. The problem is—what is cognition? The problem presents a paradox at the very outset. Subject and object are two substantive terms that carry the paradox into the very heart of the cognitive situation. Though knowledge is a relation between the subject and the object, the two substantives themselves escape our knowledge. The essayist then criticises realism, phenomenology of Husserl and critical realism in their bearing on the problem of cognition. To the new realist, experience is a single phenomenon, interpretable either from the standpoint of matter or mind. None of them has an advantage over the other, both being at bottom one. Its character as mental or material is fixed by the context in which it occurs. Independence and immanence are the two pivotal points of realism *alias* Neutro-monism. Objects have an independent status of their own. The perceived objects are perceived objects and not copies, or ideas thereof. The essayist is of opinion that Neutro-monism is vitiated by a degree of intellectual formalism. Moreover the knower in any knowing relation is more than an act of awareness or comprehension. He feels and wills. Then he criticises the phenomenology of Husserl by saying that Idealism and Realism are never worse confounded than in Husserl's ideas. Next he takes up critical realism. To the critical realist knowledge-situation has three elements (1) physical object (2) mental event (3) and the datum or essence. The datum is a non-mental, non-physical something. It is a logical entity. The self-intuits the datum which in turn represents the object. Critical realism introduces the datum and precludes the

possibility of arriving at a criterion to judge the correctness or otherwise of our perceptions. After showing how all these theories cannot escape some ultimate term as the basic foundation of any sort of judgment, the point is pressed for a return to the view of regarding the whole of experience as a single category of existence, of which, knowledge is an irreducible minimum of manifestations. The distinction between mind and matter is regarded as false, individual minds being only localised foci of universal being. The paper concludes by pointing out that knowledge in terms of our normal duality is incomplete and that a claim to absolute science can be made good only when the subject-object tension is fixed down to a higher reach of experience bearing the stamp of absolute self-certainty.

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On Malebranche and his theory of knowledge

BY

P. S. NAIDU

The paper attempts to dispel the widely current notion that Malebranche's system is only a transitional stage to the full-fledged speculations of Spinoza, by setting forth the important contributions of the French philosopher to European thought. These contributions are discussed under the headings of (1) vision, emotion, attention, (2) Essence and existence, and (3) self-consciousness.

(1)

Although Malebranche treats of only one sense, vision, yet he deals with it in a manner which is remarkably modern. He is of opinion that the distance of an object is judged

according as the intensity of the light and the sharpness of the image increase or decrease.

Malebranche's theory of emotion is noteworthy. He points out clearly that there can be no 'passion' without the bodily concomitants.

As regards attention, Malebranche contends that it is through the concentration of attention that we think away all that is contingent in perception and attain ultimate clarity in pure perception of the idea.

(2)

For the first time in the history of philosophy emphasis was laid by Malebranche upon the metaphysical distinction between essence and existence.

(3)

Under this heading the essayist discusses Malebranche's view on self-consciousness. The self, he asserts, is never the object of thought. It is only apprehended through feeling. We feel the existence of the soul and know the essence of objects. These are the original thoughts of the philosopher. The essayist also makes a brief discussion of Malebranche's theory of knowledge. Malebranche comes to the conclusion that knowledge is merely our vision of all things in God. He denies the existence of innate ideas because the presence of a plurality of these innate ideas conflicts with the divine nature. As to the status of sense-perceptions, he says, they are relative. It is to establish this type of relative validity of sense-perceptions that Malebranche brings in Occasionalism.

Is Absolutism self-consistent ?

BY

I. V. TRIVEDI

Idealism as a theory in metaphysics culminates in absolutism. The fundamental thesis of absolutism is, the Real can be the only existent; and the non-real must be a contradiction in terms. The variety of concepts and facts are explained as mere 'appearances' of the Real. The purpose of the essayist is to see if such an absolutistic position is free from contradiction. The absolutist recognises degrees of reality. The reason which he advances in support of this thesis is the assumption that the ultimately real is one and it is individual. Admission of degrees in Truth and Reality fails to satisfy our inquiry for truth. The essayist is of opinion that subjective emphasis leads one to the adoption of absolutism as an objective principle. The absolutist cannot explain the gulf between mind and matter. He finds it a difficulty to explain the notions—Substance, Quality and Relation. Then there is the difficulty of synthesising the variety of existences. It cannot be got over by a simple reduction of all existences to modifications of the Real. The absolutist does not admit any external element in his scheme of idealism. But his admission of degrees of Reality as dependent upon human purposes leads one to think that an external element creeps into the considerations of the degrees of Reality. It is the pragmatic tinge. Lastly the essayist says that absolutism cannot give a satisfactory solution of the question of moral life. The absolutist then faces a dilemma. If he adopts the inherent distinction between mind and matter, between morality and immorality and so on, he is no longer an absolutist. If he does not admit these distinctions, his thesis does not commend itself to our unqualified acceptance. It is difficult to solve such a position. However Realism today exposes the weakness of absolutism and tries to arrive at a consistent theory.

The Problem of Causation.

By

K. P. Kar.

This paper attempts to study 'causation' in the light of experience. Causation implies necessary connection between cause and effect. On the operation of cause, effect follows as a matter of necessity. How is this possible? Is there any 'power' resident in the cause by virtue of which it can explode into the effect? Experience does not reveal any inherence of 'power' in the cause by which the cause can ensure its effect. Does this rejection of 'power' in the cause imply the rejection of causal connection altogether from the world of experience? If experience is studied from an atomistic point of view, it will imply ridding the world of experience, of all causes, of all effects. The world of experience will appear to consist of atomic bits of existence—of an infinite number of discrete and detached particulars—the "eaches" of William James. In such an atomistic world of experience the causal relation will be an impossibility, or rather an absurdity. Hume had done right in rejecting 'causal relation' from such a world, reducing causation to a mental fiction without any corresponding relation in fact. His conclusion—there is no cause or effect in nature, nature simply is—is perfectly right, but the premiss—the atomic construction of experience—from which he derived this conclusion is not certainly beyond question. Kant did not question this premiss. And in consequence Kant has not answered Hume. For, granted the Humean premiss, the conclusion is bound to follow. It is only an unbiassed study of experience that can reveal that causation is not a mental fiction but a real relation. What the mind has to do is not to create such a notion from within itself and apply it there, but to discover it there in nature.

Self-consciousness,

BY

P. R. DAMLE

1. The importance of this experience in human life is too well-known to need a mention. Nor has philosophy failed to treat it with equal consideration. The history of modern philosophy begins with an express recognition of this experience.

2. The accepted position can be summarised under the following pair of alternatives (1) self-consciousness is an experience in which the conditions of ordinary cognition do not hold ; or that it is like other cognitions and therefore the self as knower is altogether independent of the self as known. (2) That if the first alternative is accepted Idealism is proved ; if the second, Realism.

3. It is proposed in this paper to discuss whether the position described above is valid and necessary and to state whether any other position is more logical and satisfactory.

Self-consciousness is like other cognitions governed by rules of cognition. Nevertheless, Realism is not proved.

4. Self-consciousness is concerned with a special object. It has however to depend on suitable organs and other suitable facilities.

5. Introspection then becomes like observation of external objects, an activity dependent on environmental facilities and leading to the knowledge of a different object.

6. Self is not the eternal knowing subject nor consciousness a logical implication.

7. The essayist raises the question, Does independence of subject and object follow from the fact that self-consciousness is not a special case of consciousness ?

8. The realists ignore an alternative. Although the realist has proved the mutual dependence of the subject and

object to be universally impossible, the possibility that both may be parts of an inclusive whole still remains ; and the case for an idealistic view of reality may very rightly be based on that alternative.

9. Does spatial relationship of two objects prove that they are absolutely independent ? What is true of the spatial relationship is true of the cognitive. Two objects cannot be related in cognition unless they both are already in knowledge.

10. The case for Idealism stands on the analysis of any instance of cognition and the fact that self-consciousness is proved to be like other cognitions is, therefore, insufficient to disprove it.

11. Undue importance has been attached to the nature of self consciousness and wrong inferences have been drawn from it. This is due partly to a sense of mystery based on ignorance and partly to the tendency to regard as objectively important whatever is practically so.

Is Death Inevitable ?

By

A. JAGANNATHA DAS.

The theory of inevitability of death declares the impossibility of eternal bodily life. But the theory stands contradicted by the universality of the will to live. The two aspects of the will to live are self-preservation and fear of self-extinction. These aspects would be inexplicable except on the basis of the possibility of conquering death. Instances of so-called suicide more confirm than negative the theory of the possibility of eternal bodily life.

Nor does the theory of soul, as the only imperishable part of every living being, set at rest this conflict between the will

to live and the inevitability of death. The self for whose preservation every human being struggles cannot possibly be any non-material spiritual part to which immortality attaches and of which the body is utterly unconscious, but it is the body in and through which the spiritual part can function. Soul, if any, can but be an abstract principle, and like every other abstract principle, it can be neither mortal nor immortal. It is the form, the body, whose perfection is the one natural aim with any real psychological basis, and which can be either mortal or immortal. Perfection can consist only in the transformation of the present mortal and dependent form into an immortal and independent centre of life. Then the principle and the form, the soul and the body, will merge into each other, the soul being fully realised in the form,—the body.

A Critique of Absolutism.

By

M. D. VIDWANAS.

The criterion of absolutism is self-consistency. Self-consistency is based on the law of contradiction which in its turn is the negative aspect of the law of Identity. If the law of Identity becomes the criterion of Reality then experience has no place in the Absolute. The absolutists inconsistently try to preserve appearances in Reality. But this lays them open to the charge of solipsism, duality, creation of hierarchy of realities, etc. Absolutism is based on the identity of thought and being. Real is what can be thought. To be is to be cognised by the Absolute. That which is not present to the Absolute Subject is as good as non-existing. This is solipsism. It is usually replied that the subject of Berkely is the

Individual, while here it is the Absolute. But this makes no difference. Absolutism is a bigger solipsism. Secondly, it is said that the Absolute and its experiences are indissolubly one. The duality can be conceived in thought and does not exist in fact. If Absolute and its experiences are one, why do absolutists speak of Absolute and its appearances? This means, they are dual. The primal unity of the Absolute and its experiences is not proved. Thirdly, the absolutists apply the criterion of reality to a fragmentary experience and say that it is real to the extent to which it is coherent. Thus they create a hierarchy of realities. The essayist does not support this view of the absolutists. He is of opinion that there are no degrees of reality but degrees of correctness of our belief. If we compare absolutism with vedanta, we find that the start in the upaniṣad is unconsciously epistemological; the method is constructive and it takes us to the Absolute, that is above the duality of the knower and the known. Every category is denied of it. Imperfectly we call it Being and Thought. Upaniṣads use the same criterion of self-consistency and rightly interpret it as transcending contradictories. The Absolute can be described negatively. Each category stands for a stage in human reflection, that is unfettered, and that points "to the "That".

Process in Judgment

By

P. T. Raju.

By "process" is not meant merely temporal process, The evolution of categories in Hegel's dialectic is also a process. Yet it is not temporal, but is the logical process of implication. In Saṅkara's system, we have a process,

though it is neither *sat* nor *asat*, for which reason it is termed *māyā*. This paper tries to find out whether and how any of the above processes is implied in the judgment.

The judgment is not a relation of two mental states. If such is the nature of judgment, and if the whole Reality is a single judgment which sustains the ideal structure of the world, and whose elements are the logical ideas, there is no scope for any process except the logical one to be present even within Reality.

In the judgment "The rose is red" there is no temporal process. Hegel says that there is a logical process. According to him, the Absolute Idea, which is the ultimate subject, puts forth the lower Categories by a process of judgment. And this process is nothing else but implication.

The first difficulty in Hegel's view is : this implication cannot decide, if it is mutual, which is to be the subject and which the predicate. The second difficulty is this : because the lower Category has lost its determinateness in the higher and thus its relations too with the differences in the higher, it cannot be deduced. Where the relational form disappears, and deduction becomes impossible, it would be meaningless to talk of implication.

Now, can we postulate a metaphysical process ? The contention of the paper is that we can. We have seen that the higher does not imply the lower. But how then could the lower appear ? The appearance of something new implies a process. It may be that the process as well as the predicate are unreal from the higher standpoint. Yet so long as the predicate exists as such, the process should be regarded as real. Like the predicate, the process too is neither *sat* nor *asat*, and hence unreal.....The judgment "The rose is red" implies as its presupposition the judgment "The Absolute is the rose," for it is only the Absolute that can lend existence or reality to the rose. Now, if we can

admit the inexplicable metaphysical process *māyā* from the Absolute to the rose, there is no reason why we should deny its existence from the rose to the red.

There is implied an inexplicable metaphysical process from the subject, though not as such, to the predicate in every judgment. But in some judgments a temporal process also is implied, e.g., the changing colours of a chameleon. But neither of the processes can get recognition in the judgment. So we may conclude that any significant process cannot find a place in the province of logic.

The ultimate nature of reality is not logical but indeterminate. By making a judgment we are not enriching the Absolute.

The judgment as such can express only the logical process, i.e., the process of mutual implication of the subject as subject and the predicate. But this logical process implies the metaphysical processes of *avidyā* or *māyā* from the same subject viewed at a higher level and the same predicate. Yet this process cannot get recognition in the judgment. The temporal process too cannot find a place in the predicate. Therefore even phenomenal reality cannot be adequately represented by logic.

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Sex and Spirituality.

By

P. NARASIMHAM.

The paper goes into the basic principles of Sex evolution and criticises the attitude of mind that treats sex as an arch-enemy of religious and spiritual life. Evolution being a progress from an abstract being to a more concrete fact, the

human form as the worked-out product holds the key to the secret. Sex is the first emergent that splits up the abstract principle of life for the purpose of a higher concrete synthesis. In the highest sense all progress is but progeny and life a reproduction of itself. Sex is not to be understood as an accident belonging to the lower physics of evolution, but rather as the very metaphysics of the original "impulse to become many." Celibacy and Sannyāsa are just the samples of wrongly directed activities to know Brahman and should consequently be classed as perversities of the religio-sexual impulses. The essayist discusses the nature of Mukti. Mukti cannot be his who has not unified in himself his Kuṇḍalini Śakti which is in reality himself in his own female aspect of being. We are to know that sex is a great fact belonging to our root-nature. It finds its expression in our sexed physical forms. Salvation or Mukti is attained by the joint yoga of the two parts of our total being (Siva and Śakti) and not in their isolation. If Mukti could be achieved by either alone, the sex should not have evolved at all in nature.

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The System of Yoga.

By

T. S. Mahabale.

If the Upaniṣhads are the foundations of Indian Philosophy, Darśanas are the systematised superstructures upon them. Study of Darśanas throws a good deal of light on the way by which ancient Indian thinkers have tried to solve the problem of 'How' and 'Why' of the mysterious universe around us. No Darśana is, perhaps, more practical in its view-point and subjective in its treatment than the Yoga.

Yoga has been recognised as one of the 'highest legacies left to us by the ancient Indian savants.' But unfortunately the misconceptions about it are pretty wide. To get a clear idea of Yoga and its system, the notion of limits in the present-day sciences should be followed.

Yoga has different parts—the injunctory part Yama, Niyama etc., the preparatory part—Āsanas, Prāṇāyāma etc., the scientific side and its application to therapeutics, physical culture, etc., while as a whole Yoga combines all these several parts into a system.

The scientific side of Yoga has been considered in the paper with a view to bring out the nature of Yoga as a science. Yoga is a synthetic science like biology and psychology, as it studies the working of human mind and body in relation to mind fully, and appears to take up the thread where biology leaves it off. Its scope, however, is wider than that of either biology or psychology or other allied sciences.

Yogic system is full of many potent suggestions worth testing in our present-day Laboratories. Data of the Kai-valyadhāma Āśrama, Lonavala, have been considered on this point.



Ethical Relativity.

By

M. M. SENAPATI.

The supposed objectivity of moral ideas is an illusion. Morality is relative. It is relative to social conditions and individual circumstances. Objectivity presupposes universality and there is no universality in moral ideas. It is admitted that positive Morality varies in different times and countries. Even in Ideal Morality no uniformity can be

found, for there are conflicting ideals in the region of morals, and an action which is in harmony with one ideal might be antagonistic to another. So the same action is right in one case and wrong in another. The principle of moral relativity is not destructive of social life as it is generally supposed to be, though it admits that in the case of conflicting ideals, the invocation of force might be necessary. It invokes the aid of force where social life or human life becomes otherwise impossible. Its end is constructive and not destructive. True moral progress is a transition from a narrower application of moral ideas to a wider one.

Swadharma and Freudianism.

By

M. S. SRINIVASA SARMA.

An attempt is made in this paper to correlate the Freudian method of sublimation with the Hindu ethical ideal of Swadharma. For this purpose a psychological analysis is made of the conduct of individuals and of society. It is found that instincts and emotions which supply the energy and the driving power to sustain life's activities are not harmonious among themselves. This disharmony gives rise to mental conflict. There are different methods to tackle the situation created by this mental conflict. Forgetfulness, repression and rationalisation are the methods. But they do not produce enduring results. So sublimation is adopted as a preventive to maintain the equilibrium of life. It is a new name for an old practice brought into prominence by psycho analysts. It is the purification of the instincts effected by self-knowledge and self-discipline under the guidance of worthy ends. By sublimation Freud understands a 'process

which seeks to utilise the sexual energy immobilised by repression and set free by analysis for higher purposes of a non-sexual nature' But there is no reason to believe that it is only the perverted sex motives that are repressed and are capable of sublimation. The essayist is of opinion that all instincts can by over-emphasis become grotesque and stand in need of sublimation. Sublimation being a psychological prophylaxis and a social convenience is an excellent remedy for all perversions of instincts. The modern unrest which express itself in the cries of 'free love, birth control, back to nature' and in the craze for brothels and other forms of unnatural excitements is due to the fact that life today is extremely mechanised. The only corrective is to energise the individual by a living ideal. The essayist suggests Swadharma as a possible solution for the present mental and social disorganisations. He quotes the Gītā and proves that Swadharma is an adequate ethical ideal.

Ethics and Religion.

By

J. K. DAJI.

In Ethics, the field of observation is one's mind and heart and the means to that end is interior observation. Truth is within ourselves. Truth is the power within each one of you which urges you on to attainment. The impurity of the heart veils truth. Dissipate that impurity by cultivating virtue in full. Power of truth is the moral motive power.

There are two types of religion, viz, religion of morality and religion of bargain and ceremonialism. The moral motive power is one and the same in religion of morality and the science of ethics, but that power is wanting in the religion of

bargain and ceremonialism, where its place is taken by self-seeking and asking for earthly gifts and enjoyment in after-life. 'Back to the Founders' should be the aim of religious devotees. Let ethics tear the veil of priestcraft covering the teaching of the blessed ones. Virtue has become vice, because it has been misapplied. Let us make it virtue by rightly using it.

Idealistic Perfectionism.

BY

CHARU CHANDRA SINHA.

The field of human values has been explored, their relative values have been formulated, and they have been arranged in a system only in relation to man, considered as a self-subsistent being. But the universe is rationally continuous and therefore, there can be no true self-subsistence short of the whole. The individual should be explained and interpreted in terms of the larger whole. The true nature of an individual can be known only in relation to others in the whole. View the self as you may, in whatever aspect or form, you always find in it a necessary reference to something beyond itself. Man, therefore, is not a self-subsistent being, but he is a centre of relations, and relations are a part of his nature. Individuality which is the same as concrete universality is his highest good. He cannot enjoy individuality if he strives to develop his particular self. Forgetfulness of the particular self is the only way of apprehending the self which is the highest good.

Caitanya sect in Bengal and Maharashtra

BY

S. V. DANDEKAR.

The essayist discusses whether Mahārāstriya Caitanya sect can be considered as a branch of the Bengal Caitanya sect. He elucidates the points in favour of establishing this relation between the two. Mahārāshtra Mystics have been classified into four classes—Caitanya, Swarūpa, Prakāś and Ānanda. The historical information available of one of the lines of the Caitanya Sampradāya dates from the beginning of the sixteenth century. In Bengal also, we find that Caitanya sect flourished towards the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century ; and it is said, in the life of Caitanya, the founder of this sect, that he travelled in the far south, and that in his travels he also visited Pandharpur, the seat of pilgrimage of the Mahārāshtra Caitanya sect. So it appears plausible that the Bengal sect might be regarded as the source of the Mahārāshtra sect. Even the biographer of the Mahārāshtrīya Caitanyas expressed a hope that, if the life written by Kṛṣṇadās were discovered, more detailed information regarding Mahārāstra sect could be made available ; and it must be remembered that the name of the biographer of the Bengal Caitanyas was also Kṛṣṇadās. On account of the similarity of the names also, it is widely believed that the two sects must be intimately related. But there are points of difference between the two sects. The Bengal theory approaches the position of Nimbārka, while the Mahārāshtra theory approaches the Kevala Advaita of Śaṅkara. Caitanya's mysticism approaches the personalistic mysticism of Christianity, while Tukaram's appears to combine the personal mysticism reached through love with the impersonal reached through *via negativa*. The essayist suggests that the Bengali temperament

is proverbially emotional and Mahārāshtra is equally proverbially rationalistic. These and similar other points of difference lead the essayist to conclude that the two sects are not connected as root and branch. They must be independently interpreted from their native sources.

Religion, Culture, and the Comparative study of Religions,

By

A. K. Trivedi.

Religion, now a days, is treated with indifference, but this should not be so. With the advancement of the Sciences, religious interest has waned in our civilizations. We talk of eternal verities, but the Modern Age wants religions to leave their impersonal outlooks, and to act as guides to the social and personal sides of our nature. The days of Absolutism have gone. So too, religious superstition, and selfishness and hatred or cruelty in the name of Religion will no longer do. Religion as Faith is not likely to be a living force. Yet Religion is a psychological necessity, and irreligion, a mental atrophy. Religion must satisfy two conditions: (1) it should be a guide to man in his relations to his fellowmen, and (2) to the universe as a whole. The second condition Religions are trying to fulfil from early times, though not satisfactorily; but the first condition is more important. If religion is to be a living force it must attack the evils of our day; it should not be stand-alooft. A good guidance to life is possible by a comparative study of religions, which will reveal the essential truths of the major religions of the world. One may not be interested in Religion as Dogma or as Faith, and yet Religion as a source of culture is a study welcome to all. Such study will reveal

the truth that the narrow-minded man observes only religious differences, and that the large-hearted man would greet the differences of Faiths and Religions, nay even the differences of Science and Religion.

On the externality of the object

BY

JYOTISH CHANDRA BANERJEE.

The essayist raises the question whether there is any independent reality of the external object we perceive, and if there is not, in what sense it is not. He considers subjectivism and rejects it. The external object is independent of the individual mind. But this independence must not be understood in the sense of the Realists. The object before being known remains as unknown. This unknownness (*ajñātatva*) is not the *Svabhāva* of the object. It is caused by the counter-entity of knowledge—*Ajñāna* which is positive. This *Ajñāna* is illumined by some other entity called *Sākṣī* or witness or consciousness. Hence the external object cannot remain independent of any knowledge as the Realists maintain. Similarly the subject which knows the object falls within this *Sākṣī*. The percipient and the perceived are but the manifestations of one consciousness—*Sākṣī*. Perception of an object is no doubt direct, but directness cannot lead us to the conclusion of the ultimate independence of the object. The essayist then rejects the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, between *sensa* and objects. The distinction is meaningless. An object is nothing but the Absolute consciousness in one definite form or shape. The whole of the world is nothing but the projection of that consciousness based upon *Ajñāna*. Brahman is the only substance and the rest are meaningless attributions.

Modern World and Motherhood of God.

BY

A. M. BHOOPAL.

Taking the diagnosis of the world as it is to-day, materialism, individualism, and uncontrolled desire of enjoyment have made the world most selfish and most miserable. Discoveries of Science have shattered religious belief because religions have unfortunately not been nuggets of gold unalloyed with dross, and have enthroned Mammon, whose favours rarely need the qualifications of religiosity or righteousness.

The ideal of Motherhood advocates the conception of God as Mother and the immensely practical relation of all human beings as of sisters and brothers without any distinction whatsoever of caste, creed and colour.

The ideal has been taken up by the Mother's Lodge in Poona.

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The Evaluation of the Individual.

BY

M. VENKATARANGAIYA.

The problem of the evaluation of the Individual is one of the most complicated and perplexing problems awaiting solution in India at the present day. The problem is, "Is it safe to proceed to determine the value of the Individual, his whole worth or his worth for any particular function or purpose by reference to any one quality in him?" The classical idea was that it was safe. Birth was regarded as providing a criterion for judging the abilities of the Individual. In place of birth, Islam substituted creed as the standard of life. It is not the object of the paper to discuss the relative merits of birth and

creed as criteria of value. The object is to lay bare the absurdity of applying a single standard for discovering the real worth or "worths" of the Individual. When we speak of the worth of the Individual, it is always "worth" with reference to a particular situation. There is nothing like general worth. It is therefore fallacious to judge the individual's capacity to do a particular kind of work by his capacity for doing some other kind of work. The truth is that an Individual may possess abilities of different kinds—and it is the theme of this paper that we must recognise this truth, and it is not right to conclude either that one who is a success in one field cannot be a success in another, or that one who is a failure in one field will be equally a failure in every other field. The Individual is a plurality of worths and values. When the Individual is so complex, deriving each element in his complexity from a large variety and multiplicity of sources—heredity, education, etc. why set up the view that you can deduce everything about him by looking at only one of these elements and that perhaps the least significant ?

Introduction to the Gita-Dharma-Kaumudi.

By

R. R. KALE

We are passing through the transition period of our national life, and at this juncture it is necessary to direct the attention of the people to the practice of a religion in which the service of humanity, irrespective of community or caste, is prominently inculcated. The above objects can be achieved by stressing the principles and practice of the Bhagavatgītā.

The Bhagavatgītā is one of the most widely known scriptures in the world. The reason for this is that there is in the Gītā very little that is merely local or temporal. It is pre-eminently a scripture of the future world-religion as it represents the greatest synthetic effort of human thought.

The Bhagavatgītā may be said to reconcile the conflict between religion and science.

The Bhagavatgītā is not a systematic work elaborating a single organised system. The omnipersonality of God in Christianity, the spiritual democracy of Mohammedanism and the religious purity of the Zoroastrian religion can all be found interwoven into the Gītā.

The message of the Gītā is that the world problem is essentially the problem of the individual, and the world will progress when each member of the society looks within himself.

The eighteen chapters of the Gītā cannot be separated into three distinct sections dealing with Karma-yaga, Bhakti-yoga and Jñāna-yoga as is generally done.

The catholicism of the Gītā can be illustrated by verse II. 43. Whatever is of permanent value and of universal

application in the contemporary systems has been anticipated by the Gītā.

Religious teaching at home and in schools is quite necessary. A study of the Gītā will be of great help in this respect.

The Pāṇdavas and the Kauravas would seem to symbolise the two sets of activities, virtuous and vicious, respectively. The whole teaching involved in verse 37 to 43 in chapter III can be summed up as stating that it is selfish impulse in all its forms which is the enemy against whom Śrī Kṛṣṇa asks Arjuna to fight.

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Idealism and the Physical World

By

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I

It is extremely difficult to handle the theme of the relation between Idealism and the Physical World as neither of the terms has any well defined meaning in contemporary thought. The many nuances of the first term have become a well-known feature of Philosophy for some centuries now ; but it is only in recent times that we have learnt how different may be the senses in which the second term can be used. Common sense takes the gross material world for granted—a tangible world which in rest and motion fills space and is indifferent to the thoughts and wishes of man. This world man has to adapt himself to, if he is to live and thrive ; he has to learn its laws and rhythms by repeated experience, if he is to utilise them in his own life. In this task he is assisted by the co-operation of the entire race. His predecessors have left records of their experience in social tradition and literary composition, and his contemporaries far and near are engaged in the same task of unravelling those mysteries of nature which have thus far baffled the efforts of man. No one who discovers a fact or a phenomenon, a law or a coincidence, thinks that he is building up a knowledge for his own exclusive benefit. He feels on the contrary, that he has hit upon a new truth which would stand the test of time and would be confirmed on repetition, under proper conditions, by himself as well as by others. He is not satisfied with the uniformity and general validity of the physical world as one that is space and time.

possibility of communicating its knowledge ; he believes also that its nature and existence are not dependent upon its perception by those sentient beings, which explains its independence and objectivity and the possibility of eliminating the subjective factor in dealing with it. He goes further still : he not only thinks that experience makes no difference to its nature and existence but he also believes that it has no thinking of its own and that it is incapable of capricious action which explains its predictability and mechanical character.

To such an unthinking substance occupying space is opposed, in popular thought, Mind with its quality of thinking, feeling and willing and its peculiar property of knowing itself alone by introspection. Mind is private while Matter is public ; and even when the existence of the former in other beings can be indirectly known its character cannot be fixed with precision, with the effect that its conduct remains unpredictable at all times. Mind occupies no space although it is intimately associated with a body so far as our experience goes : even if external perceptions which seem to have extension and magnitude be omitted, there still remains the world of feelings in which extension seems to have no place. Common sense is not much worried over the problem of knowledge,—as to how an extended unconscious world gets known by an unextended conscious mind—it was left to Descartes and Reid to provide the necessary philosophical basis for common sense belief. Before and since their times philosophers have indeed shown the inadequacy of the common-sense standpoint and familiarised the distinction between appearance and reality ; but common sense has clung to its favourite belief about the duality of mind and matter just as it has clung to the belief in sun-rise and sun-set in spite of the heliocentric theory. The question is : has popular thought been entirely wrong in the first case or in the second ?

The attack against popular conception has come from two different quarters. Scientists have been obliged to go beyond the grossness of physical bodies in order to explain the physical and chemical properties of things and to inter-relate different kinds of physical forces. The philosophical speculations of the ancient atomists were approved by the chemists of a much later time and the visible world has decomposed into an infinite number of invisible particles, either heterogeneous or homogeneous in quality. Molecules and grosser bodies were now regarded as products of atomic combination; and the nebular theory, associated with the names of Kant, Laplace and Spencer, was supposed to supply the mathematical basis for the evolution of the physical world, and the laws of chemical combination and thermodynamics, the production of qualitatively different physical objects, both living and non-living. The physical ultimates now proposed receded from the realm of experience into that of imagination. They were still conceived to fill space and also possibly to retain some of their qualitative differences; but they had ceased to have sensible qualities and existence, although some of the laws of grosser bodies, such as those of weight and gravitation, were supposed to operate still in their case.

But common sense, once swept off its feet, was dragged deeper into abstraction by mathematicians and physicists. The picturable atom moved by force from outside was found to be an inadequate explanation of physical happenings. In the hands of Boscovich and Faraday it was transformed into a mathematical centre of force, an imaginary centre from which energy was supposed to radiate in all directions. This obviated the necessity of distinguishing between matter and energy and enabled physicists to formulate more satisfactorily the doctrine of the conservation of energy after the older doctrine of the conservation of matter had proved mathematically unsatisfactory. Those who like Ostwald were for treating energy as an

intermediary between matter and force reified this abstraction and thought the assumption of a substantial basis of physical changes unnecessary ; but there were others like Lord Kelvin who could not get rid of imagery altogether and imagined matter to be a kink, twist or vortex in ether which now took the place of the physical ultimate. Then came the days of radio-activity and relativity. An intensive study of electric and light phenomena as also of the disintegration of matter revealed the fact that imagination was not to have the last say on the matter of physical constitution. Atoms were now regarded to have an internal structure of positive and negative electric particles and the laws of celestial mechanics could be applied to their constituents with necessary modifications ; but the qualitative differences of atoms were reduced in view of the experiments on the transmutation of elements by Rutherford who broke down a nitrogen atom and reduced it to hydrogen and helium, not to talk of the spontaneous disintegration of elements and the possibility of deriving lead as a residue left by radio-active substances. But even this picturable model of atomic structure was rejected by Schrödinger who suggested the electron-in-its orbit or electronic wave as the true picture of an atom ; and this theory of wave-mechanics was sought to be modified by Eddington who invented the hybrid 'wavicle' as a compound of wave and particle as the proper description of the internal constitution of an atom. In the meantime Einstein had proposed to explain physical events without assuming ether and gravitation ; and, to crown all, came the isotopes of Aston, the relativity of Einstein and the indeterminacy of Heisenberg to demolish that element of constancy in nature on which common sense had reared its faith. In fact, the recoil from rigidity began at all points simultaneously. Not only were the atoms not fixed in their masses and elements ; they were not even of the same weight as supposed by those

who had propounded the theory of fixed atomic weight. Their values again were dependent upon their position or the field in which they acted. Even the inviolable natural laws began to be considered as statistical averages sufficient for practical purposes but not for science: the supposition of Boutroux that they were contingent was accepted by the scientists as a result of their own investigations, and even pluralistic spiritualism began to hope that they would be ultimately explained as imperfectly mechanised habits of spiritual units or monads in interaction with other monads. Common sense began to despair and philosophers began to think that in such a realm of inconstancy truth was unattainable—Vaihinger supposed atoms to be metaphysical fictions and Poincaré regarded them as hypothetical in character. Thus even the imaginative faculty had to cry halt and the physical world came to be regarded more as an object of intelligence than that of sensation or imagination. In the meantime Time had ceased to be considered as independent of Space just as motion had ceased to be independent of matter. The combined result of all these currents of thought was to make common sense ashamed of itself and to depend upon mathematics and physics for an exact formulation of the nature of the physical world which seemed so simple to sensation and was so complicated to understanding.

The other attack against common sense came from the side of the philosophers. The Greek sceptics led the assault with the theory that it is not possible to formulate exactly the nature of the physical world as knowledge is subject to ten tropes or conditions and that, therefore, it is relative if not subjective in character. In close alliance with them came the empiricists who taught that our knowledge is limited to the surface of things, that is, to the pheno-

menal aspects of reality and that our generalisations about physical events have only the value of probability and not that of certainty. The secondary qualities were the first to go under, as in their case relativity was greater than in that of the primary qualities. Locke tried to save the latter by jettisoning the former from the unknown substratum of the physical world and by referring them to the apprehending Subject. As against naive presentationism he also put forward the doctrine of representationism according to which the physical world is a matter of inference from the data of sensory knowledge and is therefore liable to all the disabilities to which indirect knowledge is subject. Locke himself had no doubt that matter existed—as a matter of fact, he went so far as to assume that God might have endowed some matter with the power of thinking and thus of assuming a spiritual form ; but it is not his conclusion but his method that posterity chose to follow. In the hands of Berkely and Hume, Matter was eviscerated of all reality and reduced to a system of ideas in mind. Kant's half-hearted attempt to rehabilitate the physical world proved a failure because he was more eager to show the contributions of mind to the constitution of the world than to establish the reality of the world itself, with the effect that although, as in Locke, a shadowy thing-in-itself was allowed to remain, it was difficult to say what exactly it was. The very fact that subsequent idealism had no scruple in claiming this thing-in-itself to be spiritual shows that Kant's achievement was indecisive. Post-Kantian Idealism formulated the positive side of an idealistic philosophy, and in Britain and Italy grew up schools of thought pledged to attenuate the physical and to reduce it to the spiritual in the manner of the immediate successors of Kant in Germany. Even Pragmatism with validated claim as the criterion of truth was not pledged to support the reality of the physical world : rather by its insistence upon

coherence as the test of truth it inclined more towards idealism than towards realism.

The materialistic counterblast in France and Germany, not to mention earlier attempts, went to the other extreme and tried to belittle the importance of Mind ; but it is the Evolution theory that for the first time made a concerted attack on all fronts upon idealism in the interests of a material world. By tracing back things to a time when the mental had not yet evolved the doctrine of Evolution tried to establish the priority and independence of Matter ; it showed at the same time the accidental character of progress in the world of physical, organic and mental objects. It enthroned *Tyche* in the place of *Nous* and, in the place of Divine providence and design, substituted accidental adaptation and survival of the fittest. According to it that which is valuable is not conserved but that which is conserved is called valuable : it is quite conceivable that under opposite conditions of survival, values and unvalues would change places.

II.

Now, any Idealism that professes to dispense with the necessity of a physical world must undertake to prove that all the characteristics of physical existence can be as well explained without assuming anything else but spirits and their states and qualities. But before we examine the claim of Idealism we must distinguish the different senses in which this term has been used in philosophy. The time has come to delimit the boundaries of each meaning by using an appropriate term instead of covering them all by an ambiguous word.

It seems to me that the term Idealism can be used in three entirely different senses. According to the first usage the external world is in reality a system of ideas in the mind of a spirit or spirits. Berkeley is the great exponent of this type of Idealism in the West and the *Yogācāra* school in the East.

It is best to call this type of Idealism by the name of Mentalism, as suggested by Sidgwick, or that of Subjectivism or Subjective Idealism. In its extreme individualistic form it leads to the fantastic conclusion that each spirit is shut up within its own world of thoughts, some of which it regards as external to itself—there is a projection of subjective fancies outside as in illusion of hallucination or dream and the thinking mind wrongly regards such subjective fancies as revelations of an independently existing external world. Students of the Vedānta philosophy are familiar with the stock illustration of a mother of pearl being mistaken for silver or of a rope being taken for a serpent. The analogy is not perfect, for the presentational element is not altogether eliminated in either case; even the comparison with a magician's art has some defect, for the hallucination there is not self-caused. There must be something within the subject himself to project an outside world to satisfy the strict conditions of a world of fancy taking the shape of an outside world, and the Yogācāra school comes nearest to this position with its doctrine that within the stream of consciousness there arise conditions, prompted by latent desire (*vāsanā*) to produce the illusion of an external world just as a single moon looks double on a rippling surface of water. The rise of representations prompted by desire resembles very closely Leibniz's doctrine of each monad being endowed with a cognitive and an appetitive aspect; besides, according to both Yogācāra and Leibniz, each spirit is windowless and its world of representation is due purely to psychic causation. In one sense the Buddhistic school is a purer type, for, being untrammelled by theistic traditions, it did not drag in a Monad of monads to complicate its solipsistic philosophy: in this respect Wildon Carr is nearer Buddhism than Leibniz, for he saw the obvious limitations of the doctrine of pre-established harmony in his *Leibniz* and gave a different interpretation of God in his *Cogitans Cogitata*. A quotation from the latter

(pp. 22-23) will show clearly his own philosophical position : " According to the monadic theory external reality is not known directly by perception. There is no perception of external things or of other minds in the meaning of a direct intuition or of simple revelation. We know them only by the limitations of our own perceiving activity and these limitations are perceived from within and take their form from the nature of the monad and from its activity in expressing that nature. The limitations which the monad meets are of two kinds, passive and active, obstructions and oppositions. It is in the necessary interpretation of these limitations that the ideas of independent external reality are formed."

The objections to this type of idealistic interpretation of the physical world are so many that it would be enough to recount them without much comment. If the *esse* of things is their *percipi*, it would be necessary to explain the following features of the external world :—

(1) *Externality and Extension*.—These two features are not the same and have to be separately derived out of mental states. Mental states have multiplicity and simultaneity ; but these two do not necessarily constitute extension. Bergson's attempt to derive spatiality out of simultaneity, caused by the detension of the intensive flow of life, is not wholly successful for unextended simultaneity, as in the compresence of different kinds of mental states, is a regular feature of conscious life. Wundt distinguished this kind of simultaneity from extensiveness by calling it intensive fusion—a distinction which was retained by Külpe by differentiating Fusion from Colligation. The only way in which extension could be derived out of mental states was adopted by Ward, and more particularly by James, who invested sensations with the quality of extensity ; but neither of them thereby intended to imply that the physical world was a precipitate of thought nor did they think that

mental extension could be manipulated in the same fashion as material extension was—the running-togetherness of mental states in which both expressed their belief by their respective doctrines of presentation-continuum and stream of consciousness cannot be equated with the divisibility and distinctness of material objects. Bergson saw the difficulty of creating space out of unextended consciousness and cut the Gordian knot by treating conscious perception as an attenuation of reality itself which he called—without justification—a system of images. Alexander, presumably under the same difficulty, equated physical space with psychical space by unjustifiably identifying the latter with neural space, which he sometimes regarded as an object of contemplation and sometimes as an object of enjoyment. The realistic attempts in modern times to evolve matter and mind, out of a neutral stuff which is neither physical nor psychical in character, have all concentrated upon sense or sense-data, presumably because it is in sensation that the boundaries of subject and object dissolve and it is easy to pass from thought to thing. Spinoza and Stout in different fashions practically acknowledge that the mind-body riddle is an insoluble one and that we have practically to assume that both aspects are real and correspondent. McTaggart went to the opposite extreme and, in order to prove that matter did not exist, denied its infinite divisibility and thus obliterated the distinction between mental and physical objects. Notwithstanding all these conflicting opinions there is no doubt that matter is characterised by magnitude and measurability in a sense different from the magnitude and measurability of mind, if in fact the latter possesses those two characters at all, and that there is nothing corresponding to the superposability of the former in the latter. Electrons are not non-spatial although they are non-sensible, and although the mass of a physical object is subject to certain conditions of position and velocity it is never suggested that it operates out of space altogether.

Greater difficulties arise when we try to create externality out of thought. It is true that, as Ward points out, externality and internality primarily refer to the body and not to the mind, as everything that the mind knows is in a sense inside the mind. Idealism has proposed to use an ambiguous word, 'object', to cover all contents of thought, and the relation between mind and matter has accordingly been regarded as a relation between mind and one order of thoughts. In this respect there is not much difference between Locke and Hegel, for both reduced the immediate object of cognition to an idea or a mental phenomenon although both agreed that thereby the possibility of positing an external world was not ruled out. Now, it is extremely difficult to make out in what exactly the transcendental reference lies. Why should the mind look upon some of its thoughts as instances of extreme otherness, as Hegel calls them, or as implying the existence of an object other than itself, as Locke supposes? To say that in some of the ideas there is a sense of opposition involved is practically to assume that the mind has a sense of constraint in the matter of positing an external world and on purely idealistic hypothesis it is impossible to accept this distinction except with what Alexander would call natural piety. The old joke of the Sautrāntikas against the Vijñānavādins still stands true: "If there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the 'comparison' as if they were external is illegitimate. No man in his senses would say, 'Vasubandhu looks like the son of a barren mother'."

Much has been made of the fact that in dreams and hallucinations we have a sense of externality although the whole process is mental. The analogy breaks down at two points. The dream and hallucinatory images contain no qualities which have not been originally derived from sense-perception—a congenitally blind person can never perceive colour in dreams and hallucinations; and the same is true of externality.

Secondly, dreams and hallucinatory images can reproduce only gross pictures whereas Nature, as we have seen, can be thought of not only in terms of gross experience but also in terms of its super-sensible or imaginary subtle elements and of its abstractions. No knowledge of Nature beyond a mere picture of gross external things is vouchsafed in dreams and hallucinations: we should not forget that Descartes wrote in favour of his provisional scepticism in pre-Daltonian days and Berkeley too did not tackle the view that Nature was super-sensible in its ultimate constitution. There is the other fact that the mind has the knowledge of other spirits as well and these too are in a sense external to itself: we must have some knowledge of the ways in which ideas are allocated to three different types of beings—the mind itself, the other spirits and the material world—without invoking the aid of any objective reality whatsoever. The whole problem will turn round the question: Do ideas veil or reveal other realities? The fallacy of ego-centric predicament is at the root of the belief that ideas are not continued into another order of reality and it itself arises from the fact that ideas are taken without their implications and simply regarded as mental. Berkeley himself was not unmindful of the differences among cognitions; he, therefore, distinguished between the ideas which were without transcendental implications (not so wholly, however, as we shall see) and notions through which spirits could be known. I need not reproduce the arguments used by G. E. Moore in his paper on "Objects of Perception" in his *Philosophical Studies*: they amount in fact to an acknowledgment of the truth of the quaint formula of Bradley, 'What *may* be, if it also *must* be, assuredly is', in their defence of the knowledge of material things and other minds through our own mental states.

That the sense of externality requires something really external to explain it has been tacitly recognised by the idealists themselves, the great Berkeley not excepting. Failing

to find a reason for exteriorising experiences, idealists have invoked a divine agency to create ideas in finite minds who, therefore, owe their ideas to something really external. Berkeley and Green were both guilty of this device and both of them rejected the warning of Descartes that, although it is conceivable that God should be able to produce the idea of an external world direct in us, to assume that He does so would be tantamount to an admission that God is a deceiver. We shall reply to their arguments by quoting another idealist of a different texture. Says Prof. Pringle-Pattison, "How this real system of externality, on which as finite spirits we depend, is related to or included in an absolute experience, is necessarily dark to us; for to answer such a question would mean to transcend the very conditions of our separate individuality. We can but dimly apprehend that, to such an experience, nature cannot be external in the way in which it necessarily is to the finite minds which it shapes and fills. And just because the two experiences are not in this respect *in pari materia*, the mode in which nature is included in the Absolute cannot be expected to throw light on the question in debate between mentalist and realist. But, at any rate, to treat the system of nature (as Berkeley does) as the effect in the finite centres of an abstract Will, is to evade the real difficulty altogether; and to figure its ultimate reality (as Green seems constantly inclined to do) as that of a system of thought-relations is so astonishingly meagre and incredible an account of the mighty fact in question that it explains Mr. Bradley's famous protest against the dissolution of the world into 'some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.'" (*The Idea of God*, pp 202-3). We say nothing of the fact that neither Berkeley nor Green could make any satisfactory provision for the concept of evolution as both conceived of God as upholding an eternal system of ideas. We are all familiar with the fact that this difference between the

eternal and the temporal way of knowing has been the rock on which most, if not all, idealisms have split.

That Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza and Schelling, none of whom can by any stretch of imagination be accused of soft thinking, should be compelled by the irresistible logic of facts to posit both a real and an ideal factor in existence, that such a devout thinker as James Martineau should think that Space as a condition of the material world exists outside of God, and that such noted thinkers as Alexander, Stout and Lloyd Morgan should be obliged to think of reality as Space-Time or Mind-Body without denying its spiritual character are sufficient evidence that the idealistic interpretation of matter as idea in the mind of finite or infinite spirit is not free from difficulties. As a matter of fact, when we turn to those who professed to rest the physical world on the divine mind we meet with such a bewildering variety of answers that the assumption of a non-mental world seems to be a far simpler hypothesis. While Berkeley and Green would probably hold that the world is consciously possessed by the Divine Mind at all times, Fichte would tell us that it is unconsciously projected out of the Absolute Ego, Sañkara would explain it as an illusory projection of the Absolute Consciousness, Schelling would call it a fall or a dissociation of the dark ground in God from His intelligence, Schopenhauer and Pfeleiderer would ascribe it to the operation of the primal blind will of the world-ground. The fact is that according to every type of idealism seeking to evolve the physical world out of an absolute the process is shrouded in mysticism and obscurity—far more mysterious than the Genesis account that God created the world by His mere fiat. On none of the hypotheses shall we ever come nearer to an understanding of the mystery of the frozen thought or the petrified will. Even Hegel's formula of the self-diremption of the Absolute is no adequate explanation of the externality of the world nor is there any unanimity

among the idealists as to whether the world is external to both finite and infinite spirits or only to the former.

(2) *Activity and Coerciveness*.—Closely connected with the external character of the physical world is its coerciveness or aggressiveness. Hume in a famous sentence distinguished an impression from an idea by the force and liveliness with which the former strikes upon the mind. Stout has corrected the ambiguity of the clause by pointing out that Hume's tendency to think of the latter as an attenuated form of the former does not do justice to the qualitative difference between the two. Percepts have an aggressiveness which does not belong to images or ideas and we have to adjust ourselves more actively to the former than to the latter as those cannot be altered by our thought or made to vanish by changing the direction of our attention. A sense of compulsive thinking accompanies all cognitions of the external world. How pleasant would the world have been, had we the power to replace a headache by a sense of exhilaration, a revolting smell by sweet fragrance, or an excruciating sight by a lovely vision ! If the world is a system of thoughts (even the idea of a system is an assumption in subjective idealism), how does it come to possess the element of activity ? Why do we feel coerced by it ?

The two answers that Idealism has thus far given are that (1) that even ideas produced by the self may have a compulsive force, and (2) that ideas in the finite minds are produced from the outside by the infinite mind and are accordingly coercive in character. We shall limit our discussion to the sense of compulsion in man without wasting our time over the attempts of Fichte and Saṅkara to explain the sense of coercion or illusion in the Absolute. Thus it has been suggested that just as a delusion or an obsession may have all the characteristics of an objective happening, although neither is anything but mental, and we have to adjust ourselves to the creations of our own fancy, so it may be supposed also that the world is not anything

other than our ideas in spite of the fact that we feel helpless before its activity. As contrasted with dreams and hallucinations which are sporadic in character, delusions and obsessions are more systematic. They also take place in conscious waking life like hallucinations but unlike dreams. But against them the same objection may be urged, namely, that none who has not otherwise known externality would have the least means of having a sense of compulsion from his own fancies. Again, we can be cured of abnormal mental states but not of the sense of the physical world. The Vedānta could see that the world of practicalities was not the same thing as the world of illusions and abnormalities.

If then we are not starting at the shadows of our own mind when we feel the impact of an external world, do matters improve much if we assume that we are passive recipients of Divine thoughts? The idea of God acting from outside is really a survival of that deistic mode of thinking according to which God is transcendent to man and His thoughts can come to man only as an outside force. That God could act within us without making us feel every time that we are being pushed against our will is not possible to accept on this supposition—we are to suppose that the external world is, as it were, the thought of God permanently opposing human thinking and compelling the latter to take cognisance of the former. Does God have any other way of communicating His thoughts to us? In prophetic inspiration and the impulse towards religion and morality does God speak in another language? Would the sense of compulsion persist when we would learn that there is really no external world and that we are merely prying into the mind of God? Can we live, move and have our being in the mind of God and yet at the same time feel that His thoughts are alien to us, not only in the sense of being external to us but also in the sense of being objects coercing us in the form of material objects? Even a hypnotic subject

has greater identity with the hypnotiser, for he can spontaneously feel a pain when the latter is pricked without the idea of pain being coercively put into his mind by the hypnotiser actively transferring his own thought to his subject. But God has to produce a sense of coercion in us when communicating some of His own thoughts, and this coercion is not born of a conflict between human and divine will, as Martineau supposes, but generated in the act of appropriating thoughts, either spontaneously or actively transferred from His own mind to man by God. And when man bows to this Divine operation he not only feels passive but also materialises the spiritual activity of God. We are to remember in this connection that there is an opposite idealistic tradition, represented by Bradley and Bosanquet, that what we receive we render back unto God and that our finite experiences are redistributed and preserved in the Absolute. If the sense of passivity is one such experience, then God is both actively producing the ideas in our minds and passively feeling them when they are funded back to Him ; we cannot understand in what other sense finite experiences can be known by God to come from such a finite source. Or shall we go the opposite extreme and hold that in the Absolute there is no thought but what is felt by finite spirits ?

It is doubtful if all these ideas of the world being a system of thoughts would have arisen had not the whole matter been conceived in intellectual terms. In fact, the whole business of the finite has been regarded as a passive reception of impressions and in this matter at any rate there is no distinction between Brekeley who fought for the activity of the spirit and Locke who began with a *tabula rasa*. That in relation to the physical world we are not only spectators but also active agents and that it is by interacting with it that we become

conscious of its reality—this the idealistic interpretation has a tendency to ignore. Dr. Johnson's refutation of Berkeley is still the most cogent, namely, that it is only by kicking against the stone that you know it to be real and that without such active manipulation you are likely to take it as an idea in your own mind. No idea, whether of your own mind or of God, would hit you in the same fashion: the idealist has more in mind visual sensation with its picturing than tactuo-muscular sensation with its sense of resistance when thinking of man's knowledge of the physical world.

(3). *Persistence, Universality and Uniformity.*—The physical world is not only external but relatively abiding. It has not that flow and flicker, which characterises all mental states in spite of all our attempts to hold them before the mind's eye for some time. You can leave off your analysis of a physical object and return to it again after some time and get practically the same impression as when you left it. Of course, we are not denying that changes are taking place in things as in thoughts, but they are mostly imperceptible and the serial cognitions that apprehend an abiding object have no suspicion that any change has taken place in the object. Let us attempt a similar serial cognition in the absence of any physical object and we shall soon find out that identity is the last quality that thought possesses as an inherent characteristic. To say that the similarity of successive thoughts is the cause of objective presentation and not the reverse would be a travesty of the facts of actual experience; it is necessary to remember that the *ratio cognoscendi* is not identical with the *ratio essendi* and that the psychological priority of the former does not rule out the logical priority of the latter. As a matter of fact, when it is doubtful if the similarity

of thoughts can, as Hume supposed, establish even the identity of the self without the help of the transcendental unity of apperception, to suggest that things get anything but their unification from the mind would be flying in the face of facts. When J. S. Mill went on to posit a permanent possibility of sensations in addition to their transient actuality he was only anticipating the distinction drawn by Russell and other realists between the percept and the *perceptibile*, between the momentary subjective experience and the objective conditions under which such experience can always arise according to law. It would be ridiculous to suppose, for instance, that in order to get hydrogen and oxygen all that you have got to do is to analyse your thought of water and not to get into a chemical laboratory and take the help of electrolysis. The phantastic philosophy of Nature that post-Kantian idealism built up by the method of logical analysis should prove a warning to all serious thinkers: you cannot logically or psychologically prove anything regarding Nature—you will have to take the Baconian advice "Do not anticipate Nature but interrogate Her." I shall not go to the behaviouristic length of suggesting that by introspection you do not know anything even about the mind; but there is an obvious danger in identifying matter with mind, for we may easily get into the idea that the rules of thinking apply also to things and meet with the inevitable disasters of a panlogistic scheme of the world.

How hopeless it is to attempt to derive the physical world out of thinking becomes more patent when we try to build up a common world. We need not tarry here to discuss how on the basis of subjective idealism it is possible to believe in the existence of other spirits at all. Possibly we shall have to assume that we possess two orders of thought or that out of our thoughts we build up two sets of realities --the one corres-

ponding to the so-called physical objects and the other to other spirits, and that after setting up these graven images we fall down in worship before them in different fashions. But after the existence of other spirits has been proved or assumed, how are we going to have a world that is not private but public? Our feelings we do not suppose to be shareable by others; but we have no doubt that when we come to the knowledge of the Sun, Reid, who believed that ten men see the same sun, was more right than Hamilton, who believed that each saw a different sun. Why should we at all have not only relatable perspectives but similar experiences? The belief in a physical world is not only universal but under the same conditions it is uniform. True, perspective would depend upon position but from the same position we shall have the same perspective according to the laws of Physics—it is not possible to make individual variations in perspective from the same position under identical physical and physiological conditions.

Idealism has been obliged to adopt desperate devices to explain universality and uniformity. We have been referred to dreams that all dream together—to the Kantian dictum that objectivity is universal validity, the only small difficulty being that such universal dreams are not vouched for by experience and that when one subject manipulates that dream actively there is no reason why the rest of the world should begin to change their dreams. When a carpenter is sawing wood he is doing something more than merely dreaming and yet the rest of the world begins to have an idea of the sawn wood, without having the other sense of muscular activity, as soon as the carpenter himself has it. So, unless we say that the process of sawing was not necessary on the part of the carpenter and that he would have got the idea of the sawn wood like other spirits without taking the trouble of sawing, we must be prepared to admit that the same dream-effect is being produced by different psychic causation. Again, mere universality does

not prove reality and the coherence of beliefs is only one of the grounds for believing in a real world. In order to make universality effective we shall have to take the experience of all times and places before drawing any conclusion about the reality of things—a procedure which no Idealist would strictly adopt because in that case judgment would have to be suspended till eternity. Reality on the idealistic assumption would be strictly relative to the time and the place in which it is constructed by one mind in alliance with other minds and would therefore be variable under different conditions. These variations would be constitutional and not accidental, for reality is a construct of mind and not merely subject to the limitations of finite apprehensions—in fact, we shall have to assume that where the same thing is being differently apprehended there is not one thing but many things, each corresponding to its own type of apprehension.

Failing to get satisfactory answer to the problem of uniformity, Idealism has been obliged to drag in the operation of an Infinite and Omnipotent Intelligence to explain the similarity of experiences in different individuals. Berkeley himself was compelled to assume that the impartiality of God was responsible for the uniformity that is observable among the experiences of finite individuals situated under similar circumstances—he saw in the perception of the same object by different finite subjects a moral quality of God who does not present a banana to one person and a bug to another at one and the same place at the same time. We are not to suppose, however, that impartiality is uniformly spread over the whole of creation, for even under the same circumstances different types of creatures have different experiences; we are only to suppose that beings of the same type are similarly favoured by God. It must be admitted, however, that it is less easy to conceive why an omnipotent God should not treat all types of creatures uniformly under the same circumstances than to believe that

such differences arise out of differential action of real objects upon the physiological organism of different types of creatures. In fact, it is difficult to see, for instance, why a dog or a crow should see a corpse as a man does and yet have a different smell from the same object. We shall have to fall back upon the supposition that God has His own good reason for not extending the uniformity further between a crow or a dog on the one side and a man on the other. Physiological difference being inadmissible (as there is no body), we must suppose that the difference in experience is due to difference in spiritual endowment; howsoever caused.

If we accept the other explanation, namely, the doctrine of pre-established harmony as advocated by Leibniz, we fare no better. If each monad keeps time with all the rest in all matters, there would be no conflict of opinions and no diversity of individual experiences. But what we are asked to believe is that such uniformity extends only to the experiences of monads in respect of physical objects under similar conditions. You do not feel a tooth-ache when I do nor does the striker feel the painful blow which he administers to his victim. The miracle is that the monads that are windowless are still able to mirror the same universe and do not simply develop it from within. If, again, each monad mirrors the world from its own standpoint, pre-established harmony is likely to be seriously jeopardised. We shall not discuss at present the question of the origin of the space-idea in Leibniz's system or how without assuming its reality it is possible to understand the difference of standpoints among the monads. It is enough to point out that on his theory no satisfactory explanation of agreement among monads about the presentation of same objects is forthcoming. The extension from the parallelism of mind and body to that of monads was unwarranted and was done only because the body was also regarded as composed of spiritual monads; but at the same time the body was assigned a privileged position in

relation to the soul which was supposed to reflect the happenings of the body much more clearly than those of other monads—a contingency that could arise only if the non-spatial soul could be unconsciously given a spatial proximity to the body it tenants. Yet when it comes to parallelism we find that although each soul knows its own body best and all souls are related by pre-established harmony, it is not the happenings within all the bodies that all the souls know best but only happenings within those souls which because of their low degree of spirituality are called naked monads or physical objects. Leibniz had to give way evidently to the sheer weight of empirical facts and to admit that the knowledge of what takes place within the extra-organic world of matter could be far more universalised than the experience of the organic sensations which each soul enjoyed itself.

The other uniformity that Idealism of this type has failed to explain is the uniformity of Nature's laws. Nor only are things the same to different individuals but their behaviour too is uniform to all. Nature is predictable because she behaves in a similar fashion under similar conditions. How can this uniformity be secured by relying upon the mind alone? Hume had said that something akin to the law of gravitation holds sway over the ideas so that they remain associated together without any soul, just as the planetary bodies keep one another in position without any connecting cord. We have now to reverse that kind of thinking and to suppose that just as ideas are held together by association so also the things of nature are associated by laws. But are laws of Nature thus derivable out of the laws of thinking? For one thing, men have ever been regarded as exceptions to mechanical laws inasmuch as they are free agents. Then again mental associations are often multiple and variable; and it is this that led Hume to say that on the basis of experience alone we can only say that things are conjoined but never connected with the effect that

regarding Nature's future events we can only say that they are probable but not necessary—a position which was so impossible that Kant had to invoke the aid of *a priori* categories to establish the universality and necessity of natural laws. This was necessitated by the fact that experience would not only not establish any uniformity of nature's behaviour for the individual percipient but would, if any law be established at all, establish different laws of Nature for different individuals. Nature would, in that case, cease to be the depository of that confidence which not only human intelligence but even animal instinct places in it because of its uniform dealings.

Berkeley's theory of Divine signs is not less unsatisfactory than Hume's theory of probabilism. To suppose that there are no necessary connections of things because all are ideas and one idea is not caused by another and that therefore we are only to suppose that when we possess one idea it is a divine sign that another idea is following immediately afterwards, places objectivity of laws on a divine basis and secures at the same time, through the same impartiality of God as establishes the uniformity of presentations in his system, their universality and uniformity. But in order to achieve this object Berkeley has practically to assume that God has to work in a uniform fashion so far as the presentation of the order of nature's happenings is concerned—to set up some "permanent lines of volition," as Martineau calls them. All discoveries of fresh natural laws would be merely gaining increased illumination regarding divine secrets. While this theory has its eye upon the divine arrangement of the invariability of natural causation it omits to say what part the finite mind plays in the manipulation of the world of divine ideas. To say that the finite spirit is active and yet to leave to it no field wherein it may exercise that activity—for its thoughts are divine copies and its knowledge of orderly changes divine dispensation according to the divine law of ordered presentation—is to eliminate from the

finite all genuine experience of activity and initiation. When I raise my hand and strike another person he may take the raised hand as a divine sign that painful contact is coming immediately after ; but how would he know that behind the raised hand there was my finite will (of which he has no direct knowledge) and how would he make me responsible for the act ?

If however Nature is not governed by uniform laws, that is, if the laws of Nature are contingent and indeterminate, as is now being advocated, then all comparison with the laws of association would fall to the ground and it would be necessary to invoke the aid of the free volition of man as the nearest analogue of Nature's happenings ; but that leads to the second type of Idealism which we may now discuss.

III.

This second type of Idealism may best be called Spiritualism. In its pluralistic form it may be called Monadism which has been familiarised to us by Leibniz. In its monistic form it may be called Singularism, Absolutism, Sankara-Advaitism or Illusionism when it is intellectualistically inclined, and Objective Voluntarism or Irrationalism when viewed from the standpoint of Schopenhauer. We shall dispose of the last two forms first.

According to Sankara whose philosophy is typical of absolutism the physical world has no reality as a system of ideas in the mind of God as conceived by Berkeley or Green or Hegel, as from the standpoint of ultimate truth there is no personal God who possesses the quality of thinking but only the impersonal Brahman whose essence is consciousness, wherein therefore it is distinguishable from the impersonal Absolute of Bradley in which finite thoughts are somehow conserved and rearranged. What then is the physical world ? It is only a system of illusory ideas projected by Brahman

under the influence of *Māyā*—a principle which is neither real nor unreal but simply indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*). Associated with this power of projection from all eternity (*nityā śakti*), Brahman brings into being illusions of plurality and change which take on the forms of finite spirits and God and also a physical world. In the process Brahman loses itself and then by a laborious process man has to rediscover the primal unity hidden from view by the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*) after seeing through the unreality of finitude in all forms, physical and spiritual. What the critics of this type of Idealism have repeatedly pointed out is that it is difficult to conceive how Brahman came to have a second shadowy principle like *Māyā* eternally associated with it without compromising its unity, what exact meaning is to be put on a being which is not conscious but is consciousness itself, how an impersonal being develops not only into a personal God but also a world of finite spirits (*jīvas*) with mutual relations between the two forms of personality, why it should develop a second principle of illusion in these in the form of *Avidyā* and how *Māyā* and *Avidyā* are to be related, and lastly as to how the dawning of knowledge in finite spirits should prove the redemption of Brahman itself, i. e. how far it is possible for the finite to transcend itself in such a fashion as to lose its own being in the process and reinstate the purity of Brahman whose eternal *Māyā* never forsakes it and therefore presumably subjects it to fresh illusion. What we are concerned with, however, is why spiritual darkening should cast a physical shadow on Brahman or God or *Jīva* unless *Māyā* is somehow regarded as the principle of physical existence as in fact was done in theistic speculations (*māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt māyinam tu maheśvaram*). This would make *Māyā* very much like Plato's Matter which has been described as Nothing, as the object of ignorance, as the cause of plurality and change; but in that case the *advaitism* would be compromised, as it was done in Plato, and

there would be no room left except for a demiurge fashioning a preëxistent material to the best of his knowledge and ability.

The voluntaristic solution is no less unsatisfactory. To call the leg the will to move, the tooth the will to chew or the brain the will to think is good poetry but not convincing philosophy. This cosmic Lamarckianism with the function preceding the structure professes to derive the material world out of blind will and sees in the forces of attraction and repulsion in the elements of Nature the most rudimentary materialisation of the Absolute Will. And yet the same philosophy lays down that space, time, causality, etc. are given at a stroke when the primal will succeeds in evolving a brain, leaving the reader to imagine as best as he can how pre-cortical processes of the will are to be explained without assuming a spatial world and a temporal process. We may draw attention to the fact that the impossibility of deriving anything out of mere Will led von Hartmann to assume that while the will supplied the material the idea supplied the form—a philosophy which has been copied by Pfeiderer. The materialisation theory in Schopenhauer is analogous to that in Bergson who also postulated a downward materialising tendency in life and yet thought that matter is ideally generated when the brain and the intellect are evolved. Whether we call the ultimate stuff of the world Will or Life is not very material: so long as we are unable to indicate how exactly either of them evolves Matter without being itself material and why the evolute resists the evolvent in no uncertain ways it will be necessary to hold that to that extent the philosophy advanced is unsatisfactory.

Monadism which is the pluralistic form of spiritualism starts, as Moore points out, not with '*esse is percipi*' but with '*esse is percipere*', but ultimately its validity depends upon the truth of '*esse is percipi*.' It does not follow that because the world exists as a system of thoughts, therefore it must consist

of thinking spirits behind each object of thought, or, in other words, that the thoughts belong to independent thinkers. From the idealistic position the existence of these independent thinkers is as difficult to establish as the existence of an independent world ; but while Idealism has been more charitable towards the possibility of cognising the existence of other spirits it has been persistently hostile towards the assumption of an independently existing physical world though the latter is equally justified by the necessity of explaining experience. In fact, without assuming the reality of bodily expressions it is not possible for finite spirits to posit a soul behind these expressions—that is why even if disembodied souls exist, their existence cannot, for want of bodily manifestations to some sense-organ or other, be proved and must remain a mere object of hope or faith.

Supposing, however, that there are an infinite number of such finite spirits, how are we going to evolve a physical world out of mere spirits ? It is well known that Leibniz took it for granted that before there could arise any knowledge of the material world—*materia secunda*, as he calls it—there must be a *materia prima* in each spirit in the form of limited knowledge or comparative ignorance. This is the *avidyā* principle in each finite soul and it is due to its operation that the intelligible relations of souls are converted into spatial relations. The only monad free from this limitation is God, the Monad of monads,—a position that reminds one of the intuitive understanding of God, free from space and time forms and creative of its materials, in Kant's system. Now a strict application of the law of continuity, as advocated by Leibniz, would demand that the higher souls should be more free from this proneness to materialisation than the lower souls : what Leibniz actually taught, however, was that materialisation depended not upon the intelligence of the apprehending spirits so much as upon the degree of intelligence of the apprehended

spirits, the naked monads being regarded as almost material because of the preponderance of the principle of passivity over that of activity in them. As the body as compound has no perception of its own, according to Leibniz, his philosophy is farthest removed from panpsychism—in fact, his reaction against Spinoza is due to his conviction that only individuals are conscious entities. But if the monads form a continuous series, would it not follow, notwithstanding his doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles, that there is no common world of knowledge which the individuals possess in an unequivocal sense? The device of the preëstablished harmony would prove too much and the doctrines of the mirroring of the world from individual positions and that of graded perceptions (law of continuity) too little about a common world. Besides, Leibniz has not explained clearly the possibility of compounding on which the perception of the material world depends. We are indeed told of the procession of compossible monads before the eyes of God; but about compound substances Leibniz was not without doubts, for while in the opening section of his *Monadology* he takes it for granted that compound things exist, later on in the book (Sec. 61) he tells us that compound things are merely symbols of the monads which compose them, so that just as in each monad there is an aspect of entelechy and an aspect of *materia prima* so also in each compound there is a dominant monad or soul which is the entelechy of the body and a *materia secunda* which wears a physical aspect. His theory of the windowless monads again is difficult to reconcile with the necessity of assuming an active aspect in some monad to explain the passive aspect in some other, in which also he believes (Sec. 52), not to mention over again the difficulty of understanding the meaning of the word 'distant' (Sec. 61) in a purely spiritualistic world, and also the effect of distance upon clearness of perception, (when possibly the reverse should be the case, but for the fact that in Leibniz the word 'distance'

is meant to cover also the meaning of quantitative difference in spirituality).

Suffice it to say that later monadism has not chosen to follow Leibniz. We have referred to Wildon Carr already; Croce too was constrained to refer the existence of matter to the activity of the spirit. Although under the influence of the Kantian tradition he sometimes writes as if below the level of the intuitive activity of mind there is a realm of passivity, namely, sensation or feeling, Croce takes care to point out that this is a mere abstraction from the concrete life of mind and is only a limiting concept which in its abstraction is an unreality, the true reality being intuition on which conceptual thinking has to do its work. He also points out that while intuition supplies the concreteness and the individuality of things, their characters, so to say,—it is not necessarily spatial or temporal. In fact, in Croce we meet with a twofold account of Matter. On the one hand, we have a shadowy realm of sensation, either undifferentiated or vaguely differentiated, which supplies the stimulus to aesthetic activity and gets transformed into intuition with its particularity and lyrical expressiveness waiting to be transformed further into a world of reality by the touch of concepts. It is this sub-intuitional realm of the spirit that Croce generally designates as Matter: "Below intuition is sensation, the, as yet, formless matter, which itself can never be grasped by Mind in so far as it is mere matter and which Mind can only possess in Form and through Form, but the concept of which it postulates as a limit. Matter, considered in abstraction from our thinking, is merely the negation of activity, viz. mere mechanism and passivity, that which the human mind submits to but does not produce. Without it neither knowledge nor human activity is possible. But mere matter just gives us our animal nature, what is brutal and impulsive in man, and not that spiritual mastery which constitutes our humanity." Crespi (in his

Contemporary Thought of Italy) has ably refuted the presuppositions and the results of this infra-intuitional process which is neither handed over to a non-spiritual entity nor brought into organic relation with the life of the spirit. It is devoid of distinctions and yet it calls forth different intuitions ; it is not objectified in expression, with which intuition is identified, and yet it is not non-spiritual ; it is possibly spiritual but it is formless and without any felt qualitateness. Kant took for granted that the forms of intuition were imposed upon a qualitatively distinguishable manifold ; but Croce, in his eagerness to reserve all qualitative formation to the spirit, has invoked the aid of a shadowy principle which can be compared only to Milton's description of Death,—

"The other shape,
If shape it might be call'd, that shape had none
Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb,
Or substance might be call'd that shadow seem'd,
For each seem'd either."

Gentile who saw this weakness in Croce's idealism had no hesitation in rejecting this infra-intuitive passivity and substituting in its place the notion of an earlier actual thought being superseded by a later actual thought and reduced by the latter from an *act* to a *fact*, from Spirit, which is activity, to nature, matter, which is passivity. "Nature is just only past thought, which living thought begins to consider as other than itself, forgetting in the end that it is its own offspring." It is instructive to note that Stout, who has drawn the same comparison between memory-knowledge and knowledge of physical existence as Gentile, has drawn an opposite conclusion and defended the realistic position. (*Mind and Matter*, p. 219).

The second account of Matter given by Croce is equally unsatisfactory. We are told that mere passivity of the spirit which is sensation does not represent any reality and that after the intuitive and conceptual functions of the mind have done

their work there emerges the notion of a really existing physical world which we are said to perceive. But when this notion of reality is carefully analysed it is found that, although it goes beyond the stage of objectified expression of intuitive impression which is Art, it is pervaded by two sets of ideas—the concrete but not universal pseudo-concepts of the natural sciences and the universal but not concrete pseudo-concepts of mathematics, both of which are impositions of the practical aspect of our spiritual life. This nature of the natural sciences is only an abstract scheme devised for descriptive, social and practical purposes—a position with which we are familiar in the writings of Bergson also, only that he does not emphasise so much the social aspect of the materialising capacity of the human intellect. When we try to understand nature in its true significance we are told that only the philosophic concepts, whose qualities are expressiveness, universality and concreteness, can enable us to do so; but then nature ceases to be physical altogether and is seen to be the relationing of the particulars of intuition by the same creative activity of the spirit which acted originally as aesthetic imagination—"natural events and phenomena are only fragments of concrete human experience depersonalised and mechanised as signs and instruments of permanent social relations and necessities." But lest the individualistic beginning should render the evolution of a common world impossible, we are transported now to the historic consciousness of the race—the consciousness not of men but of Man—as the support of nature, and, instead of history being a continuation of cosmology, nature becomes a part of the history of the spirit,—evidently not of the finite spirit but of an absolute spirit. The same transition from the empiric ego to the transcendent ego is to be found in Gentile also. Here we have a curious combination of the Kantian starting point of the finite ego and the Fichtean conception of the absolute ego; the similarity

with the Kantian Consciousness-in-general is also evident. We have already shown that the assumption of an absolute ego is itself fraught with great difficulty, for the necessity of materialisation in the case of the absolute is much less than in the case of the finite ; but when an attempt is made to reach out to the absolute from the original finite starting point, as has evidently been done by Croce and Gentile in imitation of the Consciousness-in-general of Kant, there is obvious danger. Joad is perfectly right in holding about Croce's philosophy that "the argument for the existence of Mind as a whole outside the individual experience...is not easy to follow, and has seemed to many unconvincing. Croce's philosophy has often been charged not only with providing no escape from the position of Subjective Idealism, which asserts that the only things we can know are our own ideas, but even with a logical reduction of itself to Solipsism, the doctrine that our mental states are the only things that exist in the Universe." It is interesting to note that in most of the absolutistic schemes God is charged with the sole task of bringing about agreement among finite spirits in respect of their percepts but not of their mental equipment in general. Our beliefs, tastes and ideals have a proverbial heterogeneity but our percepts are almost identical : why is Divine operation so partial in its choice of agreement ? To think that the infinite spirit is immanent in the finite spirits and yet to be unable to show why agreement is easy only in one particular domain of cognition creates a suspicion that the ground of uniformity about percepts is to be sought elsewhere than in the operations of thought, finite or infinite.

We shall summarily dispose of the theory of Ward that the law of continuity obliges us to postulate the existence of spirits in whom will is reduced to automatism, memory is replaced by a succession of instantaneous cognitions and statistical constancy of large numbers takes the form of the uniformity of

laws. Taking it for granted that progress and development are facts, Ward thinks that these cannot be explained by mechanistic theory with its belief in complete reversibility. He thinks, however, that "as a necessary consequence of the interaction of a plurality of individuals, intent on self-betterment as well as self-conservation, there should be a general tendency to diminish the mere contingency of the world and to replace it by a definite progression." But the psychic aspect of the bare monads is whittled down to such an extent that they are regarded by him as providing a uniform medium for the intercourse of higher monads while they themselves are supposed to have only external relations or rather to have the distinction between internal and external totally abolished in their case (*Realm of Ends*, Lecture XII). Ward's general tendency to invest all monads with conative impulses is calculated to preserve the element of contingency in nature and to link it up with freedom in higher spirits. But his comparison of habits of bare monads with heredity and instinct will not carry us far, for life not only knows heredity but also variation and instincts are not altogether free from adjustment to varying conditions and failure in precision. To suppose that the world is being relegated more and more to the control of subordinate monads with fixed habits of action as an adjustment of self-preserving and self-developing spirits is being effected by mutual intercourse is after all a description whose continued veracity will depend upon the extent to which monads have rendered themselves incapable of novel action even under unusual conditions of environment without ceasing to be spiritual. The logical conclusion of this position would be that spirits would cease to be conational and become mere spectators of events as they sink into habits of routine action and would lose that immanent efficiency and purposiveness on which a realm of ends depends. They would cease to be individuals and become units.

We need not discuss the relation between the finite and the Absolute in Ward's system or the possibility of reaching out from individual experience to universal experience. He seems to oscillate between a theory of physical world which is a reification of the abstractions of thought generated by inter-subjective intercourse and a theory of degenerate spirits which become mechanical in their habits or of imperfect spirits incapable of betterment beyond a certain stage. He rejects Leibniz's doctrine of windowless monads and believes that inter-action with a view to mutual adjustment is the true characteristic of monads and that in this process they evolve that uniformity and externality which we are wont to associate with material entities and their operations. He is anxious to show that without a belief in the spirituality of nature ends will not be realised—a position which we shall discuss immediately in the last part of this paper. It is extremely hazardous, however, to assert that the law of continuity on which both he and Leibniz lay so much emphasis would permit us to pass over from the conscious self which each person knows by introspection to "sticks, stones and starry heavens" with nothing apparently similar to our own conscious quality.

IV.

We shall now close with a consideration of the third form of Idealism which it is better to call Finalism or Idealism proper. According to this theory the physical world is not a mere idea nor a system of spirits but a means whereby spirit rises to higher eminence or realises nobler ideals. The first interpretation would not preclude the existence of plural spirits as the sole real substances, but this type of idealism has in mind a greater coöperation of the elements of the world than what monadism with all its mediating factors would justify. Accordingly idealism of this type has a tendency to think of the world as the history of the evolution of the spirituality that

is at the bottom of things and to suppose that from very lowly beginnings spirit is gradually emancipating itself from its imperfections and contradictions and to attain to heights that are becoming loftier as the world is progressing in time. If the world is an idea, it is to be conceived in the manner of a manipulation of the spiritual data in the life of the spirit whereby all that were imperfectly coördinated or remotely associated come into closer organisation and reveal gradually the lineaments of an immanent unity and a growing spiritual value. The Evolution theory is welcomed as confirming the true nature of spirit which cannot think without developing.

In spite of some attractiveness it is difficult to believe that this form of idealism does justice to the protean variety of nature or succeeds in establishing the evolution theory on a spiritualistic basis. For one thing, it has a tendency to think very often that the evolution is not of the world but of our knowledge of the world—that reality is perfect from the very beginning and that it is this eternal perfection that gradually comes into view as the world progresses in time. Many would readily remember the standpoint of Pringle Pattison in this connection and some forms of Hegelianism also. This would reduce wordly happenings to mere shows—not an epigenetic development of the reals but an unwinding of verities put at the beginning of things and real even without a history. We are back, that is, to a type of Platonism where phenomenal appearance can only be a fall from a pristine purity and the significance of the historical process is entirely lost. If, on the other hand, the process is genuine, then we have to defend some form of the conception of a developing God, and it would be open to us to believe either in a purely spiritual entity without a touch of materiality or spatiality about it or in a being which embodies some form of spatiality within itself and gradually emerges into higher levels by the complexification of its elements. This second alternative is too recent to

be lightly set aside and while it is not entirely free from difficulties it does greater justice to the reality of physical existence than the mere idealistic theory does. What the purely idealistic theory fails to explain is the transition from being to becoming, from spirituality to contingency at the beginning. It is permissible to suggest that a chaotic material gradually gets into shape with the march of time : but why should there be a chaos at the beginning ? In the case of the finite spirit the chaotic beginning represents the passive stage of reception of impressions and the spiritual development consists in gradual emancipation from the aspect of passivity and the creation of an independent world of thoughts. Now no such initial chaos is permissible to the Absolute and the extreme otherness with which Hegel starts in his *Philosophy of Nature* is a gratuitous assumption unless we believe that like the finite mind the Absolute Mind is torn by contradictory leanings at the beginning and like the former it gains control over the baser elements of its own being by culture—a belief which would necessitate the positing of an ideal even before the Absolute Mind and would take away from the unity and the absoluteness of the Ultimate Principle of existence. We shall have to fall back, in fact, on Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, Bahnsen and others—if not on Zarathustra, for an explanation of the initial opposition to the life of the Spirit which is destined to triumph in the end by a painful and laborious process—if, of course, there is any end at all, which is doubtful. The main idea is to get rid of a static world in the mind of God—an unmoving world of thoughts which is supposed to furnish materials to finite minds ; but to conceive of the world of things as a system of thoughts by means of which the Absolute Mind rises to higher consciousness is neither a uniform belief with idealism (for genuine development of the Divine Mind has very often been questioned) nor a sufficient explanation of the first stage of an admittedly panlogistic

scheme. We do not refer to the difficulty of conceiving the right place of the finite in such a developing Absolute and the method by which divine thought is communicated to finite minds ; suffice it to say that the left-wing Hegelians contended that in such a developing Absolute the highest attainable consciousness belonged to the finite and the opposite party thought that the risk was rather that the finite would disappear altogether and we would be left with a pantheism in which the finite would have a mere adjectival and not substantive existence. It is not easy to understand whether the world of thoughts wears a physical aspect to the Absolute itself or whether the otherness which characterises its consciousness of the world of thoughts takes on a physical form to finite beings alone. Creation of finite spirits being at a discount in this type of Idealism, the exact mode of the genesis of the finite spirit and the method by which divine thoughts are shared by the finite and yet with a physical significance are almost insurmountable difficulties in this type of Objective Idealism.

If, on the other hand, we believe that the physical world is the travail of the spirit and that it is through the world that the spirit is to mount up to its native heights, we shall have to admit that howsoever repellent the physical world may appear at first sight it is really conducive to the realisation of the highest ideal of the spiritual world. The world of nature may throw obstacles in the way as a test of our spiritual earnestness but it is ever ready to yield to the pressure of spiritual values and to conserve the worth that spirit generates in the world. Nature is neither indifferent nor hostile to the aspirations of the spirit, but is on the contrary amenable to spiritual control and destructive of unvalues of all types. Evolution may in one sense be regarded as a process

whereby the less good is superseded by the better, a greater harmony replaces a lesser one as in ontogenetic development (Hobhouse). This description really falls into two parts. The first is that nature provides the materials of education. This by itself does not establish the spiritual character of nature for it may very well be a school of adversity in the literal sense of the term—a thoroughly hostile world which exists only as an opposition, an obstacle never to be overcome completely at any time. Intellect and Morality may grow as much in a thoroughly material world as in a spiritual one: in fact, the more we are thrown upon an uncharitable world the greater ingenuity and sociality do we develop to maintain ourselves in existence and to thrive in uncongenial soil. The real emphasis is on the second part of the description, namely, that the world is friendly to spiritual values and that we may work morally in the hope that the good we do will live after us and that the evil will be interred with our bones. Is this belief justified?

We would do well in this connection to remember the saying of William James that, so far as the *past* history of the world is concerned, it is immaterial whether it is Matter or God that has created it but that it makes a great difference, so far the *future* history of the world is concerned, whether we believe that we are building our achievements on the shifting sands of chance or on the solid rock of divine goodness. The belief that Nature is friendly to the preservation of the goods we create heartens us in our struggle for bettering the intellectual, aesthetic and moral conditions of the world, while the converse belief that we are at the mercy of an indifferent or merciless world and that good no less than evil may be swamped in course of time would take away the zest of fight on behalf of illumination and ethicality. But this

belief, while it allows a pragmatic justification of faith in the friendliness of nature, is not based on any unassailable rational ground. We are still far from any satisfactory theory of good and evil and the too many acts of devastation associated with physical nature cannot be explained away. We fondly believe that all will be well at the end and that through ignorance we fail to see the good that is latent in the apparent evil of nature. It would have been intolerable if man did not have this faith for he would not then have stirred for any noble action. The march of civilisation has been possible because man has ever hoped that all achievements will substantially survive. But we must not forget that it is being widely questioned if man's morality has kept equal pace with his intellect and also whether civilisation has in any way made nature more prone to moral transformation. Nature remains the same inscrutable indifferent power that it was in primitive times; and although an increased knowledge of its laws has enabled us to build better, its unforeseen furies have often carried away the noblest achievements of men, and the genius has been or will be no more immune from the ravages of time than the idiot or the imbecile. The microbe gains upon the man in the race for survival and monuments of art crumble into dust in course of time. In the face of these facts it is difficult to retain one's idealism and to believe that spirit is gradually triumphing over matter and using it as a pliant tool of its own greatness. The moral indifference of Nature, if not its positive hostility towards spiritual aspirations, led Plato to call Matter or Space the principle of imperfection; and unless one is determined to be optimistic at all costs one cannot fail to be impressed by too many flagrant cases of dysteleology and want of plan exhibited by the physical world. Nature can be only imperfectly moralised and hence fact and ideal can never be completely equated.

Even if nature agrees to accept the dominance of spirit, it would not be established that nature is spirit in disguise. It is always permissible to hold that just as the body is partially amenable to mental control and yet the body and the soul make the only kind of reality we know, so also the physical and the mental are both real aspects and that the physical world is no less real than the soul. This would lead to some sort of panpsychism or animism or parallelism—only that it would not be possible for us to say definitely how far the mental aspect controls the physical and in fact if there is any causal relation between the two at all. If the analogy of the human body is to be pressed to its utmost limits, we shall have to believe that just as some bodily actions are guided and controlled by the mind while there are others that are only imperfectly so and others still which are totally beyond mental control, so also the physical world can only be imperfectly brought within the dominance of the spirit and there are realms which no spirituality would ever govern in a perfect fashion. We may in fact go so far as to admit that the area of mental control would be increased in nature as it is in the body by suitable culture ; but we may still hold that there would always be a residue which would tantalise the spirit and make its efforts unending. In fact, on close analysis it would be found that the anxiety of Idealism to bring nature within spirit rests on two grounds. The one is the knowability of the physical world ; and regarding this it is held that knowledge is a relation which can hold only between commensurable entities—an assumption for which there is only a doubtful justification. This epistemological ground, made familiar to us since the time of Fichte and Schelling, provides a shaky foundation for the spirituality of nature : thoughts provide the medium through which we may reach out to spirits as well as to things. The second ground is the growing rationality of the world and its subservience of spiritual ends. We have seen

that this too is a doubtful support and does not prevent the assumption of a physical world. The real basis of our faith in the spirituality of the physical world is the necessity of assuming that our endeavours to better the world are not useless and that the world will conserve and enhance the values that spirits are creating. But even this faith is maintainable only because we ignore the cases where just the opposite is happening, out of an irrepressible optimism without which life would be an intolerable burden.

V.

Our main conclusion, therefore, is this that Nature cannot be what any one of the three types of Idealism we have discussed above thinks it to be. It is neither an idea in the mind nor itself spiritual nor amenable wholly to spiritual control. It is opposed to spirit in many ways although it is also associated with it at many points. The ultimate conjunction of Mind and Body is a mystery which refuses to be dispelled by the curious enquiry of man who himself embodied in his own constitution this mysterious combination. The aspect of materiality is just as real as that of spirituality and any attempt to whittle down the first aspect lands us in difficulties and contradictions. We may not be able to arrive at any finality regarding the ultimate nature of Matter just as we are far from knowing the ultimate nature of Mind ; but no advance of human knowledge makes the assumption of the physical world superfluous. We shall not discuss how this world is known, whether directly or indirectly ; but, howsoever known, it is always distinguished from mind and its laws of behaviour are not uniform with those of the latter. A world extended in space and composed of units related externally can hardly be reduced to a spiritual world perfectly organised or advancing with unerring precision towards a spiritual goal, even when it is partially subject to the influence of mind. Our final

conclusion would then be that Idealism in all its forms has failed to do justice to the proper nature of the physical world and its independence of the mental aspect of reality. The duality of Mind and Matter, if not their dualism, is a position beyond which it is not possible to go so far as the knowledge of man is concerned and it is with man that we have to deal in philosophical speculations if we are not to find ourselves in the cloud-land of fancy.

Idealism and the Physical Word.—ii.

By

G. R. MALKANI.

By idealism I understand the view according to which spirit alone is real. Idealism thus defined can still take many forms. But I am not concerned with those forms. By spirit I understand "any intelligent entity that is indeed capable of knowing other entities, if any such exist in fact or otherwise, but is not itself known." We all know this spirit in our own individual selves. Our self is capable of knowing everything beside itself, but is not properly itself known. Anything that is spirit must be fundamentally of this nature. I shall not here consider the question whether there is any real spirit at all, nor the question whether, if any exist, that spirit is one or many. I shall take for granted that some spirit does exist in the sense above indicated. Whenever and wherever anything is known. there is an entity that knows, and this entity cannot properly be the object of knowledge of some other entity. If it is known at all, it is in some sense known by itself or self-known. We shall have therefore to deny all knowledge, if we want to deny the reality of spirit. But then there will be no problem to solve.

The notion of the physical world may be differently interpreted by the scientists, the philosophers and the man in the street. But I shall define it in the same unequivocal way in which I have defined the notion of spirit. That which is capable of having contact with our sense-organs and can thereby be rendered sensible to ourselves is physical. The ultimate constituents of matter indeed, if any exist, can never be rendered sensible. But they are necessarily imagined as parts of what is sensible. They are thus not wholly unrelated to our sensibility. The physical world thus defined may have

certain essential properties or what are called the primary qualities of matter ; but these properties are either themselves sensibly known, or they are implied by what is thus known.

It is not difficult to see, if these definitions are accepted, that spirit cannot be physical, nor that which is physical be itself spiritual. But these two terms do not seem to exhaust all reality. We have provided no room for the mental world, or the world of ideas, feelings, volitions, etc. They appear to be neither physical, nor spiritual, according to our definitions of these terms. In fact, the mental world is neither purely spiritual nor purely physical. It stands in a peculiar kind of relation to both these kinds of entities. The mental world is not a static world of entities that are simply there. It has in a certain sense the fluidity of the spirit. It is a world of acts rather than of facts. In order, for example, to have an image, I must imagine. In order to have knowledge of x , I must know x . Similarly about other facts of mental life. What I later introspect into are more or less accomplished facts rather than real processes of the spirit. I can never introspect into the living spirit or the pure act. But all will be more or less agreed upon one thing. The mental world which I introspect into has a necessary relation of dependence upon the spirit. As I imagine, so is the image ; as I think, so is the thought ; as I will, so is the volition, etc. That however is not all. There is also a relation of dependence upon the physical world. I do not merely know, but know something. I do not merely will, but will to have something changed in my physical environment. Thus every mental act has a more or less distant relation to physicality. The mental world is in this way interposed between matter and spirit.

Now the kind of question which we might raise here and discuss may be : Is the physical world an idea in the mind ? If that is the question, the answer is plain. It is absurd to think that what is physical in our sense of the term is some-

thing in the mind or that it is mental in our sense of that term. But the matter is not so very simple. We have distinguished the mental from the physical. But if our perception of the physical world is mental, can the perception have a different kind of reality altogether? It might be supposed that this is possible. In that case, we shall be led to certain epistemological problems of a difficult nature. We shall however take for granted here that it is possible to know a world that is entirely distinct from the spirit, a world that is essentially unintelligent or physical. The question which we shall raise is, have we the same assurance of the reality of this world as we have of the reality of the spirit? And if we have not, is a fundamental dualism ultimately warranted?

I said that we cannot doubt the reality of the spirit unless we doubt all knowledge. But that we cannot possibly do. Also we know the spirit directly in our own self. There is nothing to mediate between it and our intuition of it. In fact it would be wrong to speak of an intuition of the self. The self is this intuition, and not some kind of object on which the intuition can be said to have a resting-place. We therefore properly speak the self, not speak of it. The self is thus absolutely certain. We can make no problem as to its reality. We can make a problem as to the reality of something that is at least a thought-content. The self is no such content. It is beyond thought. The reality of the self is thus not distinct from what may be called its intuition.

Can we now be said to have the same certainty as to the reality of the physical world? Indeed we are said to know this world quite directly and immediately in sense-awareness. But this is not literally true. Our sense-awareness is awareness that is mediated. The senses and other physical conditions play their part. Then there are subjective factors. Altogether we have no direct intuition of any object. In fact, however direct our perception of a thing may be, we cannot really be

said to know it as it is. Our senses are not reliable instruments of knowledge. They are often known to err. Consequently doubt and error can never be eliminated from our perception of things. Thus the physical object, unlike the spirit, is certainly suspect. Our knowledge of it is neither immediate nor certain.

This sets a problem. We may indeed, like Kant, argue that after all what we know is not the thing-in-itself, but a certain object which is in the main our own construct. The reality as it is in itself is for ever unknowable. We may try to shake ourselves free from this agnosticism in various ways. We may suppose, for example, that nature is the objective counterpart of thought, and that this renders possible the knowledge of things as they are. Or again that nature is a system of signs through which the ideas in the mind of God are communicated by an undeceiving God to the human spirit. Lastly, we may suppose, as most realistic thinkers do, that we have in the system of empirical checks all that is needed to eliminate error in perception and make it true to the thing. But all these explanations seeking to validate our knowledge of things suffer from a common error. They seek to justify our knowledge of physical nature on grounds other than the ground of sense-perception itself. If however our only means of knowing what is physical is this perception, we must enter into a thorough analysis of it as a source of knowledge. This analysis reveals that perception is not a reliable means of knowledge, and that we cannot be said to know through it the thing as it is.

The independent existence of the object cannot be proved on the strength of our perception of it. Is the mental world in a different position? Has it a noumenal as against a phenomenal existence? That too is questionable. We know facts of the mind in introspection. But so far as they are thus known, they have already ceased to be real and become

mere recreations of introspective thinking itself. What Kant called the inner sense may not be a real sense comparable to the outer senses. But it is a mode of apprehension which is, like our sensible perception, not at all direct. Mental facts are not present facts or given facts when they are introspectively known. They have thus only a ghostly existence. What is important to note is that both in the case of physical nature and of mental life, there is no direct intuition of *the* thing. There is no meeting face to face or seeing pure and simple. Accordingly, the being of the thing falls asunder from the being as known to us. It is only in our self that being completely coincides with the knowledge of being, and there is no room left for error or doubt. We claim that it is the reality of the pure spirit alone that is absolutely certain.

It might here be argued that we cannot doubt the reality of other spirits. Our knowledge of them is quite certain. And if it is so, can we really deny the reality of physical nature either? For after all we know other spirits only as they confront us in their bodies which are an integral part of their being to us. Now it is not necessary for me to deny, for the present argument, the existence of other spirits. If other spirits exist, they all will still constitute a group of spirits, and idealism in my sense of the term would be proved. But I certainly deny that they are known to us through inference, or from the physical movements of what are called their bodies. The only spirit that may be said to be directly intuited by me is my own self. This is neither perceived nor inferred. It is not known through any ordinary means of knowledge. It is in a sense not known at all. How can I know other spirits through means of knowledge which are appropriate only to physical objects? If I know other spirits at all, I know them immediately; and it is because of this knowledge, that I *proceed to interpret* certain physical movements as intelligent behaviour. But if that is so, the admission of the reality

of other spirits does not entail the reality of the physical world. We have not proved that something exists which is not spirit.

It might be said that our conclusion is not justified. Even if our argument is entirely correct, all that we can conclude from it is that the object of sense-awareness is not as it appears to us to be. We cannot say that it is nothing,—not even that it is without any sensible qualities whatever. It is certainly something, and it certainly can act upon our sense-organs and produce perception of sensible qualities which have the real thing as their only possible ground.

Now if this real something or the thing-in-itself is needed to account for the possibility of perception, the assumption is quite gratuitous. We cannot analyse our perception into non-perceived elements, and then suppose that it is produced out of them. As a matter of fact, causality is a postulate of the sciences, and its only legitimate use is to connect one sense-content with another. It cannot account for the production of this content. For after all, what would be the nature of that from which all perceivable characteristics are abstracted? It would have no knowable or thinkable nature. It would be as good as nothing. It cannot cause anything or account for anything. But if it can act upon our sense-organs, it must be, for that very reason, already a sensible.

It would be more plausible therefore to argue that what we call physical reality is in fact sensible, and that our perception of it is an ordinary scientific problem. The perception of this reality is possible, and it is also possible that there might be error in our perception of it. This however is no reason for supposing that there can be no true perception. It is only a matter of empirical detail to find out which perception is true.

All this may be admitted. But evidently the question *what* constitutes my perception true, is not a matter of empiri-

cal detail. There must be a principle by which we can distinguish a true perception from one that is false and that principle must be shown to be capable of application at least in one instance. If the principle is not capable of application even in a single instance, it belongs to the realm of arbitrary theorisation and not to the realm of logic or of factual thinking. Now the only principle which we can think of in this case is that my perception of a thing should correspond to the thing, or that I should know objective reality as it is. But this is just the principle which is incapable of application even in a single instance. Whatever instance one might quote would be just the instance where the principle can be disputed ; for objective reality is not known to us otherwise than in a given perception of it. On the otherhand, there would be common agreement that our perception is positively erroneous in certain well-established instances, the rope snake etc. It is therefore no question of mere empirical detail. It is a question primarily of logic, with which is bound up the question of ultimate reality itself. We cannot therefore regard it as a valid conclusion that the object of our perception can be real, or that it is in itself sensible and can be known truly by us in sense-awareness.

Let us however take for granted that we can know the real itself in perception. But the question can still be raised,—is this something that is real non-spiritual ? Thinkers are not wanting who have argued that matter itself is constituted of monads or centres of spiritual experience, and that there is nothing beside spirit or spirits anywhere. Leibnitz, James Ward and McTaggart are instances in point. Their argument may be true or false. But whatever plausibility that argument has, is derived principally from the fact that we have no direct intuition of the *being* of anything except our own self; and that therefore what appears as soul-less matter can well have a soul and constitute a group of spirits in a universe of spirits.

In fact we cannot well have an idea of any kind of being that is essentially different from our own, or that is not-spirit. The primitive man was by nature anthropomorphic. We have outgrown his anthropomorphism in outer form. But we simply cannot get rid of that secret anthropomorphism according to which we can only conceive of any other kind of being on the analogy of our own. Just only try to think how any kind of being that is different from ours would feel like. I think it would only feel as our own being feels. We have no two intuitions of being, one proper to the spirit and the other proper to the not-spirit. Spirit and not-spirit are only distinguished through certain characteristics. Spirit is characterised, we say, by thinking, feeling, etc. Not-spirit is characterised by "being thought, known etc." So far as the intuition of being is concerned, it is exhausted by the intuition of being a self. Or what is the same thing, we know only one kind of being, and that is spirit.

This argument may not be regarded as very convincing however. It may be argued that although matter may be spiritual in a sense, we cannot altogether deny that it is also in some sense mere matter, or something that is non-spiritual in character. What we know in sense-awareness quite certainly lacks the quality of being spirit. We never know spirit in that way. We have no sensible intuition of our own self. It never confronts us as something that is there, out in space. We must therefore suppose that what confronts us in perception is really physical or non-spiritual, and that it knows neither itself nor anything beside itself. But the question is, how is this contention to be itself validated? It may be that whatever we know as being material may, if it has an existence of its own, exercise certain spiritual powers. If I am an existent, and you are an existent, we both can, as embodied, exercise spiritual powers. I do not intuit your spirituality, nor you mine; and yet we think that both yourself and

myself are equally spirits. The same reasoning can, without any serious difficulty, be extended to what we call matter, and we shall see that there is no proof that matter may not be spirit. We can only be said to prove the non-spirituality of matter, if we make one hypothesis. This hypothesis is that the something which we perceive is not to be considered as an existent (in which case it might quite possibly be spiritual in character and exercise spiritual function), but simply as something which is perceived and having its essential character exhausted in being perceived; or in other words, what is perceived is for that reason alone not spirit. But this argument which proves something that is not spirit also proves that this something is not an existent, and that its *esse consists in its percipi*. But evidently such an entity which does not exist but is merely perceived is what we call an illusory appearance. Our argument for the reality of matter has turned out to be an argument against its materiality, and so against its real existence as matter.

It might now be argued that "knownness" itself is a quality that can only belong to an existent. We do not say that known-ness belongs to a thing that is not, but only to a thing that is. If then known-ness belongs to matter, matter must be supposed to exist. It is however clear that whatever we perceive, we simply perceive. We do not perceive it either as existing or as non-existing. If we did, we should never *fall in error* as we say. From the mere fact of perceiving an object we cannot deduce the fact of its being. Or what is the same thing, known-ness does not contain in itself any implication of reality. A thing which does not exist can be known or perceived; and there is not one single instance where it can be said to have been proved that what is perceived is as it is perceived to be.

Our conclusion is that the spirit alone is absolutely real. Anything beside it can at best be claimed to have a doubtful

existence. But we cannot really stop with the doubt. The evidence for the reality of matter is found on analysis to provide us with just the proof for the non-reality of matter. The physical world with all its order and regularity is from a truly rational point of view an unreal appearance. The only reality is the spirit. Idealism in our sense of the term is the only possible theory that can give a consistent view of the facts of our experience taken as or whole.

Idealism and The Physical World—III.

By

J. K. CHAKRAVARTY.

It is a matter of great gratification that we are called upon to open investigations to-day on a topic of first rate importance for philosophy. The problem of the physical world has all along proved to be a stumbling block to generations of thinkers. Simple common sense realism with its naive acceptance of the world on one side, and speculative idealism with its repudiation of the world on the other, alike foundered on this rock. The wonderful successes of the physical sciences induced men once again to believe in the existence of a world apart from and independent of mind, to the stuff of which is usually given the name of matter. So both by our animal faith as well as by what the sciences tell us we are driven to assume that a physical world exists, and it becomes exceedingly difficult for us, in this frame of mind, to accede to the doctrine of idealism that nothing but 'thinking entities exist.'

In fact for the last quarter of a century idealism had been considerably discredited owing to its tone of indifference to external nature. 'Its philosophy of nature has, from the first, been somewhat of a scandal.' If there is to be a resurrection of idealistic philosophies for which times are pressing so much, it is necessary that the fundamental conceptions of idealism be brought in line with the teachings of modern science regarding the stuff of the external world. What is required of the idealistic philosopher is that he should be serious with the problem of matter and estimate the place it holds in his conception of reality.

Such a task is far from easy to accomplish. There are difficulties, in the first place, as to the meaning of matter.

To this we may add the difficulty that the idealists are not all of one mind. There are included, in the camp of the idealist, the sceptic and the dogmatist, the empiricist and the rationalist, the immanentist and the transcendentalist. In view of such conflicting differences it becomes exceedingly hard to summarise their definite attitude towards matter.

The central position of idealism is embodied in the proposition that 'ultimate reality is mental in structure and matter is a delusion.' But this idea has found expression in other ways as well, such as, 'nothing but thinking entities exist,' 'the universe is spiritual.' Sometimes it also refers to the doctrine that recognises ideas as the only reality.

Setting aside all these views I will confine myself principally to three different varieties.

In the first place I speak of the Berkeleyan type which is responsible for having enunciated and given currency to the well known doctrine : 'Esse is percipi.' The implication of the formula is matter of common knowledge. According to it the entire physical world is resolved into ideas or contents of perception of individual minds. Whatever is not perceived by me, *i. e.*, felt as states of my own consciousness has no reality. Felt ideas alone have reality. To this an exception was made in the case of the individual soul and God. Neither the soul nor God is perceived as an idea. They are active spirits and capable of perceiving ideas, but are not themselves perceived. My self is real and along with this I accept as real all that my self perceives. But this position is immediately beset with the difficulty that I am sometimes obliged to accept as real the experiences of my dream-states and hallucinations on the score that they are experienced ; and sometimes I am forced to disown the existence of the solid extended things of the world simply because I fail to perceive them. Even admitting that the whole physical world is dependent on mind it is

extremely unreasonable to hold that it depends on my individual mind. Berkeley was aware of this and sought to remedy it by bringing in God and resolving the whole physical world into ideas of the divine mind. God's eternal act of perceiving sustains the world and uses it as a medium to let in his system of ideas appear in fragments in our consciousness. I do not enter, here into the merits of Berkeleyan philosophy, but whatever remedies he might suggest, the central doctrine remains unshaken, viz. that 'whatever makes any piece of fact real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience.'

Mention may be made, in the next place, of a new movement of thought, known as personal idealism, very much resembling the Berkeleyan type, yet differing largely from it in its ultra-nihilistic metaphysical outlook. Along with matter it denounces the substantial reality of spirit as well, and holds up in their place an unbroken continuity of an everflowing world of pure experience. Out of this world of pure experience there crops up, through selective interest, a local centre of subjectivity. This selective interest in its evershifting career, rears up a world of objects of diverse forms and names. The so-called material world is the temporary creation of such fluctuations of biocentric interests. It is idle to demand of such a philosophy what account it offers of matter. For according to it there is no substantial reality, spirit or matter, to which philosophy should cling.

Strangely enough, there is a desire to emphasise the reality and importance of individual subjects, notwithstanding the fact that none of them have any abiding reality over against the flow of cosmic experience. Borne in upon the tide of an ever-moving historic process they typify so many biological centres of interests and pathos, and under their impulsion initiate a career of choice and movement. The flux of the

environment is, through their active movement, transformed for the time into fulness of reals. This is what the personal idealists have to say about the concept of reality. Anything that functions towards the fulfilment of their felt interests figures as real for the occasion. Thus in the scheme of this philosophy all truth and reality are of subjective origin.

But there is a type of Idealism representing the classical tradition in philosophy that stands apart from the varieties of idealism enumerated above in that it proceeds with an unshaken faith in ultimate reality. It holds firmly to the doctrine that beyond and behind the temporal succession of things and events there is an everlasting reality that lends to the objects of our experience the seeming reality that they have. The personal idealists are content with the temporal flux and spend no thought over the question of the eternal. The classical idealists, on the contrary, are concerned primarily with the *eternal* and defines philosophy's principal function as determination of the nature of this everlasting reality. By the method of pure rational speculation philosophy builds a system of conceptions about the ultimate reality of the universe and declares it to be an all inclusive whole, so that it embraces and comprehends within its system all parts and phases of existence in such a manner that none of them can be resolved into the other, each element implying and being implied by the other. Such a conception turns decidedly in favour of monism and rigorously excludes dualistic and pluralistic suppositions. For although it is not opposed to the reality of the separate elements of experience it can never put up with their separate reality. The inmost meaning of reality is found in the idea of totality, so that whatever elements of experience we feel disposed to treat as real derive their reality from participation in the whole. The whole is organically related to the parts and the parts receive their fulfilments in the whole.

Much confusion arose from the attempt to treat the different elements of experience as having independent existence of their own without any connection with one another or with the whole. In such a philosophy the concept of reality loses all intelligible meaning and is resolved into a number of meaningless entities that are not guided by reason but merely exist as brute facts.

Idealism is distressed at the thought that existence should be resolved into a number of irrational entities. It is difficult to put up with such a doctrine that lands us in a cheerless world of chance elements drifting aimlessly without reason or purpose. It offers in its place a philosophy of faith, hope and promise. It brings into prominence the idea of reason and purpose as the constitutive principle of reality. Everything that is, is because of some reason. The universe is through and through rational, and the reason of the whole expresses itself in the reason of the parts and the reason of the parts finds completion in the reason of the whole.

The central feature of classical idealism lies in the identification of reason and reality. From this follow the three cardinal principles of idealism, viz.(1). that all reality is spiritual which means that 'the things we ordinarily call real are very much unlike what they appear to us to be.' In outward appearance they are characterised by extension, separateness, hardness and inertia. That is their wrong view. In truth they are all bound together by reason in one common life of realising a unified purpose. In the second place, we are introduced to a distinction between appearance and reality. The world of appearance is the scene of manyness and separation,—the realm of untruth and deception, whereas the world of reality is an all-inclusive unified totality, without gaps or divisions. From this we pass on to the third point which is mainly epistemological. There are several strands of this epistemological position. Of these we emphasise the cult that

identifies knowledge and reality. The popular belief in the existence of being independent of knowing is turned down, and in its place we are asked to accept the essential dependence of being upon knowing. If reality has no being apart from knowing it follows necessarily that all reality is cognitive which means that it must be mental.

Idealism is thus decidedly opposed to the accepting of the independent existence of the physical world that may yet be a matter of sense-perception. The world of our daily acquaintance which provides the field of action is either wholly ignored or treated as mere appearance. As appearance it is infected with every manner of inconsistencies and contradictions and thus cut off from the world of reality altogether. If however it is allowed to retain its connections in any way with reality it does so not as pure unthinking matter, but by reason of certain properties that justify its characterisation as more akin to spirit.

A twofold task now awaits us. On the one hand we have to study and examine the current conceptions of matter as the stuff of the physical world and see how far they tally with an idealistic metaphysic, and on the other hand we have to call to mind the various phases of the idealistic cult to ascertain which of them, if any, accommodates itself with the truth about matter.

Theorising about matter has been a fascinating game with modern science. The central drift of these speculations may be embodied in three distinct assertions: There is the initial supposition that the existence and structure of the world cannot be wholly reduced to events of the mental order. The world is neither mental nor mind-dependent. In the next place, it is assumed that the elements entering into the constitution of the world are not marked by any intrinsic qualitative differences. The only marks of distinction they possess are occasioned by the relations of space and time in which they

occur. And so in the third place, among the ultimate principles we have to reckon with space, time and a number of primary simples.

Science proceeds to investigate the nature of these reals under the name of Time, Space and Matter. Herein we are confronted by a great divergence of views. For all the natural sciences are not on the same level. At one end of the scale we have astronomy and physics and at the other we have psychology. Between these appear the biological sciences, owing allegiance sometimes to physics and sometimes to psychology. Astronomy accepted the principle of mechanism and sought thereby to guide Biology. But the incident of life proved intractable. And the advance of psychology together with the exposure of the mechanistic cult moved biology to give up the deterministic point of view and turn over to vitalism. Nor does physics show any thoroughgoing agreement with astronomy. Astronomy gave the lead to physics in its mechanistic outlook, but while astronomy began with time, space, and matter as three distinct entities, physics went beyond this original position. The first noticeable change physics introduced is in the direction of refining upon the astronomical conception of matter. Astronomy remained content with the picture of matter as made up of small bodies sensible to vision. But physics reduced these bodies to smaller units, atoms and molecules, not perceptible to the senses. The process of decomposition was carried on to a further stage until atoms were reduced to electrons and protons. It is risky for a layman like myself to discuss the subtle intricacies of these scientific theories. But one thing stands out prominent. With the conceptions of electrons and protons the traditional pictorial conception of matter as made up of a number of hard, inert, static and immobile particles was being abandoned. We have in its place the dynamic view that regards matter as centres of electric energy.

From another direction also owing to the growing prominence of the principle of Relativity physics was changing its character and the conception of matter was undergoing radical transformation. Originally matter was thought to be something that could be touched. In this respect it seemed to be thoroughly concrete. But in proportion as physics attained eminence it tended to move away from its concrete standpoint. The popular notions of matter as something extended and of space and time as existing separately, each in its own way, do no longer hold. The principle of relativity has thoroughly upset these notions and introduced in their place the notion of space-time as a single continuum—a four dimensional curvature into which objects are resolved. The space-time of relativity is thus very far removed from the space and time of unscientific experience. I do not pretend having understood the implications of these theories. But there is one thing of which we may be sure. In investigating the nature of the reals modern physics finds itself busy with certain conceptions to which the world of our sensible experience bears no analogue, so that when the physicist talks of matter he is thinking of something far less material than anything which affects us through the senses.

In this process of dematerialisation modern physics is moving towards the teachings of empirical psychology of perception which resolves the objects of the world into contents of a perceiving mind.

From two directions, physics on one side and psychology on the other, we are now furnished with results to which a brief reference is needed. Physics reduces the whole physical world to certain entities that have none of the qualities of hardness, or rigidity characteristic of material objects. To the physicist's eye the real world is without smell, colour, extension and hardness etc. It is arbitrary, if rigidity and hardness are thus blown away, to characterise that world as material. If to

this we add what the psychologist has to say we may venture into the supposition that the whole physical world is of the nature of ideas and has its being dependent upon an experiencing mind.

But such an offhand alliance between physics and psychology is far from excusable. The physicist's world, though not made of anything like sensible matter, is not on that score held to be wholly dependent on mind. On the other hand the psychologist's world, although declared to be wholly mind-dependent, is felt to be very much like sensible matter, full of taste, smell, hardness etc. The physicist's real world is a world of non-sensible entities, existing in their own right, and determinable by logico-mathematical analysis. With such a world the psychologist has no acquaintance. On the contrary, the world which, in spite of its mind-dependent nature, is so very real to the psychologist is in the opinion of the physicist a mere passing show, a deceptive appearance to which unscientific minds, through prejudice, cling.

It is now clear that with regard to the problem of the physical world there is no common ground covered by physics and psychology. To the psychologist our question is whether it is correct to say that the objects of perception are wholly mind-dependent. Is perception a mere beholding of the contents of one's consciousness? May we not assume that the objects of perception have an extra-mental character? Do they not exist and continue to exist even when we are not perceiving them? On the other hand to the physicist our query is whether the world of logico-mathematic entities to which he drives is not after all an artificial, abstract scheme got up by paring away the fulness of qualities of the more concrete world of our daily acquaintance.

To the physicist the problem is not difficult to connect the world of abstract logical entities with the world of common-sense belief. It is from the data gathered from the world

of our daily acquaintance that science proceeds towards the formulation of the laws of its occurrences. And the system of entities which it invokes is nothing but a scheme of shorthand symbols for purposes of easy reckoning. How far such a scheme is true or false is again verified by facts of perception. It is evident therefore that the physicist with all his apparatus for high-flown abstractions never loses his foothold of the concrete world of touch and vision.

But it is not so easy to convince the psychologist that the world he perceives has an independent existence of its own. Analysis of perception induces him to resolve the entire world of objects into modes of his own consciousness, and the inevitable outcome is solipsism. To the solipsist perception involves a relation between an act (of a perceiving mind) and its content. But certain characteristics of the perceived content,—its aggressiveness and contingency,—oblige him to surrender the purely solipsistic position, and to assume the existence of something beyond what he perceives.

But with regard to this my only observation is that if perception be defined as beholding the contents of one's consciousness there is no legitimate pathway from these contents to outside objects. The supposition must be no more than a mere conjecture. It occurred to some to appeal to God's veracity as a guarantee for the objective foundation of their perceptions. But such an appeal has no force unless starting with contents of our consciousness we find some way to justify our belief in God's existence. The traditional ontological argument is expected to fulfil this need. But the argument breaks down. The difficulty is that if we proceed with an initial supposition of a separation between thought and reality there is no way of restoring that connection. Nevertheless the belief that there is an objective foundation of our ideas swayed men's minds. It

is significant in one way. It argues in favour of the possibility that something really exists outside and we have means of ascertaining it. If this belief is to be rendered philosophically justifiable we must either assume some mode of awareness : direct and immediate and yet not perceptual in character, or define perception in a realistic style.

With the realist the problem of perception does not present much difficulty. It is an immediate apprehension of an object so that on analysis perception is found to involve a relation between an act of a perceiving mind and an object, without any intermediate content to stand between the act and the object. The admission of the content is the result of sophisticated thinking and is responsible for many vexed insoluble problems in philosophy. It presupposes a certain degree of the power of introspection and reflective thinking to be aware of the presence of ideas, but there is little preparation needed to perceive that an object is situated there in space.

The position is simple and in line with common sense belief, but simplicity in no test of truth. The possibility of dreams and hallucinations in which we have perceptions of objects that in fact do not exist has, many think, punctured the realistic theory of perception so that it is no longer accurate to hold that whenever we have perceptions there must be some objects existing independently of us. Without referring to the various other improvements on the realistic theory of perception I propose to canalise the discussion on the following points :

Does perception necessarily involve the act of a perceiving mind ? If we retain the act we cannot possibly exclude the content. But the admission of the content forces on us the cult of subjectivism from which neither the ontological argument nor the theory of representationism will offer any way of escape. If on the contrary, we eliminate the act and

interpret perception as the outcome of certain manner of interconnections among objects that will not only come in conflict with the self-evidencing certainty of our self, but also necessitate a highly complicated theory of perception. Whichever line we choose our difficulty is insoluble. To me it seems there is no wisdom in appealing to perception as evidence for our belief in something outside our mind. 'The question requiring to be asked,' as Moore suggests, is not : What reason have we for supposing that anything exists corresponding to our sensations ? but : what reason have we for supposing that material things do not exist since their existence has precisely the same evidence as that of our sensations.

The belief that there is a world of shapely, coloured and extended things moving in space and existing independently of myself and my perceptions, is widespread and deep-seated. Hardly does any one hold that he and his thoughts are the only realities and the existence of other minds and things is a mere dream or streams of ideas and impressions in his mind. Assuming that there is unshaken belief in the physical world there are two distinct questions that have to be asked.

- I. In what manner should we characterise this world ? Is there any sense in which it may be treated as mental ?
2. Is it possible to offer any philosophical justification for this belief in the existence of the external world ?

I intend to proceed with the second question first. It was in fashion to refer to the evidence of perception in support of this almost universal belief. But the evidence of perception, we have seen, is far from conclusive. It may be turned to either direction, to support realism as much as mentalism. The belief in the existence of the physical world is an original asset of our life. We start our career with this belief and all that we do or know is the outcome of this belief. Speaking philosophically we may say that the belief is implicit in the

very possibility of consciousness. Consciousness is, in truth, the meeting point of twofold awareness—on the one side of the self, and on the other of the world. Any one who tries to resolve the one into the other is inviting troubles on himself.

In their eagerness to ascertain in greater detail the characteristics of the world some have gone over to science and philosophy. But in return they were sadly disappointed. The truth is, it is not so much from the theoretical craving for knowledge as from the practical interest of doing and suffering that we get to learn more about this world. Our real guide in this respect are the various arts, the outcome of human interest, will and pathos, and not the sciences.

Science is without passion, without interest. It accepts the given world as a finished fact and has no concern to see it otherwise than what it is. In the effort to have an understanding of the world it proceeds to pull it to pieces. But the outcome of this process of analysis is that the full-blooded world is destroyed into dead fragments. Real insight is born, as the great sage Bergson puts it, out of living sympathy with the thing, not by anatomising it into pieces. But it is difficult to cultivate that living sympathy which leads us straight into the heart of the thing unless one approaches it in the spirit of an artist with a will to raise it to its maximum value.

The artist's mind is in love with the world. His heart abounds in active sympathy for its affairs. It torments him if he is ever obliged to accept the world as a finished given entity. His loving sympathetic heart forbids. It spurs him on to throw himself full into the current of the world so that he may put there all the beauty and excellence of which he is capable. To the artist therefore the world is never a given fact. It is rather a symbol of potentiality. There is limitless

possibility of development in every direction. It may assume newer forms and grow into finer qualitative gradations.

In this task of refining upon the world the artist does not stand alone. There are other agencies in the field of agriculture, commerce, industries and politics as well. Through the ever active will and effort of these workers the physical world is changing its appearance every moment, so that it is not by looking at the world as it stands to-day but by the thought of what it will grow into to-morrow that one may get to learn what sort of thing the world is in which we live. There is in the world a blending of what it is along with what it may grow to be. More than our perceptions we have to reckon with our hopes and anticipations if we seek to have an insight of the world.

Yet it is not merely the willing spirit of love and sympathy that wholly accounts for the progressive expansion of the world. Merely to cherish a dream of a better world is not to have it in actuality. The artist dreams of a finer world not yet realised. It is this dream that sets spark to his will, but the concrete actualisation of his dream involves a technique that has connection with the existing world and the laws to which it yields. In this respect we cannot too strongly emphasise the value of what the positive sciences disclose about the nature of the given world.

On the speculative side of science we are too apt to get confused. But in the practical application science never departs from the supposition of a real world moving in conformity to a uniform system of laws. Yet it never accepts this world as all in all. There is always the hope that in thousand and one directions it admits of transformations. Of late these changes have so far refashioned the world through the power of steam, electricity, the inventions of the airship and the wireless that

one feels a positive certainty that the given world is not even a tiny fraction of what the world may turn out to be. Nevertheless this evergrowing world is realised and realisable through rigid fidelity and unsparing devotion to the laws and ways of the actual world as it exists today.

If it be that in the progressive enrichment of the world there are revealed newer characteristics obeying a subtler system of laws that will never imply any break with the actually existing world. Our present-day world will never prove an unreality, cast aside by the dream-world of the artist's mind. The positive world will ever continue to be the concrete field of action and the inspiring force for every manner of transformation that is yet to be. To disown the actual physical world is to ignore the basic foundation of the vast achievements of commerce, industries and arts. And on the other hand to stand by the actual world alone,—deeply engrossed with what it presents is to lose the force of that ennobling faith in will and action that makes for progress.

The conclusions reached thus far may be briefly put thus : there is a real physical world. It cannot be resolved into a mere dream or an idea of individual percipient mind. There is a uniform system of laws to which it yields. By assiduous investigation we may hope to discover them. Thus far the world is a given factual entity.

But above and beyond this given world there extends the floating world of possibilities—the world of dreams and ideals. The entire history of mankind is a record of the strenuous struggles by which, in the various spheres of commercial and artistic activities he sought to remould this world in the line of his cherished dreams.

It may be well worth considering whether the physical world as characterised above fits in with the tenets of idealism.

Or should we renounce idealism in favour of some other metaphysical creed ?

Idealism embraces a number of propositions, with some of these the physical world may not agree. I do not maintain, e.g. that the world has no intrinsic existence but derives its being from the fact of its being known. In my opinion reality cannot be wholly resolved into modes of cognition. At the same time there is no inherent limitations of the knowing power such as would preclude the possibility of knowing reality. Nor does it follow that in order to be known the object must be transformed into something mental. From the viewpoint of knowledge the world may be said to be non-mental, but has affinity with mind. This affinity deepens in the domain of the arts and industries. The most remarkable thing illustrated there is the readiness with which the physical world yields to the discipline of mind. In some cases this pliability of matter reaches a high degree of perfection so much so that the piece of matter is no longer viewed as matter but treated as a vehicle of spiritual message. A case in point is furnished by a relic.

Instances of such spiritualisation of matter are by no means rare. But we are not yet convinced that the only thing real is spirit. If the world yields to the will of the artist it is chiefly because he has in the first instance learned the art of disciplining his will by the laws of the world. The world submits to the will of the artist no doubt, but it also resists that will. Yet by self-discipline the spirit has the capacity to overcome the resistance of matter. In so far as the world serves spiritual ends we may declare in favour of idealism.

But the question whether the world in every detail conforms to spiritual ends cannot be answered so easily. If it be possible to trace out a meaning behind every incident and to connect these in such a fashion that each in its way is found to work in harmony with another so as to make for the fulfilment of one

comprehensive purpose that would be the clearest vindication of idealism. It would substantiate the monistic claim that the whole realm of existence with all the infinite diversity of contents is at bottom a unity, running to one purpose. We should have no more occasion to complain of confusion and chaos leading to frustration of contemplated ends.

But we cannot say that such disturbances do not at all occur. Empirically we are not warranted to rule out the element of chance altogether. Suspicions are aroused that the world may be a conglomeration of diverse elements driven by chance.

One yet feels, such suspicions are not wholesome. And the progressive expansion of knowledge together with the ever-growing mastery over Nature it has conferred on man deepens the assurance that the rule of chance and unreason is wholly superficial.

It is however in the life of man that we have the clearest evidence of the supremacy of spiritual power, of the triumph of reason over unreason. Man has a double function. He is a spirit lodged in a physical body. Through his body he is rooted in the world and is subject to blind fatalism. But in his spiritual life he is beyond the rule of fate. Where the spirit is awake the contingency of the cosmic events lose their threatening aspect. This is illustrated in the lives of saints and sages,—the most sublime achievements of human will. If the physical world surrenders to reason and spirit at one point may we not hope that it will yield at every other point ?

Yet it is nothing more than a faith. It seems idealism is justified more as a matter of faith than as a creed of theoretical metaphysic. It is on the question of faith that idealism leads us to the confines of religion in whose alliance it finds its undying strength and everlasting glory.

Verbal testimony as a source of valid cognition (Sabda as Pramāṇa,)

BY

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The words Śabda and Pramāṇa have been differently used in the different systems of Indian Philosophy. We shall endeavour here not to trace and compare those meanings, but take the liberty of understanding the words in their more general and important senses. By the title 'Śabda as Pramāṇa' I shall mean, therefore, 'verbal testimony as a source of valid cognition.' The substitution of this English title has got at least two advantages. First, it will liberate the problem from the limited atmosphere of Indian Philosophy which is treated by some as mystical and sacro-sanct and by others as exploded and antiquated and the problem will then appear in its universal significance as one fit to be discussed by all. Secondly, the substitution has the merit of narrowing down the problem to a limited but pointed and important issue that can be discussed thoroughly within the short span of a symposium. In view of these advantages, I hope, my partners will bear with me in the enunciation of the problem and the framing of issues.

In discussing this problem of testimony as a source of valid cognition, Indian thinkers discuss many other subsidiary problems such as the perception of words, the meanings of words, the construction and import of propositions, the solutions of which determine to a large extent the solution of the present problem. I have discussed these in some details elsewhere. But I propose to simplify the problem here, for the sake of brevity. I shall try to consider only how far, if at all, verbal testimony can be regarded as a source of valid cognition like perception and inference which are almost universally

admitted as such sources. I shall have to repeat here mostly the arguments used by me in a short paper read before the Benares Session of this Congress and subsequently published in *Mind*, July, 1927, because they contain almost all the chief arguments which I consider important on this matter. I shall only reinforce these arguments here by adding some more from a new point of view. It is necessary also to add that I shall use here the word knowledge for 'valid cognition', and 'testimony' for 'verbal testimony'.

I shall begin with the common western view of the matter and try to arrive by its criticism to my own conclusion. As is well known, Western logicians generally recognise only two sources of Knowledge; immediate and mediate, identifying 'immediate' with 'perceptual' and 'mediate' with 'inferential'. Testimony or authority is regarded by them as a kind of inferential knowledge, because, they hold, that belief in authority is caused by an inference about the trustworthiness of the authority.

The first question that has to be asked on this answer is: Is it a fact that belief in the words of a person is really caused through inference? A little reflection will show that the opposite is rather the case. Belief in one's statement does not wait to be established by inference. On the contrary, we believe implicitly in the truth of what we hear, unless we have positive grounds for doubt or disbelief. As a recent writer, Prof. Montague, says in his book on "*The ways of knowing*":—"Man is a suggestible animal and tends to believe what is said to him unless he has some positive reason for doubting the honesty or competence of his informant". It will be scarcely accurate to say, therefore, that belief in testimony is really caused or conditioned by inference.

But in spite of this objection, the original position may still be retained by modifying the answer a little. It may be

said, for instance, that man being a suggestible animal and lazy, too, by nature, believes as a rule unquestioningly in the statement of others. But as he is often misled by the statement of others and his belief turns out to be false, he should not believe in the statement of others without otherwise ascertaining its truth through a validating inference. In other words, mere psychological belief (as Russell would say) is not to be confused with logical certainty. True knowledge is that, the truth of which has been logically ascertained. And as the truth of a knowledge got through a testimony can be ascertained only by some other method of knowledge, such as inference or perception, testimony cannot be regarded as a source of true knowledge.

If the answer is formulated in this way, it is true that testimony can no longer be regarded as a source of knowledge. But such strictures, if applied to the case of testimony, have to be applied to other methods of knowledge, as well. And then neither perception nor inference can stand this test. For like testimony, both perception and inference sometimes turn out to be unreliable and belief in them proves to be false. If they also are not absolutely free from error, how can they be regarded as sources of knowledge? The truth of a perception may have to be ascertained through inference based on another perception or even testimony. I perceive a distant object to be a man. I may have doubts whether my perception is correct, seeing that at times it proves to be illusory. There may be two ways of ascertaining the truth of the perceptual knowledge. I may either go near the object and by perceiving it to be a man, infer the truth of my first perception from the second one. Or, I may learn from a man who has come from near the object that it is really a man and I may infer from his words that the knowledge I had through perception is true. And if testimony ceases to be a source of Knowledge because the truth of it has to be ascertained through inference, why

should not then even perception cease to be a source of knowledge, too? Like testimony, perception also becomes reduced to inference exactly for similar reasons.

Though many will readily support the preliminary arguments that were adduced to show that testimony is no source of knowledge, but is only a case of inference, still few will accept the logical conclusion of their arguments, namely, that perception also is a case of inference. The source of the trouble is, however, a confusion between two problems which have to be kept distinct. They are respectively :—

(1) How is the content of a knowledge obtained ?

(2) How is that content ascertained to be true ?

The first concerns knowledge of facts, the second the knowledge of validity. Some fact may be known from one source, but the knowledge that this knowledge is true may be obtained from quite a different source. In the above illustration of the perception of a distant object, the knowledge of the object is obtained through perception (whether mine or anybody else's) and inference is a help only to the ascertainment of validity ; it gives me the knowledge of the truth of my knowledge and says nothing about the object of the knowledge. So perception can still be regarded as the source of the knowledge of the object. Similar is the case with testimony. I learn from the words of a friend that he is glad. Through inference I may ascertain that—as he is truthful, his statement is true. But this inference does not say that he is glad, which information has to be gathered only from the words of the friend. So in spite of the validating inference, testimony remains the source of knowledge about facts.

It is clear, then, that the attempt to reduce testimony to inference is based on a confusion between the source of a knowledge and the source of the knowledge of the validity of that knowledge. And when this confusion is analysed and the two questions are kept apart, there is no choice but to admit

that testimony is a source of the knowledge of facts, though it may not be the source of the knowledge of validity.

But even though one may be forced, under the pressure of these arguments, to admit that testimony is a source of knowledge he may still hold that it cannot yet be considered to be quite on a par with perception or inference. Prof. Montague who, of all Western writers, is perhaps the only one who thinks it necessary to devote any space and attention to the neglected question of testimony, comes to the conclusion that though testimony is "as legitimate a source of knowledge as any other" it is neither ultimate nor independent. It is only a secondary source and it is legitimate in so far as it is "open to free and honest study" and its truth verifiable through some other method of knowledge. So it remains for us to consider the question of independence and ultimacy, in order that we may be able to say that testimony is a source of knowledge exactly in the same sense as perception or inference is.

Let us take up the question of independence first. There may be two plausible senses in which testimony can be said to be not independent. First, testimony as a source of knowledge may be likened to memory. Just as memory, though it is a method of knowledge, is not independently so, because it is only a repetition or reproduction of a knowledge that was already attained through perception or inference, similarly testimony also is not an independent source of knowledge, because it is only a repetition (in words) of the knowledge that was attained through perception or inference.

The plausibility of this argument rests on a confusion. Memory is a source of knowledge through some other source. So memory may be a repetition. Testimony is a source of knowledge not to the speaker himself who got that knowledge

already but to the hearer who had not that knowledge before. As the hearer is the person concerned here, for him, the knowledge obtained through testimony may not at all be a mere repetition but quite a new information. So testimony cannot be deprived of independence on these grounds.

There may be another sense in which testimony may be said to be dependent on other sources. In order that testimony may be a source of knowledge, the words of the speaker or the writer must be perceived and the truth of the knowledge ascertained through inference. So that testimony has to depend both on perception and inference and cannot, therefore be regarded as an independent source.

We have already considered the question of the dependence of testimony on inference and we have also found that even though testimony may have to depend on inference for ascertainment of truth or validity, so far as the information about facts is concerned, it is quite independent of any other method. The dependence of testimony on perception cannot be denied. But perception gives us only the knowledge of word sounds and nothing more. It tells us nothing about the facts known through testimony. Dependence of this kind is present even in perception and inference. Perception would have been impossible, it would remain a mere sensation—without the help of reproduction and intellectual synthesis. Inference would have been impossible, again, if the data were not supplied through perception or testimony or memory. And if in spite of these facts perception or inference can be regarded as an independent source of knowledge, there is no reason why testimony also should not be so regarded.

The fact is that what ordinarily appears to us to be a single piece of knowledge is not really a simple thing ; it is a complex process, the different elements of which may be

derived from different sources. So accuracy demands that every source be recognised as such and given its due. The whole piece of knowledge is named, in practice, after the source from which the element of knowledge, which is new and important to the knower in a particular context, is derived. In what we call the perception of a table, though the knowledge of the class concept may be obtained through memory, the new element of knowledge, namely, the particular object—which may be characterised as 'this', is derived from perception. So the whole knowledge is called a perception. So with inference as well. In the case of testimony also the words may be perceived, but the facts described by the words which alone are new and important to the knower are known through testimony. It is found, therefore, on all hands, that the claim of testimony to independence is not a whit less than that of either perception or inference. Testimony is independent in the only sense in which perception or inference may be called independent.

We come now to the question of ultimacy. Montague thinks that testimony cannot be regarded as an ultimate source of knowledge, first, because authorities often conflict and secondly, because, in such a conflict, the truth has to be settled by going beyond testimony to some other method.

As regards the first part of the argument, we may say that conflict, as the writer himself has to confess later on, is not peculiar to testimony alone, it is common to all methods, more or less. As regards the second part of the argument, we have to say that conflict between two authorities may not always and wholly drive us to a foreign method; it may be solved through the testimony of another authority.

In some cases resort to a foreign method may be necessary. But this also is not peculiar to testimony alone. When two

perceptions conflict we may remove our doubts by a reference to the testimony of another man or to another inference based on a third perception. When two inferences conflict we may have to refer to perception or observation, for the solution of the conflict. And if in spite of these facts perception or inference can be regarded as an ultimate source, why not testimony ?

Neither can it be said that while the knowledge derived from some other method can be verified, the knowledge obtained from testimony cannot. In many cases such knowledge can be verified through testimony or some other method. But in some cases, (such as the knowledge of a past event that was observed by the speaker alone) verification is not possible. This difficulty also is common to other methods, as well. I perceive a colour. How can I verify my knowledge ? Verification of such a knowledge cannot be effected through touch, or taste or smell. If there be a second observer the knowledge can be verified to a certain extent, through his testimony. But if there be no other observer, verification would be impossible. And if the existence of some unverifiable cases does not affect perception as an ultimate method, why should it affect testimony ?

It may be said, however, that while there are at least some cases of perception (the 'hard data' of Russell, for instance) and some cases of inference also which are too certain to allow any doubt, there is not a single case of testimony the truth of which cannot be doubted and which does not require, therefore, to be certified by an external method.

To this we have to say that the fact that some perceptions or inferences are not (psychologically) doubted does not mean that logically they are absolutely free from doubts. On the contrary, if a single case of perception or inference has ever

turned out to be illusory, then absolute security has forsaken that method for ever and consequently, necessity for certification of truth is logically present in every such case whether psychologically doubted or not. So neither perception nor inference can be logically superior to testimony, as a source of knowledge. But if this distinction be not observed, we may say that there are some cases of testimony, as well, where doubts would be difficult if not impossible ; when a person says, "There is a tiger in the jungles," we may doubt his words. But when he gives a command, like "Come here" or asks a question, like "Where did you go"?, we have the knowledge of a command or a question, which we cannot possibly doubt. Here at least hearing is believing, and there is no need for certification from without.

We may conclude, therefore, on the grounds set forth above that testimony can be regarded as a source of knowledge as independent and ultimate as perception or inference. We have refuted the arguments against testimony, accepting the theory of validity that is presupposed in the objections raised ; namely, that the validity of a knowledge can be ascertained through an external method. But this theory itself is open to objection ; and it is held by some, on the contrary, that every knowledge vouches for its own truth ; i.e., that validity is self-evident. What is done by external verification or certification is not the ascertainment of validity, but the removal of doubts, which threaten the existence of knowledge itself. It is beyond the scope of this paper to judge the relative merits of these contending views of the knowledge of validity. Our thesis has been proved on the assumption that the former theory is true. But if the latter be true, the question of the ascertainment of validity from an external method being itself illegitimate, our conclusion would follow more easily.

If the above is accepted I shall consider my thesis proved and established. But I shall add here, in favour of testimony, something more which will appear to many as a very extreme view. I have developed this view elsewhere, but as space does not allow me to mention all the arguments in its favour, I will just state it briefly, if not for the conviction at least for the amusement of the members. I am of opinion that if philosophy is to be genuine philosophy it must begin with a belief in authority. It sounds absurd and dogmatic and anti-rationalistic. But really it is not so if we are patient enough to penetrate into the matter. Philosophy is nothing if it is not objective. Philosophy, in so far as it is rational, tries to establish views which will be acceptable to all rational beings. Every philosopher that we meet tries to make his views acceptable to others and is not satisfied simply by his own subjective certainty. Philosophy, therefore, is not one man's game ; it is a social affair ; it is not a mere soliloquy but a conversation. Hence the objective attitude of philosophy cannot be denied. But it is equally true that philosophy is based on experience. Whose experience, then, is the basis of philosophy ? It cannot be simply the experience of the philosopher. For then, philosophy must always remain subjective. The experience of the philosopher has at least to be compared with those of other persons and verified to be identical with or similar to them. But how can this verification take place if the words of other persons are not ultimately believed ?

Thus we find that philosophy is nothing without its objectivity and its objectivity cannot be secured without ultimately believing in the testimony of other members of society. It is interesting also to note, that if the modern sciences and the scientific philosophy which is fast coming into vogue be probed deep it is found that beneath the superficial crusts of rationalism and anti-authoritarianism, there is a fundamental belief in the experiences of other members of society—experiences

which no scientist or philosopher could know without believing to some degree in the authority of those members.

If the brief statement of this apparently extreme view be not convincing, let it not affect the stability of the more humble thesis which has been sought to be established before as the main thesis of the symposium, namely, that verbal testimony can be regarded as an independent source of knowledge like perception and inference.

Sabda Pramana or Verbal Testimony and The Mimamsaka—ii.

By

K. A. KRISHNASWAMY IYER.

In considering the testimonies to Truth the Hindu thinkers have classed them under three main heads :—Perception, Inference and Report or Verbal Testimony. Some additions have been made to the number but these fall under one or other of the three. Just as Perception may involve illusions, and Inference fallacies, so Verbal Testimony is liable to error and is acceptable only under special conditions. These are (1) the Veracity, qualification, and sincerity of the speaker or writer, (2) the nature of the communication whether verifiable or unverifiable (3) its ethical side, or effects on Life and conduct (4) its urgency or imperativeness. We shall consider some of these aspects in connection with the Vedas for which infallibility is claimed.

The validity of Vedic Testimony can be maintained only on three conceivable grounds :— (1) on the infallible wisdom and disinterestedness of its source, (2) on its own intrinsic merits, (3) on its accordance with Life and Experience, i.e., on Reason. The Hindu Logician advances the first argument. Vedic words are true because their source is God, whose power, omniscience, and impartiality entitle them to unquestionable authority. This position involves three postulates :—(1) God exists. (2) the Vedas are the words of God (3) the truths declared by them must be in harmony with facts of Life.

Now the existence of God is based on a time-worn argument whose inadequacy is patent. The world is an effect, ergo, it must have a Personal Being for its cause. Evidently this view is made possible through the exclusion of Time and

Space from the conception of the World—entities which as the presuppositions of all happenings cannot be said to have themselves happened. God as the Creator cannot have created *them*. Modern science resolves the world, into Space-Time as the matrix. But though the happenings in it apparently follow mathematical Laws, we are yet not justified in humanizing the source of these Laws and investing it with Wisdom and an ethical nature. Besides, even if casuality which is ultimately denied by Science, were extended beyond Time and Space, and God were assumed to create by His Will and the Vedas to be its expression, then the Will of an Omniscient being must be immutable and absolutely fixed. He cannot allow His Will to change with future contingencies, for then His Knowledge of the future must be defective. But if His Will were unalterably fixed, religious devotion and hope would be divested of significance, and the anticipation of His Grace would become absolutely unfounded. In other words, His Will must either include or exclude contingencies. In the former case, contingencies cease to be such. In the latter, his Omniscience will suffer. Thus the Logician's method of proving the existence of God fails to be convincing.

In the next place, what are the peculiar evidences on which the Vedic words are claimed to be those of God? There are rival scriptures making a similar stand. In the face of such an opposition a sole assertion however fortified by tradition can be of small avail.

Thirdly, the pure presumption that the Vedic words must accord with facts of Life, will not take the enquirer far on the path to a solution. For facts of external life, we depend on Perception and Inference: and even Vedic pronouncements contradicting them, when they relate to this realm, are unceremoniously set aside in view of immediate experience. As to the occurrences after death, Vedic statements being utterly incapable of verification are on the same level as the Revela-

tions of other Scriptures. Thus the Logician's defence of Vedic Testimony must be admitted to fail of its purpose.

The orthodox Hindus feeling that the Logician's reliance upon Inference to establish the existence of God and the authority of the Vedas is not the way to place them on safe ground, prefer to base their faith in the Vedas on the grounds supplied by the *mīmāṃsaka*. As the custodian of the Vedic Sanctity, and true to the trust reposed in him, the *mīmāṃsaka* has drawn upon all his powers of intellect and imagination to place Vedic testimony above question or controversy. Vedantins of all schools implicitly follow the trail and are thankful to be relieved of the task of independently establishing it.

Four arguments are put forward by the *Mīmāṃsaka* in support of the self-validity of Vedic statements.

1. The beginninglessness of the Vedas.
2. Their authorlessness.
3. The eternity of articulate sounds.
4. The unviolable order of Vedic words.

These are evidently grounds so frail that they do not seem to be inspired so much by what Mathew Arnold calls intellectual seriousness as by intellectual frivolity. They are desperate attempts to establish the superiority of Vedic testimony over any Truth-claims raised by heretical schools like that of Buddha. They are feeble reasons presented in logical form to satisfy the demands of the orthodox mind for self-defence—not the results of serious self-questioning. A faith in Vedic Tradition was an instinct with the Hindus and a sceptic was coolly ignored. Even at the present day, the Vedantins carry on discussions under the inevitable assumption of Vedic Authority, as a matter of course.

The first argument, viz., the beginninglessness of Vedas savours of mental inertness, and of indifference to the dignity of Truth. Beginninglessness is the common plea put forward

whenever an *impasse* has to be tided over. God is beginningless, the soul is beginningless, their relation is beginningless, Karma is beginningless, Avidya is beginningless, the World is beginningless, its relation to God and to the soul is beginningless, and lastly, Time, Space and Causality are all beginningless. In a wilderness of these beginninglessness, how is a rational and definite principle to be set up? Some of the famous disputants, the controversial gladiators, revel in this chorus of beginninglessness which by a tacit convention stops the mouth of both the opponents. The Vedas, however, must be reasonably admitted by all to be only a body of articulate sounds of which words are composed with some signification for man. How can they exist before man came into being? To allow the notion of their eternity to ride through all empty space and empty time without opposition is to riot in anthropomorphism. The notion of God with His concepts and Will is conceived on the same model—the model of man. The Vedas dealing with rituals, meditations and Truth cannot have existed without any relation to man, his conduct or destiny. Hence this argument has no intrinsic merits to commend itself to our acceptance. Again, what does beginninglessness mean? Does it indicate absence of reason or of cause? Why should the Vedas be causeless when their contents are concerned with a cause-ridden world? Granting their causelessness, how does that help them to be authoritative? While discussing their claim to reveal Truth it is irrelevant to trot out their beginninglessness.

The next argument that they are authorless is pure and simple presumption. Merely because the author is unknown, even if a single author could produce a mass of documents differing from one another in contents, language and sentiment, we cannot conclude that they are authorless. There is every mark of individuality in the different parts, proving that they are the product of separate individual minds. There are signs

of human foibles such as hesitation, opposition, humour and vexation, besides anecdotes, dialogues, familiar illustrations and references to a simple and primitive society with its traditions and customs. There are also remarkable instances of acute observation and of shrewd reflection on contemporary life. Still, in the face of these facts, let us concede that the Vedas are authorless. This may rouse ignorant wonder but cannot establish the validity of their dicta. The Mimāmsakas unlike the Logicians do not credit even God with the authorship of the Vedas. The Vedas are claimed to be independent beings, eternal truths embodied, and the very breath of Life to God. Are they self-conscious beings, then, spirits in the guise of sounds? If so, what warrants their veracity? Now, we might discern some sense in the view that they are the concepts or the thought of God. Their independence, on the contrary, makes them so many helpless and irrelevant entities, Laputas hanging in mid-air, reducing God to the likeness of a pure machine emitting automatically the eternal words like a Gramophone. Thus the speculative worth of the Mimāmsaka's position redounds to the glory neither of God nor of the Vedas nor of the Mimāmsaka's imagination.

As to the eternity of articulate sounds which is the third argument, we have already hinted that it has small force. Because the sound "G" can be always recognised as the same, it is contended that it is eternal. But colors, tastes, touches and smells can be likewise identified. Are these also entitled to eternity? Do they not exist only for a perceiving mind? In the absence of mind, do they not fade into a mere nothing? Modern scientists do not deal with these, but with a mathematical world of Time and Space, conceived to exist beyond colours and sounds. An electron has neither. It is mere Space-Time and as such, the matrix of all phenomenal existence.

To assert that a word is eternal because it is indissolubly tied to a concept which is eternal is equally futile. A concept implies and demands an embodied being to conceive it; and though it may be objective and eternal, it cannot bind itself to a word of one language, the Vedic, while Nature revels in infinite forms and names; and without the linguistic clothing, the concept is admittedly incapable of existence. Similarly, the formalized order of Vedic words is the natural result of long tradition and is crystalised by the demands of rhyme, rhythm and accentuation. The Vedas, ages ago, began to be set to music following the accent of syllables, and the process has till recently been going on uninterrupted. A large number of the Upanishads have yet to receive this final setting, and are at present recited in ways which pay no heed to the laws of accent which are inviolable in the Karma Kanda. In all ancient classical compositions, in Homer and Virgil, Shakespeare and Milton, Kalidasa and Bhava Bhuti, the order of words and the words themselves have become unalterably fixed. In the case of the Vedas, similarly, their ancientry, sanctity, and the awe and veneration in which they were held, naturally led to the meticulous care with which the sounds and their succession were preserved and the very words numbered—often, alas, without regard to their sense or significance. To found the authoritativeness of Vedic testimony on such fanciful and untenable grounds is not merely illogical but positively perilous. It may perhaps be affirmed that the Vedic language is the one fountain-head from which all others have been derived and that Nature or God thinks in that original language only. This contention only betrays how deep-rooted is the Hindu veneration for his scripture, and is more emotional than rational. The Jews and the Mohammedans claim a similar place for the Hebrew and the Arabic. What is there to decide the contention ?

The Mimāṃsaka must thus take a defeat on all the four

points of his defence, though we may gratefully acknowledge the meritorious service he has rendered in the exposition of the Vedic meaning. It is he that has set up the six canons of interpretation by which the import of a text can be determined; and the general effect of his performance has been to make men more rational and less superstitious, more bold and free, and less subject to text-worship, in their understanding of Vedic passages. His love and enthusiasm for action in preference to mere speculation has, however, drawn him into pitfalls, into one colossal blunder especially, which for its philosophical significance, we shall take leave to mention.

The Mimāṃsaka lays down one fundamental principle on which the entire Vedas are to be interpreted. As all knowledge is for action their main purport is to indicate the lines of human action: and whatever else we find in them, not connected with an injunction directly or indirectly, is meaningless. Hence assertive propositions can have no value by themselves, unless they support, lead to, or illuminate an imperative. For directions in our conduct we must solely depend on the Vedas: (1) because we shall otherwise have no common authority so universally recognised, (2) because there would be no more effective check upon arbitrary individual action, (3) because in matters relating to the career of the soul in and after Life, no living man can serve as a trustworthy guide. This rule rigidly applied made the Mimāṃsaka indifferent and even averse to philosophical speculation. Whether Indra and the other divinities were real or unreal, whether there was reward or punishment in a future Life, for deeds of this Life, concerned him not. It was enough for him that men should engage in action and obey the Vedic Mandates. In this, he agreed with Bergson who holds that Life is action, and that knowledge is for Life, not for intellectual or mystic contemplation. This intensely practical view superseded the need to justify stories, superstitious beliefs and

untenable doctrines relating to empirical facts ; and enabled the Mimāṃsaka to rise superior to every objection that might be conceived against Vedic assertions out of keeping with practical Life. Perception and Inference, he averred, were sufficient to deal with mundane matters, and Vedic testimony was valid only in the sphere of truths beyond their scope.

This tactical move took the whole world of opponents by storm. The orthodox felt themselves bound hand and foot to the scrupulous performance of action or karma, and without a doubt or demur gave themselves up to rituals and animal sacrifices enjoined by the letter of the law. Speculation and reasoning came to a stand-still. Life was to be devoted to works and nothing more. Then rose Buddha who set his face against this mechanical and heartless cult which rode *rough-shod* over the higher aspirations of the soul ; and declared that whatever might be the commandments of the Vedas, to kill was unethical, that Life was to be purified and sublimated by self-restraint and self-denial, and that release from the bonds of Karma could be effected only by an expansion of heart and a moral ordering of Life. This was a powerful set-back to the supremacy of Karma : and the rapid spread of the cult of the heart filled the orthodox minds with impotent dismay. The struggle lasted for centuries, till finally Gouḍapāda and more especially Sankara delivered a sledge-hammer stroke at the theory of action, and revived the dying embers of the Vedic faith, blowing them into a magnificent blaze. Sankara conceded that the Mimāṃsaka spoke a half truth. Ordinary life was really for action and Vedas meant to direct that action, but knowledge is not all for action. There is a knowledge which is inimical to action. Assertions, indeed, merely inform, but the information conveyed may not always be in furtherance of action. It may be of a kind that puts an end to action, renders subsequent action impossible. Such is the assertion "Thou art Brahman," by which the individual becomes divested of his

individuality and is absorbed in the All. It is the final step in the approach to Truth (Br. Sutras II, 1, 14), and the only explanation of the Categorical Imperative functioning in every heart.

An assertive proposition big with the Highest Truth must make an irresistible appeal to the human heart. No rule or power can inhibit its influence. Knowledge would forfeit its dignity and worth, if it had to be dragged in chains behind the heels of action. It would cease to be itself if it did not include Life in its entirety. In the sphere of duality in which we commonly live, Knowledge no doubt is a help to economic and social activity, but the Knowledge of Oneness rules out the possibility of action. An act then does not perish, but undergoes a metamorphosis. It is not any more of the kind desiderating a fruit, but becomes a free and spontaneous act which cannot bind the Soul to Samsara. (Bhagavatgita IV, 14 and 20). Hence the actions of an enlightened soul who realises the Oneness of all being, is not to be equated with those of the ignorant. They belong to a different realm, and are no actions in the ordinary sense. "The truth of Oneness," says Sankara, "cannot be subordinated to a physical or mental act, for, a mere conception of it will strike at the root of the duality which every act must presuppose." The injunctions of the Vedas must therefore be confined to the region of duality in which alone action is possible, and they are impotent where it is overpassed. The Hindu Dualists, however, do not stand to gain by Sankara's pronouncement. Their ultimate aim is meditation which is a mental act. Hence to them knowledge becomes narrowed in its sense and means knowledge of God's attributes for pious contemplation. Their failure to establish God and the Soul on independent grounds leaves them little choice. The Mimāṃsaka's grip on them is absolute. Sankara was thus the deliverer of Transcendental Knowledge from the icy hands of action.

Since his time the hold of Karma has been slackening and has long ceased to domineer as an ideal over the Hindu mind. Speculation holds up her head again and Knowledge remains victor of the field.

We shall now conclude. To vindicate the character, honour, sanctity, veracity and dignity of the Vedas which inculcate universal, immortal, and profound truths concerning the spirit, we cannot lean on reeds offered by way of arguments, but take our firm stand on the unique method of the Vedas to establish Truth and Reality, on their ethical perfection, and their subtle analysis of Life and Experience as unfolded in the shape of the three States intuited by man. Their testimony thus becomes irrefragible and final, for they testify to a truth verifiable in Life. Their veracity made sure of on this one point, reacts automatically on their dicta on the other points which by their nature are beyond verification. The authority of the Vedas as a whole can be thus no longer impeachable.
